Failure to give jury instructions on speeding and failure to stop do not automatically require reversal
People v. Kazarian (Cal. Ct. App., July 30, 2026, No. E085048) 2026 WL 2198572
Summary: Kazarian, challenged his conviction for felony evading a police officer on the ground that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding the legal definitions of several Vehicle Code violations that were used to establish the felony offense. The Court of Appeal concluded that any instructional deficiencies were either nonexistent or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the judgment.
Background: In January 2023, Deputy Sheriff Gabriel Dominguez responded to a medical aid call involving an unresponsive driver seated in a pickup truck with its engine running. Emergency personnel were already present and attempting to contact the driver, Kazarian. As Deputy Dominguez approached the vehicle, he observed the defendant suddenly placed the vehicle in drive and nearly collided with a fire truck parked in front of him. He exited the gas station and drove away.
Deputy Dominguez entered his patrol vehicle and began following him. Kazarian accelerated to speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour and failed to stop despite the deputy’s visible and audible signals.
Excessive Speed
Deputy Dominguez testified that Kazarian drove at speeds well above the posted and statutory speed limits. The roadway involved, Kiowaspeed exceeded 100 miles per hour during much of the pursuit.
Stop Sign Violations
Kazarian approached a four-way stop intersection while still traveling at extremely high speed and did not stop and did not even slow down when encountering the stop sign. Kazarian approached another four-way stop intersection and again failed to stop.
Railroad Crossing
After the first stop sign violation, defendant crossed railroad tracks at extremely high speed and the truck became airborne, with all four tires leaving the ground and rising several feet into the air before landing and fishtailing. The deputy characterized this conduct as reckless driving.
Charges and Trial Court Proceedings
A jury found defendant guilty of felony evading a pursuing police officer under Vehicle Code section 2800.2. The offense differs from simple misdemeanor evasion because it requires proof that the defendant drove with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.
Issue on Appeal
Kazarian argued that the trial court should have instructed jurors on the legal definitions of the underlying Vehicle Code violations relied upon by the prosecution, including:
• Failure to stop at a stop sign.
• Speeding.
• Unsafe speed violations.
• Reckless driving.
Kzarian contended that without receiving definitions of those violations, the jury could not properly determine whether the prosecution had established a critical element of felony evading.
Legal Framework
The felony evading statute requires proof that a defendant fled from a peace officer while driving in a manner showing willful or wanton disregard for safety. One method of proving this element is demonstrating that three or more traffic violations carrying point assessments occurred during the pursuit.
The trial court instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 2181, which identified speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign as traffic violations that carry points. However, the instruction did not define exactly what conduct legally constitutes those violations.
Kazarian relied on prior appellate decisions holding that failure to instruct on essential legal elements can be reversible error when those missing definitions prevent the jury from properly deciding a charged offense.
Analysis
Stop Sign Violations
The appellate court first considered the stop sign instructions. It acknowledged that the Vehicle Code contains technical provisions specifying where a motorist must stop, such as at a limit line or crosswalk. However, the court found that those details were irrelevant to the case.
The real dispute at trial was not where defendant stopped but whether he stopped at all. Because the concept of stopping is commonly understood, the court concluded that jurors could easily resolve that factual dispute without receiving the technical statutory language.
Speeding Violations
The court next examined the speeding allegations. Unlike prior cases involving uncertainty about applicable speed limits, the prosecution here introduced testimony identifying the roadway’s speed limit and statutory maximum speed. Defendant himself admitted that he may have been driving as fast as 70 to 80 miles per hour.
The court held that jurors had sufficient evidence to determine whether defendant exceeded the lawful speed limit. The omitted statutory language would not have materially aided their determination.
Basic Speed Law
The appellate court did find that the trial court arguably should have instructed jurors concerning California’s basic speed law, which focuses on whether a vehicle is being operated at a speed that is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions. Unlike ordinary speeding, this offense involves legal standards that may not be obvious to jurors.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that any error was harmless. Even if the jury had received the omitted instruction, overwhelming evidence supported a finding that defendant committed multiple traffic violations. Defendant’s own admission that he drove well above the speed limit established at least one qualifying violation. Combined with evidence concerning the stop sign violations, a rational jury would have reached the same result.
Holding
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court either committed no instructional error or, where error may have existed, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The omitted definitions did not deprive the jury of the ability to decide the essential factual disputes presented at trial. Since no reasonable probability existed that additional instructions would have changed the verdict, the conviction was upheld.
Conclusion
The appellate court affirmed defendant’s conviction for felony evading a pursuing police officer. The decision emphasizes that instructional omissions do not automatically require reversal. Courts must determine whether the omitted legal definitions actually affected the jury’s ability to decide disputed issues. In this case, the factual questions were straightforward: whether defendant stopped at stop signs and whether he exceeded lawful speed limits. Because the evidence strongly supported the prosecution’s position and because the omitted legal details were not genuinely disputed, the court concluded that the jury would have reached the same verdict even with more complete instructions. Consequently, the judgment and four-year sentence remained in effect.
The information provided on this website does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice; instead, all information, content, and materials available on this site are for general informational purposes only. Information on this website may not constitute the most up-to-date legal or other information.
San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

