San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., June 25, 2025, No. D085508) 2025 WL 1873313, at *1–2

Summary: in two similarly criminal cases, the People petitioned the court for writs of mandate directing the trial court to grant their peremptory challenges to Judge Cynthia Davis under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. This court issued orders to show case in each case and consolidated the petitions.

Judge Davis was then the sole judge assigned to the San Diego County Behavioral Health Court (BHC), a collaborative court that provides means for defendants suffering from serious mental illness to receive court supervised treatment under formal supervised probation. Here, the trial judges referred real parties in interest to BHC for admission screening over the People’s objection. The People filed their section 170.6 peremptory challenges against Judge Davis immediately upon the referrals. Judge Davis denied the challenges, based on a conclusion that proceedings in BHC are not hearings involving contested issues of fact or law. The Court of Appeal disagreed with this conclusion and issued writs directing the trial court to grant the People’s peremptory challenges.

Behavioral Health Courts History and Protocols

BHC is a collaborative court that utilizes evidence-based practices, treatment, and rehabilitative services with intensive judicial supervision to provide services to defendants who are suffering from serious mental illness. A team approach includes a judicial officer, a public defender, a district attorney, a city attorney, probation officers specifically assigned to the program, mental health treatment professionals under contract to the program, mental health clinicians from the public defender’s office, a court analyst, and a representative from the county Behavioral Health Services.

BHC was not created by statutory mandate, but rather through a joint agreement of the various involved parties to address mental health issues for qualifying individuals involved in the criminal justice system. BHC has no governing statutes. Potential participants in BHC are identified through a referral system. Upon request, and after the defendant is convicted or enters a plea, but before sentencing, a trial court may elect to refer a defendant to BHC for admission screening. The trial court may make the referral to BHC over the objection of the prosecutor.

At the first BHC appearance, the defendant signs a BHC referral form and an authorization for a release of medical records and information. The defendant then meets with a mental health clinician, who prepares a screening report. Prior to the defendant’s second appearance at BHC, the entire team reviews the determine whether a defendant is suitable for admission by unanimous decision. If there is disagreement, the BHC judge makes the ultimate decision as to admission.

If the defendant is accepted into BHC, in open court, the BHC judge issues an order granting them formal supervised probation. While on probation, the defendant receives services, such as stable housing, counseling/psychiatric care, and medication, when needed. The defendant must complete four performance-based phases over a minimum period of 18 months.

If the defendant violates the terms of the probation, the BHC judge holds a probation violation hearing, during which the court may modify the terms of probation or impose other consequences. If the BHC judge may revoke their probation and refer them back to the original sentencing judge for imposition of sentence. If the defendant successfully completes the program, the court will terminate their probation and may reduce or expunge the underlying criminal convictions.

Throughout its history, BHC has had only one assigned judge at any given time.

Peremptory challenges to Judge Davis under section 170.6.4

The People contend that their peremptory challenge was timely and in appropriate form, and that Judge Davis had no discretion to deny it. Broadway and Villanueva assert Judge Davis correctly denied their challenges because the plain language of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1) limits peremptory challenges to situations in which there is a pending trial or hearing that involves a contested issue of law or fact, and, as Judge Davis concluded, the screening and acceptance process is not a trial or a hearing involving contested issues of law or fact.

Section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1) states, “A judge, court commissioner, or referee of a superior court of the State of California shall not try a civil or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character nor hear any matter therein that involves a contested issue of law or fact when it is established as provided in this section that the judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against a party or attorney or the interest of a party or attorney appearing in the action or proceeding.”

Prejudice is established, for purposes of section 170.6, by a motion “supported by an affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury, or an oral statement under oath’ that the assigned judge ‘is prejudiced against a party or attorney … so that the party or attorney cannot, or believes that he or she cannot, have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).)

“As a general rule, a challenge of a judge is permitted under section 170.6 any time before the commencement of a trial or hearing.”

The trial court has no discretion to deny a section 170.6 peremptory challenge that complies with the statutory requirements and review of the trial court’s decision to grant or deny the challenge de novo, as a question of law.

Analysis of denial of peremptory challenges

The issue is whether BHC proceedings constitute a pending trial or hearing involving questions of fact or law (or, alternatively, an all-purpose assignment). BHC is a collaborative court and does not fit neatly into the common examples discussed by other courts in defining what constitutes a trial or hearing for purposes of section 170.6. In the BHC context, the BHC judge will always make the final decision as to whether to admit the defendant.  Although BHC is described as “collaborative,” it is not the case that the screening and acceptance proceedings are never contested. Here, the People objected to the trial court’s referral of both Broadway and Villanueva to BHC for consideration in the first instance, and it follows that they would oppose both their screening for and acceptance into BHC. BHC constitutes an extended sentencing proceeding, and when a new judge presides at sentencing, that judge is subject to challenge under section 170.6.

BHC proceedings may involve probation violation proceedings if the BHC defendant does not comply with the terms of probation. A defendant may file a section 170.6 peremptory challenge to a judge that presides over a probation violation hearing, if that judge was not the same judge the presided over trial or sentencing.

Once the case is transferred for screening, the BHC judge is assigned for all purposes relevant to BHC.

BHC proceedings involve judicial decisions regarding potentially contested matters of fact, and a timely section 170.6 peremptory challenge to the judge assigned to BHC must be granted. It is critical that we “ ‘preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the [collaborative] courts.’ ” (Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 973.)

Disposition

The Court issued writs of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its orders denying the People’s peremptory challenges and enter new orders granting the People’s peremptory challenges.

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People v. Rhodius (Cal., June 26, 2025, No. S283169) 2025 WL 1763117

Summary: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as person serving sentence that included one-year prior prison term enhancements for crimes that were not sexually violent offenses. The Superior Court struck enhancements from judgment of sentence but denied defendant’s request for full resentencing hearing. Defendant appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. Defendant petitioned for review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court held that statute mandating resentencing hearing based on invalidation of one-year prior prison term enhancement of any sentence “imposed” prior to enumerated date, unless prior term was for sexually violent offense also applied to sentences that were imposed and stayed.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARMANI MILLER, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., June 27, 2025, No. A170047) 2025 WL 1779185, at *1–2

Miller appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. In August 2020, Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement, and the trial court sentenced him to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, Miller filed a petition for resentencing. Following a hearing, the court held that Miller failed to make a prima facie case that he was entitled to relief and denied the petition.

On appeal, Miller argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition because he adequately alleged that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule made effective January 1, 2019. Although Miller’s plea and conviction occurred after 2019, he contends that he is still eligible for relief based on subsequent cases that recognized youth as a factor in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm because the charging document against Miller was filed after the felony murder rule was amended. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)

People v. Sinay (Cal. Ct. App., May 19, 2025, No. 2D CRIM B331391) 2025 WL 1692074, at *1

Summary:  Sinay appeals an order awarding restitution to a crime victim and her parents for horrible injuries and economic losses suffered from Sinay’s commission of crimes of torture, mayhem, corporal injury to a child, and child abuse. The Court rejected Sinay’s contentions regarding the trial court’s jurisdiction to award victim restitution, the constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and the calculation of the present valuerestit of the victim’s lost wages and affirm.

Factual And Procedural History

People v. Wagstaff (Cal. Ct. App., June 12, 2025, No. H050597) 2025 WL 1662576, at *1

Summary: A jury found Wagstaff guilty of felony false imprisonment surrounding a domestic violence incident. He was sentenced to a term of 16 months in prison.

Wagstaff, a Black man, contends the trial court violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act, or RJA) during different stages of the proceedings. Trial counsel did not object to any of these statements under the RJA, therefore Wagstaff’s claims were forfeited on appeal. Regarding a statement the trial court made at Wagstaff’s sentencing hearing, he contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object. The Court of Appeal concluded this claim had no merit because Wagstaff has not shown his trial counsel’s conduct constituted deficient performance.

People v. Duenas (Cal. Ct. App., May 27, 2025, No. B335274) 2025 WL 1502018, at *1

Summary: In 2011, a jury convicted Robert Duenas of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and it found true gang, firearm, and great bodily injury enhancements. The trial court sentenced Duenas to 23 years in prison, including four years for the firearm enhancement and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.

In June 2022, Duenas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence. In August 2022, an order to show cause was issued to consider why Duenas was “not entitled to have the Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement and the 12022.5 firearm enhancement stayed or have his unauthorized sentence otherwise remedied.” The trial court imposed and stayed the three-year great bodily injury enhancement, declined to stay or strike the firearm and gang enhancements, and left the six-year midterm on the substantive offense unchanged, reducing Duenas’s sentence from 23 years to 20 years.

McDaniel v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (Cal. Ct. App., May 19, 2025, No. A171858) 2025 WL 1428762

Summary: McDaniel, a Black individual, alleges he was disparately charged with gang enhancements due to his race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. McDaniel challenged the trial court’s order holding that he failed to demonstrate “good cause” to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to a potential violation of the Act. (Pen. Code,1 § 745, subd. (d).) The Court of Appeal held that:

1 defendant presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate good cause to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to his RJA claim, and

People v. Horton (Cal. Ct. App., May 13, 2025, No. B337373) 2025 WL 1378482, at *1

Summary : Horton was convicted of stalking and making criminal threats against Seiko H. He was acquitted of making criminal threats against Seiko’s father, John H. At sentencing, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (k), prohibiting Horton from having any contact with both Seiko and John, and an order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons. On appeal, Horton challenges the portion of the protective order naming John as a protected person, and the order directing Horton not to possess any deadly or dangerous weapons. The trial court did not err in including John as a protected person in the protective order, because there was sufficient evidence that Horton committed or attempted to commit some harm against John. The court mistakenly extended the weapons prohibition beyond firearms to any deadly or dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly and dangerous weapons, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

Jury verdict and sentencing