San Francisco Criminal Lawyer BlogEligibility for Resentencing Under Penal Code Section 1172.6
People v. Campbell (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 3, 2026, No. B334456) 2026 WL 2577310
Summary: In People v. Campbell, the California Court of Appeal reconsidered whether Sidney Campbell was entitled to resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 following significant developments in California law governing murder liability and resentencing petitions. The case arose after the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of People v. Lopez (2025) 19 Cal.5th 639. Although Lopez expanded the circumstances under which petitioners may seek relief, the Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that Campbell remained ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury instructions in his case required a finding that he personally acted with malice.
The Crime and Conviction
The case stemmed from a 1999 shooting that resulted in the death of fifteen-year-old Kenneth Colter. Earlier in the day, a dispute had arisen involving damage to a bicycle belonging to a younger member of the Campbell family. Tensions escalated, and later that day appellant Sidney Campbell and his brother confronted Colter.
Witness testimony established that Campbell was present during the confrontation and personally displayed a firearm. During the ensuing exchange of gunfire, Colter was shot in the neck and arm. He died from the wound to his neck.
In 2003, a jury convicted Campbell of second-degree murder under Penal Code section 187. The jury also found true allegations that he personally used and discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense. However, the jury did not find true the allegation that he intentionally discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily injury. Campbell received an aggregate sentence of thirty-five years to life. His conviction was subsequently affirmed on direct appeal.
The Section 1172.6 Petition
In 2022, Campbell filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The statute provides a mechanism for defendants convicted under certain now-invalid murder theories to seek retroactive relief.
Campbell alleged that because of changes to California murder law enacted by Senate Bill 1437 and later expanded by Senate Bill 775, he could no longer be convicted of murder under the same legal theories available at the time of his trial. Although the jury had not been instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Campbell argued that ambiguities in the aiding-and-abetting instructions may have allowed the jury to convict him under a theory of imputed malice.
The trial court appointed counsel, accepted briefing, and conducted a prima facie review of the petition. After examining the record of conviction and jury instructions, the court concluded Campbell was ineligible for relief as a matter of law and denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause.
Prior Appeal and Supreme Court Transfer
Campbell appealed the denial of his petition. Initially, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling. In doing so, it relied on decisions that held a petitioner could not use a section 1172.6 proceeding to challenge instructional errors that could have been raised on direct appeal.
However, the California Supreme Court later decided People v. Lopez, which rejected that line of authority. The Supreme Court clarified that a defendant is not categorically barred from seeking section 1172.6 relief merely because an analogous instructional-error claim could have been raised previously.
Following Lopez, the Supreme Court granted review in Campbell’s case, transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal, and directed the court to reconsider the appeal in light of the new precedent.
Legal Framework of 1172.6 and imputed malice
Senate Bill 1437 significantly narrowed murder liability in California. The legislation amended Penal Code section 188 to require that, except in limited circumstances, a principal in a murder must personally act with malice aforethought. The statute expressly provides that malice cannot be imputed solely from a person’s participation in a crime.
The legislation also created what is now section 1172.6, allowing defendants convicted under outdated theories of murder liability to seek resentencing. Senate Bill 775 later expanded eligibility to include individuals convicted under any theory in which malice was imputed based solely on participation in criminal conduct.
At the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 proceeding, courts must accept a petitioner’s allegations as true unless the record of conviction conclusively establishes ineligibility. Courts may review jury instructions and other parts of the record but may not engage in fact-finding or credibility
Campbell contended that the trial court improperly engaged in judicial fact-finding when it reviewed the record of conviction and relied on factual conclusions about the underlying offense.
He also argued that his jury instructions suffered from the same ambiguity identified in several recent California cases, including People v. Powell, People v. Langi, and People v. Maldonado. Those cases recognized that standard aiding-and-abetting instructions, when combined with implied-malice murder instructions, could potentially allow a jury to convict an accomplice without finding that the accomplice personally harbored the mental state required for murder.
Campbell argued that he had established a prima facie showing of eligibility and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeal rejected Campbell’s arguments.
The court first concluded that the trial court did not engage in improper judicial fact-finding. Reviewing jury instructions and other materials from the record of conviction is expressly permitted during a prima facie evaluation. The trial court simply examined whether the existing record conclusively established Campbell’s ineligibility for relief.
The court acknowledged that Langi, Powell, and Maldonado identified potential ambiguities in some aiding-and-abetting murder instructions. In those cases, jurors could have understood the instructions to require only participation in an underlying criminal act rather than a personal mental state amounting to malice.
Unlike the defendants in those cases, Campbell was tried solely for murder. No separate target offense, such as battery or another underlying crime, was alleged. The jury received instructions defining murder, malice aforethought, aiding and abetting, and first- and second-degree murder. According to the court, those instructions required jurors to find that Campbell personally harbored a malicious mental state before convicting him.
The court emphasized that the jury could not have convicted Campbell of second-degree murder without finding personal malice. As a result, the ambiguity identified in Langi and related cases was absent.
The court further concluded that it was not reasonably likely jurors interpreted the instructions as permitting a conviction based on imputed malice.
After reconsidering the case under People v. Lopez, the Court of Appeal again affirmed the denial of Campbell’s section 1172.6 petition.
The court held that Campbell was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury instructions required a finding that he personally acted with malice. Since the record conclusively demonstrated that the conviction rested on a legally valid theory of murder, he could not obtain relief under section 1172.6.
Accordingly, the order summarily denying Campbell’s petition for resentencing was affirmed.
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