A judge’s personal involvement as a District Attorney in cases considered in a Racial Justice Act Evidentiary Hearing requires disqualification

People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 16, 2026, No. E086779) 2026 WL 1029464, at *1

Summary: Petitioner, the People of the State of California, filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to vacate the order issued on August 12, 2025, denying their request to disqualify the Honorable Samah Shouka from further action in the case of real party in interest Russell Austin. Austin was charged in 2018 with first degree murder and the People sought the death penalty. Austin filed a claim under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), a prima facie case had been found and RJA discovery was ordered. Judge Shouka was assigned to Austin’s case to conduct the evidentiary hearing. Judge Shouka was a former deputy district attorney employed by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office (DAO) in the homicide unit. The People sought to disqualify Judge Shouka from presiding over Austin’s case based on provisions in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. The People claimed that that Judge Shouka had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; she served as a lawyer for a party in a proceeding that involved the same issues as in the present proceeding; and facts and circumstances exist that would lead a person to reasonably doubt that Judge Shouka would be impartial in these proceedings. The Honorable Jeffrey B. Jones was assigned to decide the request for disqualification and entered an order on August 12, 2025, denying the request.

The People filed a petition for writ of mandate (Petition) asking the appellate court to reverse the order denying the request to disqualify Judge Shouka and issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its August 12, 2025, order. The People requested a stay of the proceedings until the issue has been resolved by this court. The Court of Appeal granted the requested stay and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The Court of Appeal granted the Petition finding that Judge Shouka’s previous employment with the DAO might cause a person to reasonably entertain a doubt that she would be able to be impartial at the RJA evidentiary hearing within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).

Factual and procedural history

In 2008, Austin was charged with special-circumstance murder, and the People filed notice of an intent to seek the death penalty.

Austin’s case is currently pending an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the RJA, specifically Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(3). Austin is seeking to show that the DAO seeks the death penalty and files special circumstances charges more frequently against Black defendants than against White defendants who are similarly situated, with similar conduct. Austin has provided statistical information, specifically homicide filings by the DAO for the years between 2006 and 2019.

Amended statement of disqualification filed by the people against judge Shouka

The People filed an amended statement of disqualification (ASD) on July 1, 2025.1 Their declaration stated that Judge Shouka had personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts in the case within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A). The declaration stated that Judge Shouka was a lawyer for a party in a proceeding that involved the same issues as the present proceeding within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2)(A). The declaration asserted that there was a reasonable doubt that Judge Shouka would be able to be impartial within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).

The People argued that there was an appearance of impropriety. The People also claimed the standard for disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), was relatively low. It was only needed to show that a person “might” reasonably entertain a doubt as to the judge’s partiality.

Denial of the ASD

Judge Jones found that the ASD contained conclusory statements that Judge Shouka should be disqualified. The record established that Judge Shouka did not participate in the charging of Austin.

Austin seeks to prove an RJA violation by proving that “[t]he defendant was charged … of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the county where the convictions were sought or obtained.” (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (a)(3).) “[P]roof of a [Penal Code] section 745, subdivision (a)(3) violation—e.g., differences in seeking or obtaining convictions and differences in imposing sentences—calls for systemic or institutional analyses that are most likely demonstrated at least in part through statistical evidence.” (McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 242-243, 332 Cal.Rptr.3d 667.) The policy and practice of the DAO in charging different defendants, specifically the disparity of the charging of the death penalty, may suggest patterns of institutional bias, explicit bias, historical patterns of bias and systematic bias within the DAO.

Disqualification of a judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(2)(A), a judge shall be disqualified if they “served as a lawyer in the proceeding, or in any other proceeding involving the same issues he or she served as a lawyer for a party in the present proceeding or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action or proceeding.” Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides that a judge shall be disqualified if they have “personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(C)(iii), a judge shall be disqualified if, for any reason, “A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding.” The facts and circumstances prompting the challenge to a particular judge must be analyzed as of the time the challenge is brought. (United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 97, 105, 216 Cal.Rptr. 4.) “A party asserting disqualification has a ‘heavy burden’ and ‘must “ ‘clearly’ ” establish the appearance of bias.’ ” (Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 273, 286, 305 Cal.Rptr.3d 647.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), “ ‘[I]f a reasonable man would entertain doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality, disqualification is mandated. “To ensure that the proceedings appear to the public to be impartial and hence worthy of their confidence, the situation must be viewed through the eyes of the objective person.” [Citations.] While this objective standard clearly indicates that the decision on disqualification not be based on the judge’s personal view of his own impartiality, it also suggests that the litigants’ necessarily partisan views not provide the applicable frame of reference. Rather, “a judge faced with a potential ground for disqualification ought to consider how his participation in a given case looks to the average person on the street.” ’ ” (Jolie v. Superior Court (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1039-1040, 281 Cal.Rptr.3d 610.)

The People refer to the opinion by the California Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics Opinions (CJEO) on disqualification of former prosecutors in RJA motions, which was issued on August 7, 20253 (CJEO Opinion). The CJEO was asked by the requesting judge to address the ethical issues regarding disqualification and disclosure requirements in cases involving RJA claims. The CJEO noted that a judge need not recuse “merely because the judge, while working as a deputy district attorney, handled cases involving elements that may be subject to discovery under a motion pursuant to the Racial Justice Act.” It further noted, “Nevertheless, disqualification is required if the judge’s prior prosecutorial involvement was such that a reasonable person, aware of the circumstances, could justifiably doubt the judge’s ability to remain impartial.”

The issue raised by Austin is how the DAO chooses to file murder charges and seek the death penalty, and whether there is implicit or explicit bias. Judge Shouka was present at staffing meetings where these decisions were being discussed, and she regularly recommended charges that should be brought in homicide cases. Her role was more than just following “office policy”; she was directly involved in making charging decisions.

The People only had to show in the ASD that a person “might” reasonably entertain a doubt that Judge Shouka would be able to be impartial. Here, Judge Shouka made recommendations as to filing charges in homicide cases during the relevant period of time involved in the RJA motion, and was present at staffing meetings where decisions were made in other cases as to the charges to be filed. A person aware of these facts might reasonably doubt as to whether Judge Shouka could be impartial in determining if the DAO had a pattern of institutional bias, explicit bias, or historical and systematic bias in filing homicide charges, when she was personally involved in these decisions while at the DAO.

Here, the record was sufficiently developed to show that Judge Shouka may have been personally involved in the cases that will be examined during the evidentiary hearing. Further, she was involved in filing decisions made by the DAO in death penalty cases, which may be a part of the evidentiary hearing in relation to a pattern of institutional bias.

Disposition

The petition for writ of mandate is granted, directing  the Riverside County Superior Court to vacate its order issued by Judge Jones on August 12, 2025, denying the People’s amended statement of disqualification and enter a new and different order disqualifying Judge Shouka.

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