Trail court denial of Compassionate Release for physically incapacitated inmate was an abuse of discretion

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES BRINSTON, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 28, 2026, No. A173470) 2026 WL 1493445, at *1

Summary:  Brinston appealed from the trial court’s denial of his request for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. Despite trial court finding that Brinston was medically incapacitated and therefore presumptively entitled to compassionate release, the presumption was overcome by its finding that Brinston was an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The trial court relied on information from Brinston’s parole hearing three years earlier, when the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) found Brinston had no understanding of his own criminal behavior and scored highly on certain risk assessments despite having some physical limitations. The trial court failed to recognize that Brinston’s physical condition had changed significantly and materially in the three years following the denial of parole. By the time of the section 1172.2 hearing, Brinston lacked any residual lower extremity function, was belted into a customized wheelchair to keep him from falling out, displayed progressive intention tremor, was unable to raise his shoulders, and suffered from fecal incontinence and constant urinary incontinence that was causing chronic infection of his thighs and buttocks. Brinston was also diagnosed with ankylosing spondylitis, a progressing and permanent condition that left him as stiff as a mannequin, prevented him from rotating his head, and made it difficult for his caretakers to perform basic hygiene for him.

Brinston’s physical condition removed any realistic possibility of Brinston harming others, even if he were still predisposed to do so as the trial court found. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s denial of Brinston’s request for compassion release was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.

Brinston was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison on the rape count, with concurrent six-year terms on the remaining counts.

Medical incapacitation

In March 2025, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) director of health care services sent the trial court a letter stating it had determined that Brinston was permanently medically incapacitated and unable to independently complete basic activities of daily living. Brinston had been diagnosed with ankylosing spondylitis, cerebrovascular disease with a history of recurrent strokes, progressive intention tremor, hyperlipidemia, hypertension, insulin-dependent type 2 diabetes mellitus, osteoporosis, and ulcerative colitis. Due to multiple strokes since 2000, Brinston had developed right-sided weakness and needed a lap belt to prevent him from falling while seated in his wheelchair. His physical therapist reported that he was not making any progress and was unable to lift his shoulders above his head.

Brinston’s ulcerative colitis led to his ankylosing spondylitis. Ankylosing spondylitis is a type of chronic arthritis that affects the spine and sacroiliac joints where the spine meets the pelvis. Over time, it results in inflammation, pain, and stiffness. In severe cases, the vertebrae of the spine fuse, resulting in reduced flexibility and a hunched posture.

Brinston’s ankylosing spondylitis was severe. It caused Brinston to have diffusely debilitating stiffened joints. He lost all strength in his lower extremities, which were contracted and stiff. His entire axial skeleton had fused to a profoundly rigid state, “like a ‘bamboo stick.’ ” Brinston looked “ ‘as stiff as a mannequin’ ” in his customized wheelchair and could not rotate his neck. His overall rigidity made it hard for staff to perform his basic hygiene. However, he could feed himself with both hands if someone set up food for him. He could no longer transfer to a shower chair, so he received only bed baths. The doctor’s report further stated, “After 2023, caregivers report [Brinston] has had increasing difficulty with all [activities of daily living] secondary to progressive ankylosing spondylitis rigidity.”

Brinston was at very high risk for skin breakdown and infections at his bony prominences because he could no longer shift his weight or bend major joints. He was incontinent of bowel and bladder. Despite frequent diaper changes, his urinary incontinence led to chronic infection of his buttocks and he needed routine wound care for skin maceration on his thighs.

Caregivers reported neurocognitive decline after Brinston’s recurrent strokes, including forgetfulness and likely expressive aphasia. His stiffened shoulders prevent him from writing. A brain MRI showed signs of vascular dementia and was remarkable for bilateral cerebellar chronic infarcts with extensive microvascular ischemic disease.4

The physician’s report stated that if Brinston’s sentence were recalled, he would be released to an appropriate facility to fulfill his needs. Before discharging him, staff would ensure that he had applied for Medi-Cal and, if indicated, arrange for in-home hospice support services.

Denial of parole in 2022

When it denied him parole in 2022, the BPH made numerous observed Brinston had an elevated risk of sexual offending under the Static-99. A clinician found that he had a moderate risk of future violence, which meant that he posed a somewhat elevated risk relative to other long-term offenders. But for Brinston’s health and physical ailments, the clinician would have considered him a high risk for violence. The BPH described Brinston’s physical limitations as being in a wheelchair, having had a stroke, and having tremors. It speculated that Brinston might have language or cognitive functioning issues but did not identify anything specific.

The BPH’s main concern was that Brinston had not changed. He had taken some programs to address his risk factors, but his understanding of those programs and his triggers or risk factors was non-existent. He had not taken any courses or self-study on sexual offending and did not understand why he had committed his offense. He had little understanding of the impact of his crimes on his victims. He justified his actions, which led him to victimize and manipulate others, and he could still do that. Brinston had told the BPH he wanted to teach others about rape and help them solve their problems. The BPH found this mentality was not very realistic because he had not even faced his own problems or understood the harm he had caused his victims. His disciplinary history in prison, although the BPH gave it little weight, suggested he was still able to react in angry and confrontational ways. The BPH denied parole for three years’ time.

After the CDCR sent the trial court the notice that he met the criteria for compassionate release under section 1172.2, Brinston filed a request for release. The People did not file anything in response.

The trial court denied Brinston’s request but did not dispute that Brinston was medically incapacitated. It acknowledged this led to a presumption in favor of recalling Brinston’s sentence under section 1172.7. But it found that presumption was overcome by clear and convincing evidence that Brinston still posed a significant risk to the community.

The trial court suggested the BPH had received much more information than was available in the CDCR records and described the BPH’s findings as close in time and at a point when Brinston was similarly situated to his current medical condition. The trial court then concluded that Brinston posed a significant risk to the community if he were released.

Legal Background and Standard of Review for compassionate release

“California law authorizes the compassionate release of prisoners through section 1172.2.” (In re Brissette (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 147, 161.) Section 1172.2 mandates that if, after any necessary consultation with other clinical executives, the CDCR’s statewide chief medical executive determines that an incarcerated person satisfies either of two medical criteria set forth in section 1172.2, subdivision (b) (section 1172.2(b)), the CDCR “shall recommend to the court that the incarcerated person’s sentence be recalled.” (§ 1172.2, subd. (a).) The first criterion supporting compassionate release is if “[t]he incarcerated person has a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory.” (§ 1172.2(b)(1).) The second is if “[t]he incarcerated person is permanently medically incapacitated with a medical condition or functional impairment that renders them permanently unable to complete basic activities of daily living, including, but not limited to, bathing, eating, dressing, toileting, transferring, and ambulation, or has progressive end-stage dementia and that incapacitation did not exist at the time of the original sentencing.” (§ 1172.2(b)(2).) “Any recommendation for recall submitted to the court by the department shall include one or more medical evaluations, a postrelease plan, and findings pursuant to” section 1172.2(b). (§ 1172.2, subd. (h).)

Presumption favoring recall and resentencing

If the trial court finds that an incarcerated person meets the criteria in section 1172.2(b)(1) or (2), “[t]here shall be a presumption favoring recall and resentencing … which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18, based on the incarcerated person’s current physical and mental condition.” (§ 1172.2(b).) Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) in turn defines an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as “an unreasonable risk that the incarcerated person will commit a new ‘super strike,’ which is any violent felony listed under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).” (In re Brissette, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 162.) Such violent felonies include offenses such as oral copulation with force, foreign penetration with force, forcible rape, and kidnapping or assault with the intent to commit such crimes; sexual acts with children under 14 years of age; any homicide or attempted homicide offense; and solicitation to commit murder. (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(I)–(V); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b) [incorporated by reference into Pen. Code, § 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)(I)].)

Revised section1172.2

“Section 1172.2 became effective on January 1, 2023, and amended the existing procedures for compassionate release [in former section 1170, subdivision (e) (former section 1170(e))].  The Legislature intended for section 1172.2 to ‘broaden the eligibility criteria for compassionate release and make it available to more incarcerated persons.’  Section 1172.2 was also intended to save California taxpayers the high costs of health care for terminally ill or aging inmates and to streamline the cumbersome process for obtaining compassionate release.  According to the author of section 1172.2 (whose comments were part of the legislative record and analyses) many inmates who did not pose a risk to public safety would die in prison while awaiting a referral for compassionate release, which in part resulted in California bearing the health care expenses of those inmates.” (In re Brissette, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165.)

On appeal, “[w]e review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s determination that a petitioner poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. ‘A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.’  We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence.” (People v. Lewis (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 401, 409.) “We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” (People v. Multani (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1343.)

The statutory presumption favoring release of a defendant who meets the criteria in section 1172.2(b)(1) or (2) can only be overcome by a finding the defendant is “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1172.2(b)) In re Martinez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 800, 803–804

Because section 1172.2(b) creates a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing for defendants who satisfy the criteria in section 1172.2(b)(1) or (2), in a section 1172.2 hearing the prosecution has the burden of submitting evidence to rebut the presumption. (See People v. Strother, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 571 [under §§ 1170.18 and 1170.126, prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety to defeat resentencing];

To pose an unreasonable risk, Brinston also needed to have some reasonable prospect of being able to commit the actus reus of an offense. (See In re Martinez, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 822 [to defeat medical parole under § 3550, a defendant “needs more than a mere desire to hurt someone before he reasonably poses a risk to the public. He requires the means to accomplish his desire,” i.e., “the opportunity and capability to hurt someone”].) There is no such prospect in this case.

Brinston is marginally more capable than the quadriplegic defendant in Martinez v. Board of Parole Hearings and In re Martinez, but his risk is similarly remote. Like the defendant in those cases, the only plausible pathway for Brinston to commit a super strike would be by speaking to others and enlisting them to act on his behalf. (In re Martinez, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 821.)

The trial court  abused its discretion in finding that Brinston posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety that overcame the presumption favoring his compassionate release under section 1172.2(b).5

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying Brinston’s request under section 1172.2 is reversed.

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