A jury’s findings do not collaterally estop a resentencing court from finding a defendant was the actual killer.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAVELL TYRONE PLAYER, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 6, 2026, No. B342239) 2026 WL 936879, at *1

Summary: Player appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95, (now section 1172.6). In his last appeal, the Courtheld substantial evidence did not support the resentencing court’s finding defendant aided and abetted murder and remanded for consideration of the alternative theories that defendant was the actual killer or a major participant in the underlying robbery acting with reckless disregard for human life. The resentencing court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under both alternative theories, and therefore ineligible for resentencing.

On appeal, Player argues the jury’s findings at his trial collaterally estopped the resentencing court from finding he was the actual killer. The jury found not true allegations that defendant personally used a firearm and also found not true a robbery special circumstance that, as the jury was instructed, required a finding that defendant personally killed the victim. Player also argues substantial evidence did not support either the actual-killer or major participant/reckless indifference findings.

The Supreme Court in People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903 (Santamaria) held that a jury’s not-true finding on a weapon use enhancement was not equivalent to an affirmative finding the defendant was not guilty as the actual killer, and therefore the not-true finding did not preclude the prosecution from arguing or offering evidence on retrial the defendant personally killed the victim.  The high court further held collateral estoppel did not apply to the jury’s not-true finding because weapon use is not an “ultimate fact” of murder.

In People v. Hart (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1099 (Hart), Division One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded Santamaria’s collateral estoppel analysis applies to section 1172.6 proceedings, and therefore a jury’s not-true finding on a personal firearm use allegation did not preclude the resentencing court from finding the defendant guilty as the actual killer.  The Hart court disagreed with prior appellate opinions concluding a jury’s not-true findings are preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings.

The Court of Appeal agrees with Hart that Santamaria controls and holds the jury’s not-true findings on the weapon enhancement and special circumstance did not preclude the resentencing court from finding defendant was the actual killer. The Court also found substantial evidence supported that finding and did not reach defendant’s challenges to the resentencing court’s finding that he was a major participant acting with reckless indifference.

The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Senate Bill No. 1437

“Senate Bill No. 1437 amended sections 188 and 189 of the Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’ “ (People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173 (Lee).)

“[U]nder the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill No. 1437, a defendant who committed a statutorily enumerated felony such as robbery could be convicted of murder for a killing during the felony without further examination of their mental state.” (People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 964–965.) After Senate Bill No. 1437, however, “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of [an enumerated felony, including robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:  (1) The person was the actual killer. (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.  [or] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e); see Garcia, at p. 965.)

Assembly Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now numbered section 1172.6, “which creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) “If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of relief under section 1172.6 — that is, a showing that the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a theory no longer valid under the amended Penal Code — the resentencing court must issue an order to show cause for an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner remains guilty of murder or attempted murder despite the amendments to sections 188 and 189.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174; see § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

At the evidentiary hearing, “[t]he admission of evidence … shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”

The Jury’s Verdict Did Not Preclude the Resentencing Court From Finding Defendant Was the Actual Killer

Player argues that the jury’s not-true findings on the allegation he personally used a firearm and on the robbery special circumstance, which included as an element that defendant personally killed the victim, barred the resentencing court under principles of collateral estoppel from finding him guilty as the actual killer. The Court reviews de novo a lower court’s application of collateral estoppel. The Court of Appeal agrees with the resentencing court that the Supreme Court’s Santamaria decision defeats defendant’s argument.

Applicable case law

The Court agreed with Hart that Santamaria applies to section 1172.6 proceedings. Santamaria is binding Supreme Court authority applying those general principles to a jury’s not-true findings.

“At an evidentiary hearing in a section 1172.6 proceeding, the question before the court is the same as it would be at a retrial for the murder: whether the petitioner is guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt under current law.” (Hart, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1111.)

Hart’s observed that, were we to conclude Santamaria, which unquestionably applies to criminal trials, does not also apply to section 1172.6 proceedings, we would be “afford[ing] section 1172.6 petitioners greater protection against a redetermination of factual issues than they would enjoy in a criminal trial.” (Hart, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112.) This “would make little sense” when section 1172.6 defendants are, as a general matter, entitled to fewer constitutional protections than defendants in criminal trials.

Under Santamaria and Hart, the Court holds the jury’s not-true finding on the firearm enhancement did not preclude the resentencing court from finding defendant was the actual killer. The Court reached the same conclusion as to the jury’s not-true finding on the robbery special circumstance containing an actual-killer requirement. Under Santamaria, that not-true finding, like the not-true finding on the firearm enhancement, does not establish the jury necessarily found defendant did not personally kill the victim. The jury might simply have been unsure what role defendant played in the killing, and found the special circumstance not true on that basis.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Resentencing Court’s Finding Defendant was the Actual Killer

Having concluded the jury’s verdict did not preclude the resentencing court from finding defendant was the actual killer, the Court found the record supports that finding.

Standard of review

The Court reviews a resentencing court’s denial order following a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence supports the resentencing court’s finding defendant was the actual killer. See People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052 [“Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the [substantial evidence] standard is sufficient to uphold the finding”]; accord, People v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1117, fn. 9.)

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