Firearm Brandishing at a Motorist Requires Objective Fear, Not Actual Fear

People v. Ball (Cal., Oct. 26, 2026, No. S292969) 2026 WL 3202943, at *1–4.

A Reasonable Person’s Fear Is Enough

The California Supreme Court held that felony firearm brandishing under Penal Code section 417.3 does not require proof that the targeted motorist actually felt apprehension or fear. The question is objective: Would the threatening display cause a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances to fear bodily harm? If so, the fear requirement is satisfied. The particular victim’s emotional reaction is not an additional element. The court therefore affirmed the judgment reinstating the felony charge against Ball. It did not decide his guilt.

The Trial Court Dismissed the Charge for Lack of Actual Fear

On January 11, 2020, an off-duty peace officer saw Ball speeding, tailgating, and cutting off drivers in Mission Viejo. The officer photographed Ball’s car and license plate. At a stoplight, Ball pulled alongside the officer and pointed a handgun in his direction before entering the freeway. The officer called 911. An investigator later found a loaded handgun in Ball’s car and confirmed that both were registered to him.

Following a preliminary hearing, Ball was held to answer on two misdemeanor charges and a felony charge under section 417.3. The trial court dismissed the felony because no evidence showed that the officer actually experienced fear. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the statute required only objective fear. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve that issue.

The Statutory Text Measures the Conduct Objectively

Section 417.3 applies when a person, except in self-defense, draws or exhibits a firearm in a threatening manner against another person who occupies a motor vehicle proceeding on a public street or highway. The firearm may be loaded or unloaded. The display must occur in a way that would cause a reasonable person apprehension or fear of bodily harm.

The court began with this language. It refers to a reasonable person, not to fear actually experienced by the victim. That distinction controls. The statute identifies a real person as the target of the threatening conduct but uses a hypothetical reasonable person to evaluate its effect. Thus, the prosecution must establish an objectively frightening display, not a particular emotional response.

Other Statutes Expressly Require Actual Fear

The criminal-threats statute, Penal Code section 422, illustrates the difference. It requires a threat that causes the threatened person reasonably to experience sustained fear. Under People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228, the prosecution must prove both that the person actually experienced sustained fear and that the fear was reasonable under the circumstances.

Section 417.3 contains no comparable actual-fear requirement. The Legislature knows how to impose one. The court declined to add an element that the Legislature omitted, particularly when the statute’s natural reading already supplies a clear objective standard.

A Real Target Does Not Make Subjective Fear an Element

Ball argued that requiring threatening conduct against another person necessarily tied the offense to that individual’s perception and fear. Otherwise, he contended, the reference to another person would lose its meaning. The court disagreed. Identifying the target and measuring the threatening effect are separate inquiries.

Here, the officer was a real target who perceived the firearm display. But the legal question was whether a reasonable person in a similar situation, with similar knowledge, would have experienced apprehension or fear. The officer’s actual reaction did not determine whether the statutory fear element was met. This reading preserves the requirement of a targeted threat without importing subjective fear.

The Law Addresses Roadway Violence, Not Just Frightened Driving

Ball also argued that actual fear was necessary to fulfill the statute’s public-safety purpose. His reasoning was straightforward: A firearm display causes fear, fear causes erratic driving, and erratic driving creates danger. Without fear, he maintained, that chain breaks. The court found this account too narrow.

Threatening firearm displays can provoke anger or outrage, which may also produce dangerous driving. They can escalate into shootings involving the person displaying the weapon, an armed victim, or a bystander. Legislative materials showed that preventing freeway shootings was an important reason for enacting section 417.3. The danger therefore extends beyond a motorist’s fear. Requiring actual fear would exclude dangerous incidents that the Legislature intended to address.

Earlier Decisions Did Not Resolve the Actual-Fear Question

Ball relied on language in People v. Lara (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1560 and In re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115 referring to fear or a person’s reaction. Neither decision, however, addressed whether objective and subjective fear were both required. Their language did not answer the question presented here.

Lara concerned whether the victim under section 417.3 must occupy a motor vehicle, rather than merely be near an occupied vehicle. Michael D. concerned imitation-firearm brandishing under section 417.4 and whether a bystander’s apprehension or fear could suffice. It also assessed the evidence in objective terms: whether a reasonable person in the victim’s position would have feared bodily harm. The Supreme Court declined to treat language addressing different issues as establishing an additional element.

The Felony Charge Could Proceed Without Proof of Actual Fear

The preliminary-hearing evidence supported an inference that a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have experienced apprehension or fear. The magistrate therefore properly held Ball to answer on the felony charge. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The practical rule is limited but clear: Section 417.3 does not require proof of actual fear, although its other requirements remain. The decision allowed prosecution of the charge; it was not a finding of guilt.

Caution: This summary is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for advice about your specific circumstances.