San Francisco Criminal Lawyer BlogVoluntary Intoxication and Attempted Murder Premeditation
People v. Ammons (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 16, 2026, No. 2D CRIM. B343669) 2026 WL 2730198
Issue and Holding: The Instructions Adequately Allowed Consideration of Intoxication
Charles Nelson Ammons appealed only his attempted murder conviction arising from a traffic stop that escalated into a struggle over a firearm with City of Pismo Beach police officer Christopher Siglin. Ammons argued the trial court’s voluntary-intoxication instruction was incomplete because it told jurors they could consider intoxication when deciding whether he intended to kill Siglin and knew Siglin was a peace officer, but did not expressly say they could also consider intoxication when deciding whether the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. He also claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a clarified instruction.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held the instructions, read together, did not bar jurors from considering voluntary intoxication on premeditation and deliberation. Because voluntary-intoxication instructions are pinpoint instructions, Ammons forfeited any claim that the wording should have been clarified by failing to request a modification. The court also rejected ineffective assistance because there was no reasonable probability a more explicit instruction would have changed the verdict.
The Evidence Supported Intent to Kill Despite Intoxication
Officer Siglin stopped Ammons after seeing him make an illegal left turn while driving a white van. Ammons did not immediately yield, and Siglin eventually positioned his motorcycle in front of the van to stop it. Siglin approached in uniform and ordered Ammons to turn off the ignition. Ammons was confrontational and refused. When Siglin opened the driver’s door and reached inside, Ammons swung his right hand toward him while holding a handgun.
The encounter was captured on Siglin’s body camera. During the struggle, the two men fought at close range inside the van. Siglin tried to force the muzzle away from his head and face and to pry Ammons’s fingers from the weapon. The gun was pointed about 12 inches from Siglin’s face and made a “clicking” sound when Ammons pulled the trigger. It did not fire because the bullets in the magazine were loaded backwards; if properly loaded, the gun would have fired. After backup arrived and Ammons was arrested, a hospital screening measured his blood alcohol content at .21.
The Retried Counts Focused the Appeal
A first jury convicted Ammons of several offenses, including assault with a semiautomatic firearm, carrying a loaded and unregistered firearm, driving under the influence, and public intoxication, but deadlocked on attempted murder and resisting an executive officer. A second jury convicted him on those remaining charges. The appeal therefore centered on whether the second jury was properly instructed on voluntary intoxication as it related to attempted murder.
Reading the Instructions as a Whole Defeated Error
The trial court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 3426 that evidence of voluntary intoxication could be considered “only in deciding whether” Ammons acted with intent to kill Siglin and knew Siglin was a peace officer. Ammons argued this was too narrow because Penal Code section 29.4 permits voluntary-intoxication evidence, in a murder case, on whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice.
The court rejected that argument by considering the charge as a whole. The jury was also instructed under CALCRIM No. 601 that, if it found attempted murder, it had to decide whether the prosecution proved the attempt was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. That instruction defined willfulness as intending to kill, deliberation as carefully weighing the choice and consequences, and premeditation as deciding to kill before completing the act.
Because those definitions expressly connected willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation to the intent to kill, the court concluded no reasonable juror would think intoxication could be considered on intent to kill but not on the related mental states that made the attempted murder premeditated. Relying on People v. Castillo, the court reasoned that premeditation and deliberation are plainly mental states, and jurors would not understand the instructions to separate them artificially from intent.
Forfeiture: A Clarifying Instruction Had to Be Requested
The court also held Ammons forfeited the instructional claim. A voluntary-intoxication instruction is treated as a pinpoint instruction because it relates particular evidence to a legal theory. Under People v. Saille and related authority, the trial court has no duty to give or refine such an instruction on its own. If Ammons wanted CALCRIM No. 3426 to mention premeditation and deliberation expressly, he had to request that modification. His failure to do so barred the claim that the instruction needed further clarification.
Ineffective Assistance: No Prejudice From Counsel’s Omission
Ammons alternatively argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not asking the court to add premeditation and deliberation to the voluntary-intoxication instruction. The court applied the familiar Strickland standard, which requires deficient performance and prejudice. It did not need to dwell on performance because the absence of prejudice was decisive.
The jury necessarily found Ammons intended to kill Siglin despite evidence of intoxication. Given the body-camera evidence, the close-range struggle, the weapon aimed near Siglin’s face, the trigger pull, and the fact that the gun failed only because it was misloaded, the court saw no reasonable probability that jurors would have found intent to kill but rejected premeditation and deliberation based on intoxication. In practical terms, a more explicit instruction would not have changed the result.
The Conviction Was Affirmed
The decision affirms a practical rule for instructional challenges involving voluntary intoxication: courts evaluate jury instructions as a complete set, not in isolation. Where the instructions tie intent to kill to willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, jurors may consider intoxication in that mental-state analysis even if the voluntary-intoxication instruction does not repeat every related term. Any desired clarification must be requested, and ineffective-assistance relief requires a realistic probability that the omission mattered. Because that probability was absent here, the judgment was affirmed.
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