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Articles Posted in New Case Law

Based on: San Francisco Chronicle, “A woman is suing S.F. for $50 million over a parking ticket, saying tire chalk is unconstitutional,” Rachel Swan, Sep. 11, 2021

https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/A-woman-is-suing-S-F-for-50-million-over-a-16450146.php

ALISON PATRICIA TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF SAGINAW, MICHIGAN; TABITHA HOSKINS, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants. (6th Cir., Aug. 25, 2021, No. 20-1538) 2021 WL 3745345

Pereida v. Wilkinson (U.S., Mar. 4, 2021, No. 19-438) 2021 WL 816351, at *1–2

Summary:Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Clemente Avelino Pereida for entering and remaining in the country unlawfully. Mr. Pereida sought  to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4), 1229b(b)(1). Nonpermanent residents must prove that they have not been convicted of specified criminal offenses. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) for eligibility. Mr. Pereida was convicted of a crime under Nebraska state law. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28–608 (2008). Analyzing whether Mr. Pereida’s conviction constituted a “crime involving moral turpitude” that would bar his eligibility for cancellation of removal, §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), the immigration judge found that the Nebraska statute stated several separate crimes, some of which involved moral turpitude and one—carrying on a business without a required license—which did not. Nebraska had charged Mr. Pereida with using a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment, so the immigration judge concluded that Mr. Pereida’s conviction was likely not for the crime of operating an unlicensed business, and the conviction likely constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Eighth Circuit concluded that the record did not establish which crime Mr. Pereida stood convicted of violating. Mr. Pereida bore the burden of proving his eligibility for cancellation of removal and the ambiguity in the record meant he had not carried that burden and he was  ineligible for discretionary relief.

Holding: Under the INA, certain nonpermanent residents seeking to cancel a lawful removal order bear the burden of showing they have not been convicted of a disqualifying offense. A nonpermanent resident has not carried that burden when the record shows he has been convicted under a statute listing multiple offenses, some of which are disqualifying, and the record is ambiguous as to which crime formed the basis of his conviction.

In re Von Staich (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 20, 2020, No. A160122) 2020 WL 6144780, at *1–2

Petition claiming San Quentin does not adequately protect against COVID-19 infection

 Ivan Von Staich, incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison,serving a sentence of 17 years to life for a second degree  murder consecutive to a 13-year sentence for the attempted murder.

People v. Valliant (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 14, 2020, No. G058568) 2020 WL 6054332, at *1–6

Summary: Valliant petitioned pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, subdivision (b),1  which authorizes  recall of sentencing for military veterans who suffer from military-related trauma and substance abuse, who did not have those factors considered as mitigating factors when they were originally sentenced. The court denied his petition on the basis that section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1)(B) (subdivision (b)(1)(B)) authorizes resentencing relief only for persons who were sentenced before January 1, 2015. Valliant who was sentenced in March of 2015.

Valliant argued that resentencing relief is available to all veterans whose military-related trauma was not considered at their initial sentencing, without regard to when that sentencing took place. The Court of Appel affirmed  the order. Subdivision (b)(1)(B) clearly specifies that its resentencing relief is limited to cases in which “[t]he person was sentenced prior to January 1, 2015.” It further specifies that “[t]his subdivision shall apply retroactively, whether or not the case was final as of January 1, 2015” (italics added). The statutory limitation is unequivocal.

People v. Brown (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 899, 904–910 [267 Cal.Rptr.3d 79, 84–89, 52 Cal.App.5th 899, 904–910], review filed (Sept. 8, 2020)

 Brown was convicted by jury of murder and at his sentencing, the trial court resentenced him for a  cocaine possession case. He was sentenced to  consecutive terms and the court  and applied Penal Code section 2933.21 (which prohibits defendants convicted of murder from earning presentence conduct credits) and Brown received no presentence conduct credits. It then awarded 923 days of actual custody credits.

Brown challenges the application of section 2933.2 to the period of custody following his cocaine possession charge and preceding his murder charge. He also challenges the award of actual custody credits. The Court of Appeal  addressed these issues.

People v. McCallum (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 30, 2020, No. B301267) 2020 WL 5810212, at *1

Resentencing under Penal Code 1170(d)(1)

Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) authorizes the trial court to modify a defendant’s sentence upon a recommendation from the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), the Board of Parole Hearings, or the district attorney to “recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced ….”

People v. Ogaz, 2020 WL 4581253  (Cal.App. 4 Dist., 2020) 07/14/2020; Modified 08/10/2020

Summary: Ignacio Ogaz appealed his conviction for and argued that his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses was violated by the admission of drug testing evidence. The Court of Appeal held that the confrontation clause requires that the defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine the scientist who performed the analysis.

Facts: During a search of Ogaz, a Police Officer found a large baggie in his pocket which contained a brown powder that looked and smelled like heroin and a white crystal substance that looked like methamphetamine. The Officer weighed the powder and crystals and determined they had a combined weight of 10.5 grams. A presumptive test he performed showed that the powder tested positive for heroin, and the crystals tested positive for methamphetamine.

People v. Barton (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 4, 2020, No. F076599) 2020 WL 4462790

Facts: Barton pleaded guilty to furnishing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and maintaining a place for the sale of a controlled substance (id., § 11366). Barton admitted to having twice been convicted of violating section 11379. In her plea agreement, Barton waived her appeal rights and she received a stipulated prison sentence of eight years eight months, which included a pair of three-year enhancements for the drug-related priors.

Barton entered her plea on September 25, 2017 and was sentenced on October 23, 2017. On October 11, 2017, Governor Brown approved Senate Bill No. 180 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) which went into effect on January 1, 2018. The legislation amended section 11370.2 by eliminating its three-year enhancements for most drug-related prior convictions.

Robinson v. Lewis, 2020 WL 4045925, Supreme Court of California, S228137, July 20, 2020

A challenge to a state judgment of conviction through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court must present each claim in a timely fashion. However,  California law does not fix a determinate deadlines. An indeterminate ‘reasonableness’ standard is used to assess whether a claim was presented in a timely manner.  In this case, Robinson, a prison inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his state court judgment in the superior court. Sixty days after the  court denied the petition, he filed a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal raising the same claims. The Court of Appeal denied the petition and he filed a new original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court. After a denial by the Supreme Court, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court challenging the same judgment. The petition was denied, and Robinson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Federal time limits and timely filing in state courts-Ninth Circuit Request for clarification.

People v. Shumake (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct., Dec. 16, 2019, No. 6093) 2019 WL 8128736

Stop by Specialized Dui Patrol Officer: Admission that driver had marijuana in the car

While on specialized DUI patrol Berkeley Police Officer Megan Jones stopped a Hyundai with no front license plate, a violation of Vehicle Code Section 5200. Officer Jones testified that she stops cars for traffic violations, to see if the driver might be impaired. She testified that Shumake’s driving was normal, and that he immediately and safely pulled to the curb when she activated her lights and siren, and that he was cooperative. Officer Jones testified that she has conducted about 800 DUI investigations, with about 500 involving marijuana.

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