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San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

July 12, 2026

DUI Causing Injury is not a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated

by Uthman Law Office

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTANA DOMINIQUE YANEZ, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., July 10, 2026, No. F090098) 2026 WL 1998663, at *1–3

Summary: Yanez argued that his convictions for driving under the influence causing injury should be reversed because that crime is a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The Court of Appeal concluded otherwise.

Yanez was charged with two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (counts 1 & 2, Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)), driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage causing injury (count 3, Veh. Code,1 § 23153, subd. (a)), driving with a 0.08 blood alcohol content causing injury (count 4, § 23153, subd. (b)), driving under the influence of alcohol in combination with any drug causing injury (count 5, § 23153, subd. (g)), driving without a license (count 6, § 12500, subd. (a)), driving without evidence of financial responsibility (count 7, § 16028, subd. (a)), speeding (count 8, § 22350), speeding over 100 miles per hour (count 9, § 22348, subd. (b)), and failing to yield the right of way (count 10, § 21800, subd. (a)). The information also alleged great bodily injury enhancements (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to each victim on counts 3 through 5, and alleged as to counts 1 through 5 that defendant had caused bodily injury or death to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558).

July 4, 2026

Blood Draw of Unconscious DUI Suspect at Hospital does not Automatically Excuse Warrant Requirement

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Castro (Cal. Ct. App., July 1, 2026, No. D085983) 2026 WL 1894067, at *1–3

Summary: The United States Supreme Court Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019) 588 U.S. 840 (Mitchell), held that where a police officer at the scene of an automobile accident discovers that one of the drivers suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is unconscious,“the officers’ many responsibilities may be incompatible with the procedures that would be required to obtain a warrant.” Mitchell articulated a “general rule” that exigent circumstances will “almost always” permit a blood test without a warrant.

In People v. Alvarez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 531 (Alvarez), the police officer encountered the suspect-driver at the hospital sometime after the accident. Alvarez held that the record failed to support a finding of exigency sufficient to excuse the officer’s failure to obtain a blood draw warrant. Here, an unconscious suspect-driver was first contacted by police at the hospital several hours after the accident, and the Court held there was not exigent circumstances excusing a failure to obtain a warrant.

June 28, 2026

Presentence credits may only be applied to a case for which a defendant is sentenced

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Cofer (Cal., June 25, 2026, No. S286297) 2026 WL 1830928, at *1

Summary: After a plea agreement, Cofer was sentenced at a single hearing on five separate pending criminal cases. Cofer had been in presentence custody for extended periods in some of these cases and for shorter periods in others. The trial court awarded Coffey custody credits in each case that reflected the time he spent in custody in that specific case. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that under Penal Code section 2900.5, he should receive presentence custody credits in each of his five cases for all the time he served in custody on any of these cases, except for custody time that preceded his arrest in a particular case. (People v. Cofer (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 333, 341–342, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 (Cofer).) The Court of Appeal held that the resolution of these cases through a single sentencing hearing meant that they all involved the same “proceedings” for purposes of section 2900.5, subdivision (b), under which “the custody to be credited” against a sentence must be “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (See Cofer, at p. 341, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.) This interpretation of the statute would result in Cofer receiving more than 300 additional days of custody credit on his six-year term, compared to credits awarded by the trial court.

The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 2900.5 and concluded that “proceedings,” as used in section 2900.5, subdivision (b), is properly understood as referring to an individual criminal case. Therefore, custody credit is not automatically applied across multiple, distinct prosecutions merely because those cases are resolved and sentenced at a single hearing. Here, the trial court correctly interpreted the statute in awarding credits in each case for the time defendant spent in custody in that matter, rather than awarding him credit in each case for time served in other cases. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

June 20, 2026

Court’s failure to explain imperfect self defense jury instruction requires reversal of murder conviction

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Brim (Cal. Ct. App., June 17, 2026, No. A170747) 2026 WL 1746369, at *1

Summary: Brim boarded a BART train and got into fight with another passenger, Williams, during it Williams drew a knife and attempted to stab Brim. Brim gained control of the knife, fatally stabbed Williams in the head and neck, and ran from the train. The fight was captured on two BART surveillance cameras.

Brim was charged with murder and tried by jury, where he testified that he had acted in self-defense. The jury found him guilty of second degree murder and he was later sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. Brim asserted that the trial court erred in: instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3474 regarding the right to self-defense, and in responding to the jury’s question about that instruction during its deliberations. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially erred in responding to the jury’s question regarding CALCRIM No. 3474, and reversed Brim’s murder conviction. The Court also concluded that there was substantial evidence to support that conviction, so People may retry Brim for murder. If they elect not to do so, the Court directed that the judgment be modified to reflect a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

June 14, 2026

Trail court properly denied Mental Health Diversion bases on failure at previous diversion programs

by Uthman Law Office

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH CHARLES RUSSO, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 22, 2026, No. C103388) 2026 WL 1459441, at *1

Summary: Russo appealed the trial court’s denial of his request for mental health diversion. (See Pen. Code,2 § 1001.36.) The Court of Appeal affirmed in a published decision.

Russo was charged with dissuading a witness by force or threat, cruelty to an animal, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He had a prior strike for first degree burglary in 2013.

June 7, 2026

Racial Justice Act Violation requires reversal of death penalty

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Bankston (Cal., June 1, 2026, No. S044739) 2026 WL 1530539, at *1

Summary: This appeal is automatic from a death sentence.

The California Supreme Court finds that the penalty phase in this case violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a), and requires reversal of the judgment of death.

May 31, 2026

Trail court denial of Compassionate Release for physically incapacitated inmate was an abuse of discretion

by Uthman Law Office

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES BRINSTON, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 28, 2026, No. A173470) 2026 WL 1493445, at *1

Summary: Brinston appealed from the trial court’s denial of his request for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Despite trial court finding that Brinston was medically incapacitated and therefore presumptively entitled to compassionate release, the presumption was overcome by its finding that Brinston was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The trial court relied on information from Brinston’s parole hearing three years earlier, when the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found Brinston had no understanding of his own criminal behavior and scored highly on certain risk assessments despite having some physical limitations. The trial court failed to recognize that Brinston’s physical condition had changed significantly and materially in the three years following the denial of parole. By the time of the section 1172.2 hearing, Brinston lacked any residual lower extremity function, was belted into a customized wheelchair to keep him from falling out, displayed progressive intention tremor, was unable to raise his shoulders, and suffered from fecal incontinence and constant urinary incontinence that was causing chronic infection of his thighs and buttocks. Brinston was also diagnosed with ankylosing spondylitis, a progressing and permanent condition that left him as stiff as a mannequin, prevented him from rotating his head, and made it difficult for his caretakers to perform basic hygiene for him.

Brinston’s physical condition removed any realistic possibility of Brinston harming others, even if he were still predisposed to do so as the trial court found. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s denial of Brinston’s request for compassion release was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

May 23, 2026

Driver’s license cannot be suspended for driving an electric bike under the influence

by Uthman Law Office

Beale v. Department of Motor Vehicles (Cal. Ct. App., May 21, 2026, No. H052612) 2026 WL 1430603, at *1

Summary: Beale appealed from a denial of a petition for writ of mandate against the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) after it suspended his driver’s license for riding an electric bicycle under the influence of alcohol and refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test. Beale argues that an electric bicycle is not a “motor vehicle” under Vehicle Code section 13353 and that there was therefore no basis for suspending his license. The Court agreed with Beale that the statute does not authorize the suspension of an electric bicycle rider’s driver’s license, even if the rider refuses a police officer’s request to take a chemical test.

Facts: On August 16, 2022, at approximately 7:30 p.m., San Jose Police Officer Corini responded to a report of a man on a “motorized bicycle” who had hit a curb and injured his head. Officer Corini located Beale andsmelled alcohol on Beale’s breath and observed that he had bloodshot eyes. Corini askedBeale a series of “intoxication questions.” After initially agreeing to perform field sobriety exercises, Beale then refused to do several of them because of balance issues. Beale also refused to consent to a preliminary alcohol screening test.

May 17, 2026

Search warrant for blood test is not invalidated by failure to inform magistrate of defendant’s request for a breath test

by Uthman Law Office

People v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App., May 14, 2026, No. H053051) 2026 WL 1347413, at *1

Summary: Does an officer’s failure in a search warrant application to inform the magistrate of the defendant’s request for a breath test invalidate the warrant authorizing seizure of a blood sample to test the defendant’s blood alcohol level. The Court concluded it does not.

Feghhi was arrested after his vehicle, speeding at 130 miles per hour on Highway 101 in Gilroy, rear-ended a vehicle driven by Vanessa Arellano, killing her. Officers obtained a warrant to draw a blood sample from Feghhi after he initially refused—though later consented—to submit to a chemical test. The blood sample, taken more than three hours after the accident, revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.14 percent.

May 10, 2026

Chemical breath tests are unreliable when officer does not observe driver continuously for 15 minutes when administering the test

by Uthman Law Office

Summary: The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Myers’s driver’s license for four months for driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 percent or more. (Veh. Code, § 13353.2.) Myers appealed the suspension and an administrative per se (APS) hearing was held. An administrative hearing officer (AHO) upheld the suspension, concluding that the arresting officer complied with all laws and regulations, requiring a 15-minute period of continuous observation before administering a chemical breath test (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, § 1221.1 (title 17)).

The trial court overturned the suspension and granted Myers’s petition for writ of mandate on the ground that the observation period under title 17 was not satisfied based on video evidence from an arresting officer’s body worn camera. On appeal, the DMV contends (1) the court erred in concluding the video evidence rebutted the presumption that the arresting officer complied with the 15-minute observation period before administering the first chemical breath test; and (2) even assuming the officer did not comply with title 17, Myers did not establish the violation resulted in an inaccurate test result because other evidence of intoxication corroborated the chemical breath test. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Procedural Background