Court has broad power to impose probation conditions that serve justice and support the probationer’s reform and rehabilitation

People v. Putallez (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 11, 2026, No. A174094) 2026 WL 2674363, at *1–3

Defendant Joseph Kent Putallez pleaded no contest to theft of an elder or dependent adult by a caregiver. Under the plea agreement, the trial court placed him on formal probation for two years. On appeal, he challenges one probation condition, arguing that it gives too much judicial authority to the probation officer. We conclude the court set the condition’s basic policy and left only practical details to probation. We therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Sonoma County District Attorney charged defendant with three felonies: theft of a dependent adult (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (d); count 1), theft of a dependent adult by a caretaker (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (e); count 2), and grand theft of personal property (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a); count 3).

Defendant represented himself. Under the plea agreement, he pleaded no contest to count 2. In return, the prosecution dismissed the other counts and charges in two separate criminal matters. The agreement also called for 24 months of formal probation and a five-year protective order.

The probation report noted that defendant had recently been evaluated under Penal Code section 1368. He had received a diagnosis of “ ‘ “Other Specified Personality Disorder with Narcissistic and Paranoid Traits.” ’ ” The report also identified likely substance-abuse issues. It recommended that defendant take part in counseling and treatment programs, including drug treatment and cognitive behavioral services, as directed by the probation officer.

At sentencing, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for 24 months. One condition required him to participate in and complete assistance and counseling programs selected by probation, specifically programs involving drug treatment, psychological or psychiatric care, and cognitive behavioral therapy. The court told defendant that it had listed those areas because they appeared connected to his needs and because probation might be able to help him. Defendant indicated that he was already receiving assistance. The court then imposed the remaining probation terms, restitution, and fees.

Forfeiture

Defendant argues that the condition requiring him to complete counseling and treatment programs selected by probation improperly transfers judicial power to a nonjudicial officer.

Defendant did not object to this condition in the trial court. As a result, we consider only his facial constitutional challenge—a claim that the condition is invalid on its face and presents a pure question of law. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889.) We do not consider arguments that would depend on facts developed through an objection at sentencing.

Governing Legal Principles

A trial court has broad power to impose probation conditions that serve justice and support the probationer’s reform and rehabilitation. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j); People v. Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 302.) That discretion allows the court to tailor conditions to the defendant’s circumstances, but it does not permit the court to give away its basic decision-making role.

The court must decide the basic policy and nature of a probation condition. It may then allow a probation officer to handle details needed to carry out that policy. (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 919.) The condition cannot be completely open-ended. (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359.) This limit follows from the separation of powers: judicial authority cannot be transferred to a nonjudicial officer. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3; People v. Smith (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 897, 902.) In practical terms, the judge decides what the probationer must do, while probation may decide how, when, and through which suitable program the requirement will be completed.

Application

The condition here follows that division of responsibility. The court itself identified the kinds of treatment defendant must complete: drug treatment, psychological or psychiatric care, and cognitive behavioral therapy. The court also explained why it selected those areas, noting their possible connection to defendant’s needs and the help probation could provide. These limits gave the probation officer a defined task. Probation could choose appropriate programs and arrange participation, but it could not invent a new kind of required treatment. The condition therefore was not open-ended. It left probation only the details needed to put the court’s decision into effect. (People v. O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358–1359.)

Defendant relies on People v. Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 897, but that case involved a broader condition. There, the probationer had to participate in any treatment, therapy, or counseling program directed by probation, including a residential program. (Id. at p. 902.) The Court of Appeal held that probation could not decide whether residential treatment was required. Residential treatment may confine a person, separate that person from family and friends, and interfere with employment. Because that choice affects major liberty interests, a judge must make it. (Id. at p. 903.)

The condition before us is narrower. It does not authorize probation to place defendant in residential treatment or otherwise impose a new restraint on his liberty. Instead, probation may select programs within the treatment categories already chosen by the court. That practical role is appropriate. Trial courts are not well placed to track every available program, its schedule, its eligibility rules, or whether space is available when treatment must begin. (People v. Penoli, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 308.) Probation officers can manage those changing details while remaining bound by the court’s order. If probation attempted to require treatment outside the stated categories or imposed a residential program without further court action, that would present a different question.

In sum, the trial court made the key judicial decisions. It required treatment, named the treatment areas, and explained their link to defendant’s rehabilitation. The probation officer was left to select and coordinate suitable programs within those limits. Because the court set the policy and probation handled only implementation, the condition did not improperly delegate judicial authority. (In re Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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