Racial-Impact Mitigation Requires the RJA’s Sentencing-Disparity Showing

People v. Savoy (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 30, 2026, No. A175134), certified for publication.

Section 1385 Does Not Permit a Lesser Showing of Racial Disparity

The Court of Appeal affirmed a resentencing judgment retaining a 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement. It held that a defendant seeking dismissal based on discriminatory racial impact under Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(A), must satisfy the sentencing-disparity requirements incorporated from the Racial Justice Act (RJA), section 745, subdivision (a)(4). A lesser showing does not suffice.

The defendant offered no individual comparison cases. His statewide statistics also failed to compare similarly situated defendants in the sentencing county. He therefore did not establish the racial-impact circumstance that would weigh greatly in favor of dismissal.

Resentencing Removed One Year but Retained the Firearm Enhancement

The defendant was convicted of murder and other offenses in 2011 and sentenced to 78 years to life. His sentence included 25 years to life for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).

After legislation invalidated his applicable prior-prison-term enhancement, he petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.75. The court recalled the sentence, struck the prior-prison-term enhancements, and imposed 77 years to life. It retained the firearm enhancement.

The defendant sought dismissal under section 1385. The court found that dismissal would endanger public safety and that he had not established the mitigating circumstances he asserted. On appeal, he argued that the court failed to give great weight to evidence of discriminatory racial impact.

The Statute Incorporates Sentencing Disparity, Not Every RJA Violation

Section 1385 directs courts to dismiss an enhancement when dismissal furthers justice. In exercising that discretion, courts must consider and give great weight to evidence offered to establish listed mitigating circumstances. Proof of a circumstance weighs greatly in favor of dismissal unless dismissal would endanger public safety.

The racial-impact circumstance expressly incorporates section 745, subdivision (a)(4), which addresses sentencing disparities. It does not incorporate every provision of the RJA.

That distinction mattered here. The defendant’s resentencing argument focused principally on alleged racial bias in the original sentencing judge’s comments. Judicial bias falls under section 745, subdivision (a)(1). It does not, by itself, establish the sentencing-disparity circumstance specified in section 1385.

The Disparity Argument Was Forfeited, but the Court Addressed It

An appellate court ordinarily will not consider an argument that could have been, but was not adequately, presented in the trial court. This rule is called forfeiture.

The defendant’s resentencing memorandum developed his judicial-bias argument over several pages. By contrast, it presented statewide enhancement statistics with only a conclusory assertion that they established an RJA violation. He did not develop the disparity argument at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal held the claim forfeited because it lacked substantive legal analysis below. Nevertheless, the court exercised its discretion to consider the merits. It emphasized the importance of addressing alleged racial bias in the judicial system and the legal, rather than factual, nature of the appellate argument.

The RJA Requires Two Related Sentencing Comparisons

An RJA violation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The relevant sentencing-disparity provision, section 745, subdivision (a)(4)(A), requires two related showings.

First, the defendant must show that he received a longer or more severe sentence than similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense. This is a defendant-specific comparison.

Second, longer or more severe sentences must have been imposed more frequently for that offense on people sharing the defendant’s race than on defendants of other races in the county where sentencing occurred.

The comparisons must account for relevant circumstances. “Similarly situated” means that factors relevant to charging and sentencing are similar, not identical. Conviction history may be among those factors.

“More frequently imposed” requires a significant difference shown by the totality of the evidence, comparing individuals who engaged in similar conduct and were similarly situated. The prosecution must be unable to establish race-neutral reasons for the disparity.

The Statistics Did Not Supply the Required Comparisons

The defendant identified no individual comparison cases. That omission alone defeated the first requirement.

His statistical evidence also failed to establish the second. He relied on a statewide report describing disproportionate enhancement use. Much of his appellate discussion concerned gang enhancements rather than the firearm enhancement at issue.

The report’s firearm-enhancement figures did not cure the deficiency. They were statewide, not county-specific, and did not compare defendants whose conduct and relevant sentencing factors were similar to his.

The court did not hold that statewide statistics can never be relevant. It held that the statistics offered here did not establish the required comparisons. General evidence of unequal enhancement use was insufficient to prove the incorporated mitigating circumstance.

An RJA Violation Does Not Automatically Require Enhancement Dismissal

The defendant argued that section 1385 should require less proof than an RJA claim because an RJA violation would absolutely bar the firearm enhancement, while mitigation would merely favor its dismissal.

An RJA violation requires a remedy specific to the violation. Before judgment, a court may dismiss an enhancement if doing so serves the interests of justice. Dismissal is not automatic.

For a sentencing violation established after judgment, the court must vacate the sentence and impose a new sentence no greater than the previous one. The statute does not invariably require dismissal of a particular enhancement. Thus, the defendant’s proposed distinction between mandatory dismissal under the RJA and discretionary dismissal under section 1385 did not support a lower evidentiary standard.

The Statutory Language Controlled, and the Judgment Was Affirmed

Section 1385 expressly requires discriminatory racial impact as described in section 745, subdivision (a)(4). To establish that mitigating circumstance, the defendant must show that applying the enhancement would violate the incorporated RJA provision.

He did not make that showing. The resentencing court therefore did not err by failing to give great weight to the statistical evidence he offered.

The judgment was affirmed. The holding is narrow: section 1385’s racial-impact circumstance requires the sentencing comparisons specified in the incorporated RJA provision. Statewide statistics that lack those comparisons do not establish it.

Caution: This summary is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified attorney for advice about your specific circumstances.