People v. Collins (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 2, 2021, No. F076883) 2021 WL 343935
Summary: Collins was convicted of two counts of murder as a result of driving while impaired
On appeal, he claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to challenge the prosecutor’s excusal of a black prospective juror during jury selection.
In re Palmer (Cal., Jan. 28, 2021, No. S256149) 2021 WL 279621, at *1
Summary: The California and federal Constitutions bar the infliction of punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offender’s individual culpability. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) The courts, “as coequal guardian[s] of the Constitution, (are) to condemn any violation of that prohibition.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 (Lynch).) When an inmate claims a sentence is excessive because of one or more parole denials is the question at the heart of this case.
William M. Palmer II first sought release on parole from the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) in 1995. Following the Board’s 10th denial, Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that the 30 years he had already served on a life sentence for an aggravated kidnapping committed when he was a juvenile was constitutionally excessive. Before the Court of Appeal could adjudicate the habeas petition, the Board found him suitable for parole and ordered him released. (In re Palmer (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1202–1203 (Palmer).) The Court of Appeal subsequently agreed with Palmer that his now-completed term of imprisonment had become unconstitutional. (Id. at pp. 1207–1222.) Because that term had already been served, however, the Court of Appeal focused its order of relief on a different target. The court reasoned that Palmer was “entitled to release from all forms of custody, including parole supervision.” (Id. at p. 1224.)
The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alberto Beto Hernandez, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 22, 2021, No. B302815) 2021 WL 221976, at *1–2
Summary: On January 1, 2019 the the law governing whether a defendant can be convicted of murder under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory was changed. The Legislature enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3),1 which provides that, (except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e)), to be convicted of murder a defendant must act with malice and that malice may not be imputed based solely on participation in a crime.
Section 189, subdivision (e), is an exception to the malice requirement for murder, stating that an individual can be liable for first degree felony murder if the person (1) was the actual killer, (2) acted with the intent to kill in aiding and abetting the actual killer, or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Favor v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 13, 2021, No. E075340) 2021 WL 118005
Summary: The right to a preliminary hearing within 60 days of arraignment “is absolute absent a defendant’s personal waiver.” (Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 729, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 189.)
Here, Favor agreed to a limited waiver of this right and consented to a new deadline that was 76 days after arraignment. The preliminary hearing was not held by that date, so Favor moved for mandatory dismissal under Penal Code section 859b. The People argue that there can be no limited waiver of the 60-day deadline, so Favor’s waiver was a general one that allowed the preliminary hearing to be set later than he authorized, even without a further waiver.
CDCR incarcerates people convicted of violent felonies, supervises those released to parole, and provides rehabilitation programs to help them reintegrate into the community with the tools to be drug-free, healthy, and employable members of society. The Budget proposes total funding of $13.1 billion ($12.7 billion General Fund and $345 million other funds) for the Department in 2021-22.
The COVID-19 Pandemic has impacted every aspect of prison operations and the 2020 Budget Act projected an overall adult inmate average daily population of 122,536 in 2020-21. The average daily adult inmate population for 2020-21 is now projected to be 97,950, a decrease of 20 percent from spring projections.
Some of this decrease is attributable to suspending county intake in response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, which when resumed, will increase the population. Current projections show the adult inmate population is trending downward and is expected to decrease by another 2,626 offenders between 2020-21 and 2021-22.
In re Gadlin Supreme Court of California. December 28, 2020 — P.3d —- 2020 WL 7690154
Proposition 57- nonviolent felony parole consideration
In 2009, a three-judge federal district court panel ordered the CDCR “to reduce the prisoner population to 137.5% of the adult institution’s total design capacity.” (Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (E.D.Cal. 2009) 922 F.Supp.2d 882, 962; see also Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 501–503, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969.) The California Legislature and electorate subsequently enacted several measures aimed to reduce the prison population, including Assembly Bill No. 109 (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.); criminal realignment) and Proposition 36 (the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000). In February 2014 the federal district court ordered the Department to implement additional measures.
People v. Brooks (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 22, 2020, No. A158988) 2020 WL 7586811, at *1
Summary: Jason Brooks appealed the denial of a petition seeking recall of his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Brooks agreed to a stipulated term of years in a plea bargain 13 years ago, and sought recall of his sentence under section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1), invoking an amendment to section 1170.91 enacted two years ago. The Court of Appeal upheld the summary denial of his petition.
Facts:
People v. Gentile, Supreme Court of California, (S256698), December 17, 2020 — P.3d —- 2020 WL 7393491
Aider and abettors and liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
An accomplice who aids and abets a crime is liable for both that crime and any other offense committed that is the natural and probable consequence of the aided and abetted crime. Liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine can be imposed even if the accomplice did not intend the additional offense. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210 (McCoy).
David Peter Moore, Sr., Petitioner, V. The Superior Court of Riverside County, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California. December 11, 2020 — Cal.Rptr.3d —- 2020 WL 7296513
Summary: Vehicle Code section 23640 and its predecessor, Vehicle Code former section 23202, have generally made DUI defendants ineligible for any form of pretrial diversion. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Penal Code section 1001.36, making defendants charged with “a misdemeanor or felony” and who suffer from a qualifying mental health disorder generally eligible for pretrial mental health diversion. (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24.) The Legislature then amended Penal Code section 1001.36 to make defendants charged with murder and other specified offenses categorically ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2); Stats. 2018, ch. 1005, § 1.) But the Legislature did not amend Penal Code section 1001.36 to clarify that DUI defendants are eligible for pretrial mental health diversion, notwithstanding Vehicle Code section 23640.
The issue in this case is one of statutory interpretation: In light of Vehicle Code section 23640, are DUI defendants categorically ineligible for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36? In Tellez v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 439 (Tellez), the Court addressed the same question and concluded, based on the legislative history of Penal Code sections 1001.36 and 1001.80 (military diversion), that the Legislature did not intend DUI defendants to be eligible for pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36. (Tellez, at pp. 447-448.)
AB 3234, taking effect on January 1, 2021, allows for diversion in almost all misdemeanor cases, including DUI, vehicular manslaughter, elder abuse, child abuse, assault, hate crimes, carrying a concealed firearm, possession of a firearm in a school zone, criminal threats, and dissuading a witness. Upon completion of diversion, as defined by the judge, the case shall be dismissed and the crime deemed to never have occurred.
Diversion and dismissal of the case under AB 3234
Under AB 3234, a judge in the superior court in which a misdemeanor is being prosecuted can offer misdemeanor diversion to a defendant over the objection of a prosecuting attorney, except as specified. A judge can continue a diverted case for a period not to exceed 24 months and order the defendant to comply with the terms, conditions, and programs the judge deems appropriate based on the defendant’s specific situation. At the end of the diversion period, if the defendant complies with all required terms, conditions, and programs, the judge is required to dismiss the case against the defendant. The arrest upon which diversion was imposed will be deemed to have never occurred. The court may end the diversion and order resumption of the criminal proceedings if the court finds that the defendant is not complying with the terms and conditions of diversion.
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