San Francisco Criminal Lawyer BlogPresentence credits may only be applied to a case for which a defendant is sentenced
People v. Cofer (Cal., June 25, 2026, No. S286297) 2026 WL 1830928, at *1
Summary: After a plea agreement, Cofer was sentenced at a single hearing on five separate pending criminal cases. Cofer had been in presentence custody for extended periods in some of these cases and for shorter periods in others. The trial court awarded Coffey custody credits in each case that reflected the time he spent in custody in that specific case. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that under Penal Code section 2900.5, he should receive presentence custody credits in each of his five cases for all the time he served in custody on any of these cases, except for custody time that preceded his arrest in a particular case. (People v. Cofer (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 333, 341–342, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 (Cofer).) The Court of Appeal held that the resolution of these cases through a single sentencing hearing meant that they all involved the same “proceedings” for purposes of section 2900.5, subdivision (b), under which “the custody to be credited” against a sentence must be “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (See Cofer, at p. 341, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.) This interpretation of the statute would result in Cofer receiving more than 300 additional days of custody credit on his six-year term, compared to credits awarded by the trial court.
The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 2900.5 and concluded that “proceedings,” as used in section 2900.5, subdivision (b), is properly understood as referring to an individual criminal case. Therefore, custody credit is not automatically applied across multiple, distinct prosecutions merely because those cases are resolved and sentenced at a single hearing. Here, the trial court correctly interpreted the statute in awarding credits in each case for the time defendant spent in custody in that matter, rather than awarding him credit in each case for time served in other cases. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Section 2900.5 and awarding of presentence credits
Subdivision (a) of section 2900.5 provides for the award of credits at sentencing for time a defendant has already spent in custody. These credits reduce the length of time a defendant spends incarcerated after conviction and sentencing. This subdivision states in rpart that in “all felony and misdemeanor convictions … when the defendant has been in custody, including, but not limited to, any time spent in a jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or similar residential institution, all days of custody of the defendant, including days … credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019 … shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).)
Subdivision (b) of section 2900.5 limits the application of the custody credits authorized in subdivision (a). Subdivision (b) provides, “For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed.” (§ 2900.5, subd. (b).)
Analysis of section 2900.5
The trial court followed People v. Jacobs (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 67, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 739, which held that a defendant sentenced in two separate criminal cases at a single hearing was entitled to presentence custody credit only for custody related to the specific case for which he was sentenced. The trial court denied the request for additional presentence credits, finding that defendant was not entitled to further credits for cases where he remained on bail or was released on his own recognizance while in presentence custody in other cases. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, with the majority concluding that defendant was entitled to custody credit in all cases for any time that he was in custody in any of the five cases, provided that the custody to be applied did not precede defendant’s arrest in a particular case. (Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 335, 342, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.)
The Cofer court based its holding on the first sentence of section 2900.5, subdivision (b), which provides, “For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” The Court of Appeal reasoned that the phrase, “ ‘attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct’ ” could support two different interpretations. That phrase could be interpreted that “each criminal case must be considered a separate proceeding even if resolved and sentenced at the same time.” In that circumstance, the award of presentence custody credits for each criminal case would be calculated based on the time a defendant spent in custody in that specific case. Alternatively, the phrase “could also mean that a defendant is entitled to credit in all cases that are resolved and sentenced together for all custody attributable to all conduct in those cases occurring after the defendant’s arrest in any given case.” (Id. at pp. 340–341, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.) Under that interpretation, a defendant would receive credit for all days of actual custody without regard to the defendant’s technical custody status in any particular case. (Id. at p. 341, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.)
The Cofer majority concluded “the latter interpretation [is] more consistent with the purposes of awarding presentence credit, and it is not foreclosed by any Supreme Court authority.” (Cofer, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 341, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.) In rejecting the People’s argument that the court’s approach would create a windfall for defendant, the majority stated that its “decision ensures equal treatment between defendant and individuals who could afford bail on additional cases.” (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court interpreted the term “proceedings,” as used in section 2900.5, subdivision (b), as synonymous with a criminal case. Under subdivision (b), presentence credit that is to be applied must be attributable to the criminal case in which a defendant is being sentenced. This approach “produces fair and reasonable results in a majority of cases, and … can be readily understood and applied by trial courts.” (Joyner, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 495, 256 Cal.Rptr. 785, 769 P.2d 967.) The trial court correctly interpreted the statute in awarding presentence custody credits to defendant’s sentences; the Court of Appeal majority did not.
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