Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 16, 2026, No. E086779) 2026 WL 1029464, at *1

Summary: Petitioner, the People of the State of California, filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to vacate the order issued on August 12, 2025, denying their request to disqualify the Honorable Samah Shouka from further action in the case of real party in interest Russell Austin. Austin was charged in 2018 with first degree murder and the People sought the death penalty. Austin filed a claim under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), a prima facie case had been found and RJA discovery was ordered. Judge Shouka was assigned to Austin’s case to conduct the evidentiary hearing. Judge Shouka was a former deputy district attorney employed by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office (DAO) in the homicide unit. The People sought to disqualify Judge Shouka from presiding over Austin’s case based on provisions in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. The People claimed that that Judge Shouka had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; she served as a lawyer for a party in a proceeding that involved the same issues as in the present proceeding; and facts and circumstances exist that would lead a person to reasonably doubt that Judge Shouka would be impartial in these proceedings. The Honorable Jeffrey B. Jones was assigned to decide the request for disqualification and entered an order on August 12, 2025, denying the request.

The People filed a petition for writ of mandate (Petition) asking the appellate court to reverse the order denying the request to disqualify Judge Shouka and issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its August 12, 2025, order. The People requested a stay of the proceedings until the issue has been resolved by this court. The Court of Appeal granted the requested stay and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The Court of Appeal granted the Petition finding that Judge Shouka’s previous employment with the DAO might cause a person to reasonably entertain a doubt that she would be able to be impartial at the RJA evidentiary hearing within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAVELL TYRONE PLAYER, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 6, 2026, No. B342239) 2026 WL 936879, at *1

Summary: Player appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95, (now section 1172.6). In his last appeal, the Courtheld substantial evidence did not support the resentencing court’s finding defendant aided and abetted murder and remanded for consideration of the alternative theories that defendant was the actual killer or a major participant in the underlying robbery acting with reckless disregard for human life. The resentencing court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under both alternative theories, and therefore ineligible for resentencing.

On appeal, Player argues the jury’s findings at his trial collaterally estopped the resentencing court from finding he was the actual killer. The jury found not true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and also found not true a robbery special circumstance that, as the jury was instructed, required a finding that defendant personally killed the victim. Player also argues substantial evidence did not support either the actual-killer or major participant/reckless indifference findings.

People v. Perez (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 19, 2026, No. H053314) 2026 WL 777180, at *1

Summary: A police officer’s decision to impound a driver’s vehicle pursuant to the Vehicle Code solely to prevent further illegal driving does not satisfy the community caretaking function.

Perez pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The police found drugs in Perez’s vehicle during an impoundment and inventory search following a traffic stop. The police also found a firearm and more drugs when later executing a search warrant on a hotel room linked to Perez.

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; JOB URIAH TAYLOR, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 5, 2026, No. B346062) 2026 WL 622265

Summary: Penal Code section 1001.36 authorizes a court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder who agrees to comply with mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)) and will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Taylor with several counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, alleging Taylor viciously attacked four individuals with a metal pipe. The defense moved for mental health diversion to a community facility, supported by a psychological evaluation that Taylor suffered a treatable schizoaffective disorder but would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment.”

People v. Morgan (Cal., Feb. 26, 2026, No. S286493) 2026 WL 533311, at *1–2

Summary: During a confrontation with law enforcement, Morgan aimed a firearm at police officers, “racked” its slide, and pulled the trigger. The weapon did not discharge and when officers eventually recovered it, it was unloaded. Defendant was convicted of resisting an officer by “the use of force or violence” under Penal Code section 69, subdivision (a).  On appeal of his conviction, he argues  that assault (§ 240) is a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Because there was no evidence the weapon was loaded, he could not be convicted of assault and therefore could not be convicted of resisting an officer under section 69, subdivision (a) (section 69(a)).

The California Supremd Court concluded that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Resisting  by force or violence does not require the “present ability” (§ 240) to commit a violent injury, an essential element of assault. s this interpretation.

People v. Zapata (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 10, 2026, No. D084024) 2026 WL 366837, at *1

Summary: A “Perkins operation” is when an undercover operative is placed in a cell with the suspect to obtain information from the suspect. The term derives its name from Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (Perkins).

During a Perkins operation, Zapata admitted to two undercover officers that he murdered Justin Triplett. A jury who heard a recording of Zapata’s confession convicted Zapata of second degree murder. On appeal, Zapata argues the trial court’s admission of his statements violated Miranda because he had invoked his right to an attorney, he did not waive that right when he spoke with the undercover agents, and the involvement of a known law enforcement officer transformed the operation into a custodial interrogation. The Court of Appeal agreed.

People v. Heaps (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 2, 2026, No. B329296) 2026 WL 266465, at *1–4

Summary: The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel applies in state criminal trials. (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S.) That right is violated when a judge communicates with a jury during deliberations “without affording defendant and counsel an opportunity to be present.  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69. (Hawthorne).)

Here, the trial court judge sent the judicial assistant, (the JA), into the jury room to speak to the jury about the foreperson’s (Juror No. 4’s) note describing the jurors’ collective concern that a juror (Juror No. 15) did not speak English sufficiently to deliberate and had already made up his mind (the Note). The trial judge did not inquire of the jury or inform trial counsel of the Note’s existence. The JA’s conversations about the Note with the jury were not transcribed.

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; HAILEY MORGAN LASHELLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 9, 2026, No. E086512) 2026 WL 73966, at *1–4

Summary: Lashelle (defendant) was charged by Petitioner Riverside County District Attorney’s office (the People) with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b).) Lashelle  filed a motion to dismiss arguing that she was denied her right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant contributed to any delay by failing to appear per her signed promises to appear.

Lashelle filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking review with the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court (Appellate Division). A divided panel of the Appellate Division concluded that the People’s failure to file a formal misdemeanor complaint within 25 days of defendant’s citation as specified in Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed and automatically relieved defendant of any obligation to appear. The Appellate Division ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and to reconsider defendant’s motion consistent with the Appellate Division’s conclusion.