San Francisco Criminal Lawyer Blog

People v. Tan (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 19, 2021, No. B308687) 2021 WL 3673888, at *1–2

Summary: Tan was convicted of robbery and first degree murder. In 2020, the trial court vacated Tan’s murder conviction under Penal Code  section 1170.95, resentenced him on the robbery count, and ordered him released on time served. The court also imposed a three-year parole term. Tan appealed and claimed that  section 3000.01, which was enacted before he was resentenced in this case, limits his parole term to two years. The People conceded the point, and, as a matter of first impression, the court of appeal  agreed and modifed Tan’s sentence to reflect a two-year parole term.

Legal Principles and Standard of Review for an Unauthorized Sentence and Section 3000.01

People v. Clark (Cal. Ct. App., July 29, 2021, No. A158238) 2021 WL 3205435, at *1

Summary: Clark appealed and challenged the imposition of a monthly $100 probation supervision fee, following a violation of his probation while his  appeal was pending. Assembly Bill 1869 repealed the statute authorizing the probation supervision fee, Penal Code section 1203.1b.

Clark argued that he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Assembly Bill 1869, and  asked that  the court order vacatur of the fee imposed on him under section 1203.1b.

People v. Bryant (Cal., July 29, 2021, No. S259956) 2021 WL 3201079, at *1

Summary: The 2011 Realignment Act (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; Realignment Act or Act) provides for a period of mandatory supervision after a county jail sentence for eligible defendants. The California Supreme Court assessed the validity of a challenged condition of mandatory supervision  and concluded that discretionary conditions are to be evaluated for reasonableness on a case-by-case basis under the test set out in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (Lent).

Facts: Bryant was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle.  (Pen. Code,1 § 25400, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(6).) The court imposed a split sentence (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)), of two years in the county jail, with the last 364 days to be served at large on mandatory supervision. Over Bryant’s objection, the court imposed the following condition: “Defendant is to submit to search of any electronic device either in his possession[,] including cell phone[,] and/or any device in his place of residence. Any search by probation is limited to defendant[’]s text messages, emails, and photos on such devices.”

People v. Stewart (Cal. Ct. App., July 9, 2021, No. E074907) 2021 WL 2883176, at *1

Summary: Stewart was honorably discharged from the Army in 1976 and suffers from schizophrenia related to his military service. In 1986 and a1992, he was convicted of first degree burglary. In 2001, after being convicted on two counts of spousal battery, he was sentenced, as a third-striker, to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.

In 2018, the Legislature amended section 1170.911 to allow  convicted veterans who suffers from a specified disorder as a result of their military service to petition for resentencing, so that that disorder may be considered as a mitigating factor when imposing a determinate term.

In re Matthew W. (Cal. Ct. App., July 8, 2021, No. A159931) 2021 WL 2850407, at *1

Summary: Matthew W. appealed  from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, in which the court sustained an allegation of assault with a deadly weapon and placed him on probation.

On appeal, Matthew W. contended that  the jurisdictional findings must be reversed because the juvenile court improperly admitted defendant’s pre-arrest statements to police made during a custodial interrogation, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona(1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda).

People v. Kasrawi (Cal. Ct. App., June 16, 2021, No. D077139) 2021 WL 2451095

Summary: Kasrawi was stopped and ultimately arrested by a police officer who acted on no more than a hunch. The officer detained  Kasrawi after watching him  cross the street to his legally parked car. The officer later learned that Kasrawi had an outstanding arrest warrant. Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that despite the Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence need not be suppressed.

This case is an exception to the exclusionary rule that applies where a law enforcement officer discovers the defendant’s outstanding warrant after an illegal stop but before a search yields evidence of a crime. Under these limited circumstances, discovery of the warrant  attenuates the taint of the original detention.