Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair
Andrew v. White (U.S., Jan. 21, 2025, No. 23-6573) 2025 WL 247502
Summary: Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, that Due Process Clause can in certain cases protect against introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence at criminal trials, was a “holding,” for purposes of federal habeas review of state court’s adjudication of merits of prisoner’s federal claim alleging that State introduced irrelevant evidence about her sex life and her failings as mother and wife.
Facts: An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband and sentenced her to death. At trial the State introduced evidence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant. Andrew argued in a federal Habeas petition that this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals denied the petition because it incorrectly believed that no holding of the Supreme Court established a general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. However, the Supreme Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).