Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

In re Nguyen (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 27, 2024, No. B329158) 2024 WL 4901809, at *1

Summary: Nguyen was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of parole. Penal Code section 3046 establishes a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for when that hearing will occur. Additionally, because Nguyen was under 26 years of age when he committed his crimes, Nguyen is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3051 establishes a youth parole eligible date (YPED) for when that hearing will occur. Nguyen thus has two parole hearing dates, one set by the MEPD and the other by the YPED. Per California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) regulations, Nguyen can earn good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational merit credit, and extraordinary conduct credit to bring forward his MEPD. However, those same regulations provide that only educational merit credit can bring forward his YPED; good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct credit do not impact a youth inmate’s YPED.

Nguyen petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, it granted review, and the court ordered the Court of Appeal to issue an order to show cause.

Sanchez v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 22, 2024, No. E083015) 2024 WL 4717472, at *1–2

Summary: Sanchez filed for a writ of mandate ordering respondent superior court to vacate its order directing the San Bernardino County Public Defender (public defender) to assign a new attorney from its office to represent him in his criminal proceedings. The trial court issued the order after receiving evidence that the deputy public defender currently assigned to represent him made remarks citing Sanchez’s race as a factor to consider during plea negotiations, potentially in violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) (Pen. Code,1 § 745). The Court held that Sanchez failed to establish an abuse of discretion calling for reversal of the trial court’s order and denied  the petition.

Background

Mountain View Police Department v. Krepchin (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 4, 2024, No. H050872) 2024 WL 4664207

Summary:Police department filed application for emergency gun violence protective order against Krepchin , and after it was issued, applied for three-year gun violence restraining order (GVRO). The Superior Court, Santa Clara County, granted GVRO, and defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeal held that:

People v. Serrano (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 29, 2024, No. C100856) 2024 WL 4611666, at *1

Summary: Serrano appealed from an order denying a stand-alone postjudgment motion for discovery related to potential violations of the California Racial Justice Act (Act). (Pen. Code,§ 745, subd. (d).) The issue is whether the trial court’s order is appealable. The trial court denied Serrano’s motion on the merits. The Court of Appeal addressed the threshold question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion in the first instance and concluded that it did and that the Act permits a defendant to file a stand-alone postjudgment discovery motion before filing a habeas corpus petition. This Court agreed with the holding of Division One of the Fourth Appellate District in In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071, petition for review pending, petition filed October 11, 2024, S287339 (Montgomery), that an order denying a postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable, while disagreeing with their conclusion that the trial court lacks authority to entertain the motion. The Act’s plain language permits discovery, and in doing so, it does not differentiate between preconviction and postconviction proceedings. The Act’s language contemplates that discovery has occurred before a defendant files a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 1054.9 as allowing discovery prior to filing a habeas corpus petition and for review of a discovery order in mandate rather than by appeal supports this conclusion. (See In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, 688, (Steele).) Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Price v. Superior Court of Butte County (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 23, 2024, No. C100920) 2024 WL 4553015, at *1–4

Summary: In 2006, Price was admitted to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator. In 2022, the superior court found that Price was suitable for conditional release. Later, before placing Price in the community, the superior court reconsidered its order granting Price’s petition for conditional release, held a new hearing, and found him unsuitable.

Price argues that the superior court erred in denying him the assistance of experts in defending his suitability at the contested hearing. Price also contends that the superior court erred in subsequently finding him unsuitable for conditional release, because the ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court of Appeal found that the trial court erred in finding Price unsuitable for conditional release and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order.

People v. Nuno (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2024, No. H051205) 2024 WL 4512214, at *1

Summary:  The issue in this appeal was whether Nuno, under Penal Code section 1172.6, may obtain discovery of material, exculpatory evidence in peace officer personnel records under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) through a motion pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

Nuno pleaded no contest to attempted murder (§§ 664, 187) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

People v. Moseley (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 8, 2024, No. G062697) 2024 WL 4440601

Summary: Mosley was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offense of murder. Mosley appealed. The Court of Appeal held that trial court was statutorily required to consider Mosley’s service-related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in determining eligibility for probation and in sentencing.

Service related PTSD as a factor in mitigation

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL HERSOM, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 26, 2024, No. A168129) 2024 WL 4313709, at *1

Summary:  Hersom was convicted by a jury in San Francisco Superior Courtof felony counts of vehicle burglary and being a felon in possession of tear gas and a misdemeanor count of receiving stolen property. Hersom, incarcerated in jail did not appear on the second day of jury selection. The bailiff informed the trial court he had received notice that Hersom refused to be transported, and the court found that Hersom’s absence was voluntary under Penal Code 1043.1. The court denied the parties’ request for a continuance and proceeded with jury selection. Hersom failed to appear the following day and the court continued all further substantive proceedings until he returned. Other than one day of jury selection, Hersom was present for the whole trial.

On appeal, Hersom claims that his constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the trial was violated. Hersom claims that the trial court lacked sufficient evidence to find that he was voluntarily absent and abused its discretion by not granting the requested continuance.

People v. Turntine (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct., June 24, 2024, No. CA296018) 2024 WL 4143869

Summary: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude expert testimony of toxicologist who testified that all individuals were impaired for purposes of driving at .05% BAC;

Statement of the Case

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