Articles Posted in New Case Law

Beale v. Department of Motor Vehicles (Cal. Ct. App., May 21, 2026, No. H052612) 2026 WL 1430603, at *1

Summary: Beale appealed from a denial of a petition for writ of mandate against the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) after it suspended his driver’s license for riding an electric bicycle under the influence of alcohol and refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test. Beale argues that an electric bicycle is not a “motor vehicle” under Vehicle Code section 13353 and that there was therefore no basis for suspending his license. The Court agreed with Beale that the statute does not authorize the suspension of an electric bicycle rider’s driver’s license, even if the rider refuses a police officer’s request to take a chemical test.

Facts: On August 16, 2022, at approximately 7:30 p.m., San Jose Police Officer Corini responded to a report of a man on a “motorized bicycle” who had hit a curb and injured his head. Officer Corini located Beale andsmelled alcohol on Beale’s breath and observed that he had bloodshot eyes. Corini askedBeale a series of “intoxication questions.” After initially agreeing to perform field sobriety exercises, Beale then refused to do several of them because of balance issues. Beale also refused to consent to a preliminary alcohol screening test.

Summary: The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended  Myers’s driver’s license for  four months for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more. (Veh. Code, § 13353.2.)  Myers appealed the suspension and an administrative per se (APS) hearing was held. An administrative hearing officer (AHO) upheld the suspension, concluding that the arresting officer complied with all laws and regulations, requiring a 15-minute period of continuous observation before administering a chemical breath test (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, § 1221.1 (title 17)).

The trial court overturned the suspension and granted Myers’s petition for writ of mandate on the ground that the observation period under title 17 was not satisfied based on video evidence from an arresting officer’s body worn camera. On appeal, the DMV contends (1) the court erred in concluding the video evidence rebutted the presumption that the arresting officer complied with the 15-minute observation period before administering the first chemical breath test; and (2) even assuming the officer did not comply with title 17, Myers did not establish the violation resulted in an inaccurate test result because other evidence of intoxication corroborated the chemical breath test. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Procedural Background

ROBERT MANN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 30, 2024, No. B328374) 2024 WL 4834847, review denied (Nov. 20, 2024)

Summary: The State of California and the California Highway Patrol (CHP) appeal from a judgment requiring it to revise its vehicle impound procedures. CHP contends the injunction improperly requires it to contravene valid statutes, relies on inapplicable case law, conflicts with the existing statutory scheme, and mandates unnecessary revisions to its notice procedures. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed.

Background

Clarke v. Gordon (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 12, 2024, No. G062856) 2024 WL 4163081, at *1

Summary: Clarke appeals from the judgment which denied his petition for a writ of mandate which challenged an administrative decision of the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to suspend his driver’s license. An administrative per se (APS) hearing conducted by the DMV following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) resulted in the suspension of his license. Clarke argues the administrative decision must be reversed because (1) the manner in which the DMV conducted the administrative hearing violated due process as determined in California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 517, 532-533, 292 Cal.Rptr.3d 608 (DUI Lawyers); and (2) his refusal to submit to either a breath or blood test should be excused. The Court of Appeal agreed with the first contention and reversed the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of mandate and on remand directed the court to grant the petition.

DMV Hearings and Due Process

Mendoza v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco (Cal. Ct. App., June 15, 2024, No. A170135) 2024 WL 3408756, at *1–2

Summary: Mendoza appealed an order denying a motion to dismiss misdemeanor charges against her for violation of the speedy trial statute, Penal Code section 1382. The superior court denied her motion based on the ongoing effects of the COVID-19 pandemic which constituted exceptional and extraordinary circumstances warranting a finding of good cause for the delay.

The issue of whether there was good cause for the delay was not properly before the Court of Appeal. The People conceded there was no good cause. Because there was no competent evidence to support the court’s order the Court of Appeal directed the superior court to grant the motion to dismiss.

DAVID AUDISH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DAVID MACIAS et al., Defendants and Respondents. (Cal. Ct. App., May 21, 2024, No. D081689) 2024 WL 2860272

Summary: Plaintiff Audish appealed a civil judgment after a jury verdict in an automobile collision case. The jury found Audish and defendant David  both operated their vehicles negligently and each party’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Audish. The jury found Audish suffered $65,699.50 in damages, including $29,288.94 for past medical expenses, $3,620 for past non-economic losses, and $32,790.56 for future medical expenses, and it assigned each party 50 percent of the responsibility for these losses.

On appeal, Audish contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he would have Medicare medical insurance at the age of 65. He also argues the jury returned an impermissible compromise verdict and erred by failing to award him damages for future non-economic losses. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims and affirmed the judgment.

People v. Serrano (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 28, 2024, No. A166011) 2024 WL 1320422, at *6–9

Exercise of Discretion Under Section 1385(c)

Serrano argued  that the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion under section 1385(c) to consider striking the jury’s premeditation and deliberation findings.

Ramirez v. Superior Court of Kern County (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 9, 2023, No. F082588) 2023 WL 2399712

 Summary: A driver petitioned for writ of mandate ordering Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to set aside its driver’s license suspension order following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Superior Court granted the petition. DMV appealed as real party in interest. The Court of Appeal held that:

Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) provision, addressing when a presiding officer can conduct a hearing by telephone, applied to administrative per se (APS) adjudicative hearing conducted by DMV;  APA’s provision, stating that a presiding officer “may not” conduct a hearing by telephone if a party objects, and regulation adopted to implement the APA provision in context of DMV adjudicative hearings, are mandatory, substantive procedural protections; and substantial evidence supported implied finding that motorist was prejudiced by police officer testifying by telephone.

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311 [303 Cal.Rptr.3d 670, 522 P.3d 1074]

Summary: After serving sentence, noncitizen filed statutory motion to vacate conviction pursuant to negotiated no-contest plea, because he had not understood immigration consequences of plea. The Superior Court denied the motion. Noncitizen appealed. The Court of Appeal, 2021 WL 2177264, affirmed. Review was granted by the California Supreme Court.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that noncitizen corroborated his claim that immigration consequences were a paramount concern when he entered negotiated no-contest plea.

ALICIA URBIETA ISLAS, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., May 20, 2022, No. H049445) 2022 WL 1597051, at *1–3

Summary: Islas was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a) and (b).) She moved for pretrial diversion under Penal Code section 1001.95, which gives judges discretion to offer diversion to misdemeanor defendants. The trial court denied diversion based on Vehicle Code section 23640, under which DUI defendants are categorically ineligible for diversion. Two appellate courts have published decisions finding misdemeanor DUI defendants similarly situated to petitioner categorically ineligible for Penal Code section 1001.95 diversion. (Grassi v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 283 (Grassi); Tan v. Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130 (Tan).) We agree with the reasoning in those authorities and will therefore deny the petition for writ of mandate.

Issue: Whether misdemeanor DUI defendants are categorically ineligible from Penal Code section 1001.95 diversion by operation of Vehicle Code section 23640.

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