Master Calendar Judge Who Gives an Indicated Sentence and Accepts a Plea Must Honor a Timely Section 170.6 Challenge

People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 13, 2026, No. B353018) 2026 WL 305914

Summary: The Court of Appeal held that a criminal master calendar judge who goes beyond trial assignment by offering an indicated sentence, considering whether to strike prior strike convictions, and accepting a guilty plea is no longer acting merely in a master calendar capacity. Because those actions involve contested issues of law or fact, the trial court was required to accept the People’s timely and proper peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The appellate court therefore issued a peremptory writ directing the superior court to vacate both the order denying the section 170.6 motion and the order accepting the defendant’s plea, and to assign the case to a different judge.

Parties and Charges

The People prosecuted Giovanni Garcia in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. 25CJCF05572. The information charged Garcia with one felony count of driving or taking a vehicle without consent in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). It also alleged three prior strike convictions for robbery and a prior prison term circumstance under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3).

Master Calendar Proceedings

After the case was transferred for trial assignment to Department 100, a felony master calendar department, the parties appeared before Judge Yvette Verastegui. Before the court assigned the case out for trial, defense counsel requested an indicated sentence. The court continued the matter and stated that it would consider the request. On the continued date, the People filed a section 170.6 motion seeking to disqualify Judge Verastegui. The court rejected the motion on the ground that a peremptory challenge could not be directed at a master calendar judge whose role was only to assign cases for trial.

Indicated Sentence and Plea

After rejecting the disqualification motion, the court proceeded to consider Garcia’s request for an indicated sentence. The court reviewed the information, preliminary hearing transcript, and probation report, and asked the People for additional information about Garcia’s prior strike convictions. The People explained that Garcia had three separate robbery convictions from 2008, had served a 15-year prison sentence, and had been released on parole approximately two years before the current offense. They had offered a low term of 16 months, doubled to 32 months because of the strike priors.

Defense counsel presented mitigating information about Garcia’s age when he committed the prior offenses, the passage of time, his employment and family circumstances, and the comparatively less serious nature of the current vehicle offense. The trial court stated that it would exercise its discretion to strike the prior strike convictions and indicated a 16-month sentence. Garcia accepted the indicated sentence. The People renewed their section 170.6 challenge, arguing that taking an open plea brought the court’s conduct within the statute. The trial court again rejected the challenge, advised Garcia of his rights, accepted his waivers, found a factual basis, and accepted his guilty plea. Sentencing was continued to permit writ review.

Writ Proceedings

The People petitioned for a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate Garcia’s plea and grant the disqualification motion. The Court of Appeal stayed the trial court proceedings, issued a Palma notice indicating that it was considering writ relief, and gave the superior court an opportunity to avoid issuance of a writ by granting the requested relief. The superior court did not do so. After briefing, the appellate court treated its Palma notice as an order to show cause and set the matter for argument.

Section 170.6 Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 permits a party to disqualify a judge based on a good-faith belief that the judge is prejudiced. If the motion is timely and in proper form, disqualification is mandatory; the moving party need not prove actual prejudice. Courts construe the statute liberally in favor of allowing the challenge, and a trial court has no discretion to deny a compliant motion unless the statute clearly forbids it. Because the trial court exercises no discretion in ruling on a section 170.6 motion, appellate review is de novo.

Judge Was Not Acting Solely as a Master Calendar Court

The appellate court rejected the premise that Department 100’s master calendar designation controlled the analysis. A master calendar judge’s primary function is to assign a ready case to a ready trial department. Judge Verastegui did more than perform that ministerial assignment function. By considering an indicated sentence, evaluating the circumstances of Garcia’s prior strikes, deciding to strike those priors, and accepting Garcia’s plea, the court acted outside the limited role of a master calendar department. The People’s challenge therefore was not an impermissible challenge to a judge acting only in a master calendar capacity.

Indicated Sentence Involved Contested Issues

A trial court may give an indicated sentence in a criminal case, and an indicated sentence is not a plea bargain requiring prosecutorial consent. However, the prosecutor retains the right to challenge the factual basis for the proposed sentence and to argue that the intended sentence is wrong. Here, the trial court’s indicated sentence depended on whether it should dismiss Garcia’s prior strike allegations under Penal Code section 1385. That determination required consideration of the nature and circumstances of the present felony, the prior serious or violent felonies, and the defendant’s background, character, and prospects. Those considerations necessarily involved issues of law or fact, and they were actually contested because the People objected to the sentence and sought to preserve their section 170.6 challenge.

Acceptance of the Plea Also Triggered the Statute

The court further held that accepting Garcia’s guilty plea involved contested issues within the meaning of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(1). When a court accepts a plea, it must determine matters such as whether the plea is knowing and voluntary, whether there is a factual basis, and whether acceptance serves the public interest. Prior cases had recognized that acceptance of a plea, even when not disputed in the usual adversarial sense, may involve contested legal issues because the court must make independent determinations before the plea becomes effective.

The court emphasized that this case presented an even stronger basis for applying section 170.6 than cases where potential conflict existed only between the defendant and the court. Here, there was actual conflict between the prosecution and the defense, and between the prosecution and the court, over the indicated sentence and the striking of the prior convictions. Once the court accepted Garcia’s plea, the plea functioned like a conviction and left only sentencing to be completed. For section 170.6 purposes, accepting the plea was therefore the functional equivalent of proceeding to trial on the matter.

Open Plea Versus Plea Bargain Did Not Matter

The trial court relied on the fact that Garcia’s plea followed an indicated sentence rather than a negotiated plea bargain. The appellate court concluded that this distinction made no difference. Prior authority had treated acceptance of a straight admission or open plea as functionally equivalent to a trial for purposes of section 170.6 because acceptance of the admission or plea can resolve the merits and leave only judgment and sentencing. Thus, whether Garcia pleaded pursuant to an indicated sentence or a plea bargain, the court’s acceptance of the plea still involved contested issues of law or fact and was subject to a timely peremptory challenge.

Cases Cited by the Trial Court Were Distinguishable

The appellate court distinguished cases involving rejected plea bargains and cases concerning proceedings that did not involve contested issues. Fraijo and Montalvo involved rejected plea bargains and the timing provisions of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2), which focuses on determinations of contested facts relating to the merits. This case arose under subdivision (a)(1), which more broadly bars a challenged judge from hearing any matter involving a contested issue of law or fact. Likewise, cases involving case management or settlement conferences did not apply because those proceedings did not require the court to resolve the kind of contested sentencing and plea issues present here.

Disposition

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its orders denying the People’s section 170.6 challenge and accepting Garcia’s plea. The superior court was ordered to enter a new order granting the peremptory challenge and assigning the case to a different judge. The appellate stay of trial court proceedings was vacated upon issuance of the opinion.

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