San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Pomar (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 13, 2023, No. A167241) 2023 WL 5947909, at *1

Summary: Brooke Jenkins, an assistant district attorney (ADA), left the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office (Office) to join the campaign to recall Chesa Boudin, the then San Francisco District Attorney (District Attorney). After leaving the Office, Jenkins spoke to a reporter about a homicide case being prosecuted by the Office in which the victim was her husband’s cousin. Jenkins criticized the Office for its approach toward prosecuting the two alleged killers of her husband’s cousin, defendants and respondents Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins faulted the Office for dropping felony gang charges against Mitchell and Pomar and for failing to detain Pomar for the murder of her husband’s cousin. After Boudin was recalled, Jenkins became the District Attorney. The Office installed an “ethical wall” to prevent Jenkins from influencing its prosecution of Mitchell and Pomar for the murder of her husband’s cousin. Mitchell and Pomar moved to disqualify the entire Office from that case pursuant to Penal Code section 1424. Pomar also moved to disqualify the entire Office from his separate prosecution for the additional crimes mentioned by Jenkins in the newspaper article. The trial courts in both cases granted the recusal motions and disqualified the entire Office from prosecuting the cases. Plaintiff and appellant the People of the State of California (People) appeal from the recusal orders, contending both courts abused their discretion. Court of Appeal affirmed.

Facts: On June 30, 2021, the Office filed an amended felony complaint dismissing the felony gang count against Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins resigned from the Office on October 15, 2021, and joined the recall campaign against Boudin. Jenkins spoke with a reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle. The published article discussed Jenkins’s reasons for leaving the Office and joining the recall campaign. The article observed that “this is personal for Jenkins” because her husband’s family had been “devastated” by the death of Mallory.  The article reported that Mallory, “[a]ccording to Jenkins,” “was an innocent bystander in a gang dispute.” Jenkins then criticized the Office for refusing to file “felony charges of gang conspiracy” against Mitchell and Pomar in the Mallory case. As the article explained, Jenkins “wanted those charges filed against [Mitchell and Pomar], seeing them as the only way for prosecutors to make a case.” Because the Office declined to pursue those gang charges due to Boudin’s resistance, “Jenkins said she doubt[ed] the case w[ould] hold up in court.”

DEMOND FINLEY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 30, 2023, No. A167311) 2023 WL 5620093, at *1

Summary: The San Francisco Superior Court erred in finding that Finley failed to make a prima case of an RJA violation, where the police officer stopped and searched his car for being parked in a “high crime area.” An expert testified that “high crime area” was routinely used by police to conduct pretext stops of Black people for minor offenses to search for contraband, and SFPD’s own stats showing Black people were stopped and searched at a higher rate than whites.

The Court of Appeal set a low prima facie bar in RJA cases and held that the trial court must accept the defenses proffered factual allegations and supporting evidence as true and could not consider the DA’s race-neutral counter evidence at the prima facie stage. The court remanded for a rehearing applying the proper prima facie standard.

People v. Superior Court of Ventura County (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 16, 2023, No. 2D CIV. B326653) 2023 WL 5258663, at *1

Summary: Penal Code section 1238, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(8) permit the People to appeal a superior court’s post-preliminary hearing, pretrial order reducing a felony “wobbler” to a misdemeanor because the order is unauthorized and equivalent to a dismissal of the felony offense.

A “wobbler” is “an offense which may be charged and punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor ….” (Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64.) A “felony wobbler” is a wobbler charged as a felony offense.

People v. Suggs (Cal. Ct. App., July 31, 2023, No. C096555) 2023 WL 4861699

Summary: The Court of Appeal held that traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged when police officer saw temporary registration documents in window, realized defendant had not committed Vehicle Code violation that was purpose of stop, and then made inquiries aimed at finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Suggs appealed  from a judgment following entry of a plea of no contest to misdemeanor possession of a concealed firearm after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and methamphetamine found in his vehicle. On appeal, Suggs argued the detention that preceded the search of his vehicle was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.

Facts: Sacramento Police Officer Owen Anstess saw defendant driving a car that displayed only paper plates in violation of Vehicle Code section 5200 that requires a vehicle to attach license plates to both the front and back of the vehicle.  Officer Anstess initiated a traffic stop of Suggs because had seen the paperwork displayed in the window as required by law.

Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Francisco (Cal. Ct. App., July 21, 2023, No. A164180) 2023 WL 4673776

Summary: Nonprofit organization brought action against city, municipal transportation agency, and police department challenging agency’s policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets, moving for writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief. The Superior Court, San Francisco County, denied the organization’s motion. The organization appealed .

Holdings: The Court of Appeal held that: The community caretaking exception to warrant requirement was inapplicable to municipal transportation agency’s towing policy, and municipal transportation agency’s towing policy was not permissible under forfeiture rationale.

People v. Leal (Cal. Ct. App., July 25, 2023, No. C096463) 2023 WL 4729326, at *1

Summary: The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is fundamental. Generally warrantless searches are unreasonable. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576.) The automobile exception provides ‘police who have probable cause to believe a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.’ ” (People v. McGee (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 796, 801.) The scope of a warrantless search is “defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.” (United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 824 (Ross).) Whether a warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception depends on the facts,  because probable cause exists “where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696.)

The facts here were that the searching police officer received information via a radio broadcast from another officer that a juvenile on probation with a firearm restriction likely placed a firearm under the front passenger seat in Leal’s car before he  got into his car and drove away. Leal’s car was under constant surveillance from the time of the alleged firearm placement until the searching officer conducted the search. A search of the passenger compartment of his car found no firearm. Then, the searching officer decided to search the trunk, where he discovered a firearm. Leal was charged with several offenses and filed a motion to suppress the firearm; the trial court denied the motion. Leal pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The issue is whether the search of Leal’s trunk was justified under the automobile exception.

People v. Carney (Cal., July 20, 2023, No. S260063) 2023 WL 4630861, at *1

Summary: In People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834 (Sanchez), the California Supreme Court upheld the first degree murder conviction of a defendant who had engaged in a gang-related shootout that left a bystander dead. It was unclear whether the defendant or a rival gang member had fired the fatal shot. However, the Court  held that the defendant’s “commission of life-threatening deadly acts in connection with his attempt on [the rival gang member’s] life was a substantial concurrent, proximate, cause of [the victim’s] death.”

This case  involves a gun battle among rivals, but unlike in Sanchez, the evidence conclusively established that the fatal shot was fired by someone other than the two defendants who were convicted of first degree murder. The