San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

In re GERALD JOHN KOWALCZYK on Habeas Corpus. (Cal., Apr. 30, 2026, No. S277910) 2026 WL 1175320, at *1–2

Summary: California’s state and federal laws presume that a person charged with a crime will not be detained prior to trial. The California Constitution has recognized a right to release on bail since 1849. (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 7.)  California’s  Constitution continues to guarantee such a right, providing that a defendant “shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties,” subject to specifically delineated exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12 (section 12).) For noncapital offenses, these exceptions are set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12, which limit the right to release on bail in certain felony cases involving violence, sexual assault, or threats of great bodily harm where a court makes required findings by “clear and convincing evidence” of a “substantial likelihood” of specified harms if the defendant is released. (§ 12, subds. (b), (c).)  Section 12 also prohibits the requiring of excessive bail.

In In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135 (Humphrey), the California Supreme Court recognized that many criminal defendants who might otherwise be entitled to pretrial release were being detained “ ‘solely because’ the arrestee ‘lacked the resources’ to post bail.” (Id. at p. 143.) In Humphrey, we held that the common practice of detaining criminal defendants based solely on their financial condition violated state and federal equal protection and due process principles. The Court held that courts may not condition release on posting bail unless they “consider an arrestee’s ability to pay alongside the efficacy of less restrictive alternatives” to money bail. (Id. at p. 152.) We also held that while constitutional principles did not “categorically prohibit the government from ordering pretrial detention, … ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Id. at p. 155.)

Bobo v. Appellate Division of Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 22, 2026, No. D087393) 2026 WL 1102519, at *1

Summary: Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2)) after running a red light, colliding with another vehicle, and killing the other driver. She requested misdemeanor diversion before trial under section 1001.95. The trial court found Bobo eligible for misdemeanor diversion but not suitable on the ground that her negligent conduct caused the death of another person. Bobo filed a petition for writ of mandate in the appellate division of superior court. The appellate division  denied the petition. She then filed another petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal challenging the appellate division’s ruling. The Court issued an order to show cause and concluded Bobo was entitled to relief. A defendant charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter is eligible for misdemeanor diversion because it is not one of the excluded offenses specifically listed in the statute. (§ 1001.95, subd. (e).)

By relying solely on facts inherent in the qualifying offense and failing to connect them to the underlying purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, the trial court abused its discretion in deciding Bobo was not suitable for diversion.  Bobo  also demonstrated the absence of an adequate legal remedy and irreparable harm if relief were denied. The Court  issued a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order summarily denying Bobo’s petition for writ of mandate and issue a new order (1) issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, and (2) directing the superior court to vacate its order denying misdemeanor diversion and reconsider Bobo’s suitability in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.

People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 16, 2026, No. E086779) 2026 WL 1029464, at *1

Summary: Petitioner, the People of the State of California, filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to vacate the order issued on August 12, 2025, denying their request to disqualify the Honorable Samah Shouka from further action in the case of real party in interest Russell Austin. Austin was charged in 2018 with first degree murder and the People sought the death penalty. Austin filed a claim under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), a prima facie case had been found and RJA discovery was ordered. Judge Shouka was assigned to Austin’s case to conduct the evidentiary hearing. Judge Shouka was a former deputy district attorney employed by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office (DAO) in the homicide unit. The People sought to disqualify Judge Shouka from presiding over Austin’s case based on provisions in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. The People claimed that that Judge Shouka had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; she served as a lawyer for a party in a proceeding that involved the same issues as in the present proceeding; and facts and circumstances exist that would lead a person to reasonably doubt that Judge Shouka would be impartial in these proceedings. The Honorable Jeffrey B. Jones was assigned to decide the request for disqualification and entered an order on August 12, 2025, denying the request.

The People filed a petition for writ of mandate (Petition) asking the appellate court to reverse the order denying the request to disqualify Judge Shouka and issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its August 12, 2025, order. The People requested a stay of the proceedings until the issue has been resolved by this court. The Court of Appeal granted the requested stay and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The Court of Appeal granted the Petition finding that Judge Shouka’s previous employment with the DAO might cause a person to reasonably entertain a doubt that she would be able to be impartial at the RJA evidentiary hearing within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAVELL TYRONE PLAYER, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 6, 2026, No. B342239) 2026 WL 936879, at *1

Summary: Player appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95, (now section 1172.6). In his last appeal, the Courtheld substantial evidence did not support the resentencing court’s finding defendant aided and abetted murder and remanded for consideration of the alternative theories that defendant was the actual killer or a major participant in the underlying robbery acting with reckless disregard for human life. The resentencing court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under both alternative theories, and therefore ineligible for resentencing.

On appeal, Player argues the jury’s findings at his trial collaterally estopped the resentencing court from finding he was the actual killer. The jury found not true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and also found not true a robbery special circumstance that, as the jury was instructed, required a finding that defendant personally killed the victim. Player also argues substantial evidence did not support either the actual-killer or major participant/reckless indifference findings.

People v. Perez (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 19, 2026, No. H053314) 2026 WL 777180, at *1

Summary: A police officer’s decision to impound a driver’s vehicle pursuant to the Vehicle Code solely to prevent further illegal driving does not satisfy the community caretaking function.

Perez pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The police found drugs in Perez’s vehicle during an impoundment and inventory search following a traffic stop. The police also found a firearm and more drugs when later executing a search warrant on a hotel room linked to Perez.

THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; JOB URIAH TAYLOR, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 5, 2026, No. B346062) 2026 WL 622265

Summary: Penal Code section 1001.36 authorizes a court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder who agrees to comply with mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)) and will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Taylor with several counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, alleging Taylor viciously attacked four individuals with a metal pipe. The defense moved for mental health diversion to a community facility, supported by a psychological evaluation that Taylor suffered a treatable schizoaffective disorder but would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment.”

People v. Morgan (Cal., Feb. 26, 2026, No. S286493) 2026 WL 533311, at *1–2

Summary: During a confrontation with law enforcement, Morgan aimed a firearm at police officers, “racked” its slide, and pulled the trigger. The weapon did not discharge and when officers eventually recovered it, it was unloaded. Defendant was convicted of resisting an officer by “the use of force or violence” under Penal Code section 69, subdivision (a).  On appeal of his conviction, he argues  that assault (§ 240) is a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Because there was no evidence the weapon was loaded, he could not be convicted of assault and therefore could not be convicted of resisting an officer under section 69, subdivision (a) (section 69(a)).

The California Supremd Court concluded that assault is not a lesser included offense of resisting an officer by force or violence. Resisting  by force or violence does not require the “present ability” (§ 240) to commit a violent injury, an essential element of assault. s this interpretation.