Prison Law

May 31, 2026

Trail court denial of Compassionate Release for physically incapacitated inmate was an abuse of discretion

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES BRINSTON, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 28, 2026, No. A173470) 2026 WL 1493445, at *1

Summary: Brinston appealed from the trial court’s denial of his request for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Despite trial court finding that Brinston was medically incapacitated and therefore presumptively entitled to compassionate release, the presumption was overcome by its finding that Brinston was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The trial court relied on information from Brinston’s parole hearing three years earlier, when the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found Brinston had no understanding of his own criminal behavior and scored highly on certain risk assessments despite having some physical limitations. The trial court failed to recognize that Brinston’s physical condition had changed significantly and materially in the three years following the denial of parole. By the time of the section 1172.2 hearing, Brinston lacked any residual lower extremity function, was belted into a customized wheelchair to keep him from falling out, displayed progressive intention tremor, was unable to raise his shoulders, and suffered from fecal incontinence and constant urinary incontinence that was causing chronic infection of his thighs and buttocks. Brinston was also diagnosed with ankylosing spondylitis, a progressing and permanent condition that left him as stiff as a mannequin, prevented him from rotating his head, and made it difficult for his caretakers to perform basic hygiene for him.

Brinston’s physical condition removed any realistic possibility of Brinston harming others, even if he were still predisposed to do so as the trial court found. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s denial of Brinston’s request for compassion release was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

September 14, 2025

Removing a strike for eligibility for elder parole is improper

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Mills (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 9, 2025, No. 2D CRIM. B334998) 2025 WL 2601940, at *1–2

Summary: Mills, a convicted “three striker,” with a life sentence wanted eligibility for “elderly parole.” Elderly parole allows the Board of Parole Hearings, to review the parole suitability of any inmate who is 50 years of age or older and has served a minimum of 20 years of continuous incarceration on the inmate’s current sentence, serving either a determinate or indeterminate sentence. However, elderly parole is not available to those who sentenced pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667(See Pen. Code, § 3055).

If a defendant has two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, the term for the current felony conviction is an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12)

August 24, 2025

Superior Court does not have juisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence once judgment is final

by Uthman Law Office

Superior Court does not have juisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence once judgment is final

Summary: Issue: When a superior court receives a letter the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informing the court that the abstract of judgment for a defendant “may be in error,” does the court have jurisdiction to correct the sentence where the judgment is long since final?

Penal Code section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1),gives the court jurisdiction to recall and resentence a defendant in limited circumstances, including where the court acts within 120 days of the date of commitment or upon a recommendation of the secretary of CDCR, the Board of Parole Hearings, or other specified entities, but jurisdiction is limited to imposition of a new sentence that is no greater than the initial sentence. Appellate courts are divided as to whether, in the absence of a specific authorizing statute, a superior court has jurisdiction to correct an unauthorized sentence once the judgment is final. The Court here concluded that the courts in these circumstances lack fundamental jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence. The court can modify the sentence only if the court has jurisdiction under section 1172.1 or another authorizing statute, or by the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

August 17, 2025

Petition to Dismiss Parole Revocation on Due Process Grounds Must be Considered by the Trial Court

by Uthman Law Office

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER SKAGGS, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 14, 2025, No. A170942) 2025 WL 2356066, at *1–2

Summary: Skaggs filed a motion to dismiss his parole revocation petition on due process grounds, which the trial court treated as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied because such a motion was procedurally improper. The court then revoked Skaggs’s parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole term to terminate upon release. On appeal, Skaggs challenges the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and subsequent parole revocation.

The appeal was dismissed as moot because the Court cannot afford Skaggs any effective relief. The Court resolved the issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the motion to dismiss and concluded the court improperly determined it could not entertain the motion to dismiss.

August 2, 2025

CDCR cannot award credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates

by Uthman Law Office

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Cal. Ct. App., July 28, 2025, No. C100274) 2025 WL 2104730, at *1–2

Summary: In 2016, Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Cal. Const., art. I § 32) amended the California Constitution to give the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) the authority, “notwithstanding … any other provision of law,” to award credits for good behavior and for approved rehabilitative or educational achievements. It directed the CDCR to adopt regulations in furtherance of such authority.

The CDCR adopted regulations that: (1) award credits beyond statutory limits and (2) use credits to advance all indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates (the regulations). The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims (collectively, petitioners) challenged the validity of these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allow the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and petitioners appealed.

June 19, 2025

Court upholds reversal of parole because of incidents not resulting in disciplinary action

by Uthman Law Office

In re Rogowski (Cal. Ct. App., May 22, 2025, No. D084748) 2025 WL 1691929, at *1–2

Summary: In 2022, after he had served 31 years in prison, the Board granted Rogowski parole a second time. The Governor found Rogowski still posed an unreasonable danger to society if released from prison and, again, reversed the Board’s decision to grant parole. Rogowski filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal which issued an order to show cause. The Court upheld the Governor’s decision and denied Rogowski’s petition.

Judicial Review of Parole Decisions

June 8, 2025

Prisoner has right to consult with his attorney at resentencing hearing

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Grajeda (Cal. Ct. App., June 3, 2025, No. B337664) 2025 WL 1564615, at *1

Summary: In 2012 a jury found Grajeda guilty of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true gang and firearm allegations. The trial court found true allegations Grajeda had served four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced Grajeda to a prison term of 59 years to life.

In 2024 the superior court held a resentencing hearing under Penal Code, section 1172.75, at which Grajeda appeared remotely. The court denied Grajeda’s request to postpone the hearing to allow him to speak with his attorney. The court resentenced Grajeda to a prison term of 50 years to life.

April 9, 2025

Statements made at Parole Hearing are admissible at resentencing hearing

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Rodriguez (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 7, 2025, No. B332704) 2025 WL 1023731, at *1

Summary: Rodriguez appealed from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, contending that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made in a letter to the Board of Parole Hearings in 2011, and statements he made to a Forensic Psychologist in a 2016 Comprehensive Risk Assessment evaluating his suitability for parole. We find no error and affirm.

Im 1984, Rodriguez pled guilty to second degree murder. The prosecutor explained that the plea agreement was appropriate because no witnesses were available to identify Rodriguez as the shooter. The prosecutor also noted that evidence revealed Rodriguez was under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP) at the time of the crime, which may have entitled him to a voluntary intoxication defense.Rodriguez pled guilty and was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder.

December 1, 2024

Limitation On Credit To Advance A YouthParole Eligibility Date Do Not Violate Equal Protection Of Law

by Uthman Law Office

In re Nguyen (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 27, 2024, No. B329158) 2024 WL 4901809, at *1

Summary: Nguyen was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of parole. Penal Code section 3046 establishes a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for when that hearing will occur. Additionally, because Nguyen was under 26 years of age when he committed his crimes, Nguyen is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3051 establishes a youth parole eligible date (YPED) for when that hearing will occur. Nguyen thus has two parole hearing dates, one set by the MEPD and the other by the YPED. Per California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) regulations, Nguyen can earn good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational merit credit, and extraordinary conduct credit to bring forward his MEPD. However, those same regulations provide that only educational merit credit can bring forward his YPED; good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct credit do not impact a youth inmate’s YPED.

Nguyen petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, it granted review, and the court ordered the Court of Appeal to issue an order to show cause.

August 4, 2024

Misuse of tablets issued to CDCR inmates is not computer fraud or grounds to deny access to computers

by Uthman Law Office

In re JOSE OLIVERAS on Habeas Corpus (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 2, 2024, No. A168677) 2024 WL 3633748

Summary:Oliveras challenged a disciplinary report revoking his computer access and making him ineligible for computer-access-required work assignments or programming because of being found with contraband pornographic images on a tablet device.

The Court issued an order to show cause to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Secretary), requesting they address whether Oliveras’s conduct violated Penal Code section 502.2 In response, the Secretary asserts the petition is moot because Oliveras’s computer clearance was reauthorized. The Court disagreed and order the Secretary to vacate any reference to a section 502 and/or “computer fraud and abuse” violation from Oliveras’s record.