Blood Draw of Unconscious DUI Suspect at Hospital does not Automatically Excuse Warrant Requirement

People v. Castro (Cal. Ct. App., July 1, 2026, No. D085983) 2026 WL 1894067, at *1–3

Summary:  The United States Supreme Court Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019) 588 U.S. 840 (Mitchell), held that where a police officer at the scene of an automobile accident  discovers that one of the drivers suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is unconscious,“the officers’ many responsibilities may be incompatible with the procedures that would be required to obtain a warrant.” Mitchell articulated a “general rule” that exigent circumstances will “almost always” permit a blood test without a warrant.

In People v. Alvarez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 531 (Alvarez), the police officer encountered the suspect-driver at the hospital sometime after the accident. Alvarez held that the record failed to support a finding of exigency sufficient to excuse the officer’s failure to obtain a blood draw warrant. Here, an unconscious suspect-driver was first contacted by police at the hospital several hours after the accident, and the Court held there was not exigent circumstances excusing a failure to obtain a warrant.

Factual and Procedural Background 

Castro crashed his car into a vehicle parked in a residential neighborhood in San Bernardino County. The collision injured the occupant of the parked vehicle, a rideshare driver waiting for a customer. Hearing the crash, neighbors came outside and restrained Castro attempted to leave the scene.While Castro was being transported, Sergeant Bernardino also traveled to the medical center. On his arrival he spoke with Officer Pope, telling him about the crash.

At approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Pope went to see Castro in the emergency room (ER). Castro was sedated and unresponsive. Pope noted that a “distinct odor of an alcoholic beverage” emanated from his body. Pope learned from ER personnel that they sedated Castro “due to him being aggressive with them, yelling at them, and trying to fight them.” They said he would be unresponsive for another two to three hours.

A little over an hour later,Pope made the decision to arrest Castro on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol and causing bodily injury. (See Veh. Code, § 23153.) He said this decision was based on three factors: (1) the odor of an alcoholic beverage; (2) Castro’s aggressive behavior with emergency personnel; and (3) the circumstances of the crash, particularly the fact that Castro collided with a parked car.

At that point, Officer Pope called for a phlebotomist to conduct a blood draw to determine Castro’s blood alcohol content (BAC). He made no attempt to request a warrant authorizing him to obtain blood from an unconscious arrestee.

The results of the blood test showed a BAC of 0.193.

Castro brought a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 in conjunction with his preliminary hearing, seeking to exclude the blood test results. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitchell, supra, 588 U.S. 840, the magistrate concluded that exigent circumstances excused Officer Pope from requesting a warrant to authorize the blood draw.

Forcible blood draw violates the Fourth Amendment

Under general Fourth Amendment principles, a warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable unless the government demonstrates the applicability of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. A recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when exigent circumstances make it impossible or impractical for law enforcement officers to take the time that would be required to obtain a warrant. The transitory nature of alcohol in the blood as evidence of a DUI violation can contribute to a finding of an emergency that would justify a warrantless blood draw. Whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.

Mitchell recognizes that there may be situations where a blood draw warrant for an unresponsive suspect-driver is required because “police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties.” (Mitchell, supra, 588 U.S. at p. 857.) In Alvarez, we found nothing in the record to support a conclusion that a delay in getting a warrant would have diverted Officer Yost from any aspect of his investigation. (Alvarez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 545, 316 Cal.Rptr.3d 705.) The Court reached a similar conclusion here.

Here, Officer Pope simply did not believe he needed to obtain a warrant for an unconscious suspect-driver. The Officer did not balance the time it would take to get a warrant against other pressing investigatory duties.

Mitchell’s references to “rival priorities,” “more pressing needs,” and “other pressing duties” of police officers must be understood in the context of the opinion’s focus on an officer responding to the natural chaos that pervades the scene of automobile accident. The exigency exception would swallow the warrant rule if the time an officer spends obtaining a warrant could always be used for other police duties. Obtaining warrants before conducting searches and seizures is a crucial part of a police officer’s duties, not a distraction from them. The record in this case fails to support the trial court’s finding of exigency so as to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant.

Disposition

The matter was remanded to the superior court with instructions to (1) vacate the order denying Castro’s suppression motion and enter a new order granting it; (2) permit Castro to withdraw his guilty plea by appropriate motion within 30 days after this opinion becomes final; and (3) if he does so, determine whether the People intend to retry the case.

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