San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Cabalar (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 16, 2025, No. G065108) 2025 WL 3640515, at *1–2

Summary: Penal Code section 1001.36 creates a mental health diversion program has put in place a pretrial means of getting individuals mental health treatment and resources that meet their needs in order to reduce recidivism and advance public safety. Cabalar appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion for mental health diversion. The court found he met all statutory eligibility and suitability criteria but exercised “residual discretion” to deny the motion based on public safety concerns and a perceived inability of courts to monitor individuals during the period of diversion.

Cabalar argues the trial court had no authority to deny diversion once it concluded he met the statutorily specified eligibility and suitability criteria. He also contends the court abused its discretion by relying on matters inconsistent with the purposes of the mental health diversion statute and an incorrect statement about court oversight during diversion. Although a grant of diversion is discretionary even if a defendant meets all eligibility and suitability criteria specified in the statute: a court’s discretion must be exercised in a manner consistent with the principles and purposes of the legislation, which includes having mental health diversion apply as broadly as possible. In this case denial of diversion was based on findings unsupported by substantial evidence, matters inconsistent with legislative policy and purpose, and a misunderstanding of a characteristic of the diversion program. Here, the denial of diversion was an abuse of discretion. The judgment was reversed and remanded with directions that, absent any evidence of changed circumstances since the original denial that affect Cabalar’s eligibility or suitability for diversion, the court grant his diversion motion.

Kuhnel v. Appellate Division of Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 17, 2025, No. A163307) 2025 WL 3652126, at *1–2

Summary: Kuhnel seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to terminate her probation on the ground she is entitled to the retroactive benefit of a statutory amendment reducing the length of probationary terms. Formerly, the law generally allowed a court to place a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor on probation for up to three years. (Pen. Code, former § 1203a.) Effective January 1, 2021, this default period was reduced to one year. (Pen. Code, § 1203a.) The California Supreme Court held that because Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to cases that are not yet final, it reduces the length of probationary terms imposed before the new law went into effect and authorizes relief from the consequences of a probationer’s acts committed beyond the new maximum period. (People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 205, 210–211 (Faial).)

Kuhnel was originally placed on three years’ probation and allegedly violated its terms during the first year of her probation. The court responded by summarily revoking probation, but not until early in the second year. These events all occurred well before Assembly Bill 1950 was enacted or went into effect, and they were appropriate under then-governing law. (See § 1203.3, subd. (a).) The issue is whether the rule of retroactivity prevents the court from adjudicating the violation, alleged to have occurred during the period when probation was unquestionably proper, on the ground that probation was not summarily revoked until after the maximum probationary period allowed under Assembly Bill 1950.

In re LATASHA RILEY on Habeas Corpus. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 12, 2025, No. A174426) 2025 WL 3563320

Summary: Latasha Riley was sentenced to four years of probation and a 60-day county jail term in a plea deal. She was referred to a work release program instead of serving jail time. Due to pregnancy she was unable to complete the work release program, and the trial court ordered her to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody.

Riley filed a petition for habeas corpus and the Court of Appealissued an order to show cause. Persons enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time have a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without due process. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481–482; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458.) Here, the trial court violated Riley’s due process rights by ordering her back into custody based on a critical finding — that it was not feasible for her to participate in the program — unsupported by substantial evidence.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRAVIS SCOTT FREDERICKSON, Defendant and Respondent. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 5, 2025, No. G064577) 2025 WL 3496331, at *1–2

Summary: The Orange County District Attorney appealed after the trial court vacated first-degree murder convictions and imposed judgment on lesser offenses of second-degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 1172.1.) The district attorney argues that vacating the convictions, on which the jury found true a special circumstance, violated a statute prohibiting judges from “strik[ing] or dismiss[ing] any special circumstance.” (§ 1385.1.) The Court of Appeal harmonized the statutes and held that vacating the underlying convictions did not “strike or dismiss” the special circumstance.

Facts of resentencing in trial court

People v. Cervantes (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 825 [338 Cal.Rptr.3d 309], as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 24, 2025)

Summary: Cervantes filed a motion for “rehearing” of denial of a petition for sentence recall and resentencing, based on statutory amendment adding convictions for attempted murder to crimes for which resentencing was permissible. The Superior Court, Los Angeles County denied the petition, finding that petitioner did not make a prima facie showing for sentence recall and resentencing and concluding that it lacked power to correct Cervantes’  unauthorized sentence. Cervantes should have been sentenced solely for crime of attempted murder, without a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life based on firearm enhancement. Cervantes appealed .

The Court of Appeal held that:

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HAYLEY MACKENZIE MURPHY, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2025, No. A172224) 2025 WL 3250744, at *1–2

Summary: Murphy filed to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17.1 The trial court denied her motion. Murphy appealed and argued that  the court erred by relying — despite language in section 1203.4, subdivision (c)(3)(C) (section 1203.4(c)(3)(C)) and section 17, subdivision (f) (section 17(f)) — on unpaid restitution to deny her requests. Those provisions provide that “an unfulfilled order of restitution” or “unpaid order of restitution” “shall not be grounds for denial” of such requests. Daniel argued that this language plainly prohibits courts from relying on unpaid restitution to deny requests for expungement and reduction. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed.

Facts

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN PEDRO GUEVARA, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 31, 2025, No. A170530) 2025 WL 3043419, at *1

Summary: In 2011, Guevara was found guilty of assault and other offenses after he attacked and threatened a witness in a murder investigation, and he received a prison sentence of 32 years to life that included various sentencing enhancements. Eleven years later, the trial court recalled defendant’s sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75,1 held a resentencing hearing and struck four invalid one-year enhancements.

On appeal, Guevara contends his counsel at resentencing was ineffective, in that counsel failed to file a sentencing brief presenting evidence or argument in mitigation. The Court of Appeal reversed and remand for resentencing.

In re ROBIN MATTISON on Habeas Corpus. (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 7, 2025, No. E085614) 2025 WL 3122934, at *1–2

Summary: A new statute that makes a criminal defendant’s restitution fine uncollectible 10 years after imposition does not require full resentencing because his sentence,  is altered,

BACKGROUND

Nevarez v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 27, 2025, No. D085897) 2025 WL 3002064, at *1

Summary: Nevarez drove while intoxicated and caused a collision that resulted in the death of a motorcyclist. The motorcyclist struck Nevarez’s SUV minutes after it was  disabled on the freeway. Nevarez was charged with second-degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),and  other crimes. Nevarez’s defense counsel filed a motion under section 995 to set aside the murder charge. Nevarez argued that under People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 545 (Chagolla), that murder could not be charged because his vehicle was inoperable at the time it was struck by the victim’s motorcycle.

The trial court denied the motion, finding Chagolla distinguishable. Nevarez filed a petition for writ of prohibition asking the court of appeal to overturn the trial court’s order. The court of appeal issued an order to show cause. The court of appeal agreed with the trial court that probable cause supports the murder charge and deny Nevarez’s petition. The court clarified its decision in Chagolla and held that liability for murder under the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279 (Watson) does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving.