The Deemed Prejudicial Standard of Section 231.7 Applies Only to Denials of Objections to Peremptory Challenges

People v. Guzman (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 22, 2025, No. G065309) 2025 WL 2972244, at *1

Summary:  The Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 3070 (effective January 1, 2021), codified at Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, (section 231.7),  because it found the procedures of Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler) ineffective in eliminating discriminatory exclusion of potential jurors.

Subdivision (j) of section 231.7 (section 231.7(j)) makes the denial of an objection to a peremptory challenge subject to de novo appellate review and states, “[s]hould the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.”

The Court granted a petition by  Guzman in order to address the following issue:  The  “deemed prejudicial” standard of section 231.7(j) applies when an objection to a peremptory challenge was determined to have been erroneously granted.The Court concluded, based upon the statutory language, statutory scheme, and legislative history, that the deemed prejudicial standard does not apply when the objection to the peremptory challenge was erroneously granted. When an objection to a peremptory challenge under section 231.7 is erroneously granted, traditional rules and standards regarding prejudicial error apply. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.

Procedural history

The People filed a complaint charging defendant with resisting and obstructing an officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), Count 1); domestic battery with corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 237.5, subd. (a), Count 2); and assault on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 241, subd. (c), Count 3). Defendant pled not guilty to all counts.

During voir dire, defendant challenged Juror 122 for cause because of his experience with domestic violence as a child in foster care and work in law enforcement dealing with victims of domestic violence. The trial court denied the challenge for cause based on Juror 122’s statements he could remain fair and impartial.

Defendant then challenged Juror 122 peremptorily. The People objected pursuant to section 231.7, stating Juror 122 was a white male. Defense counsel stated the reasons for the peremptory challenge were similar to the challenge for cause–he had a traumatic childhood involving domestic violence, he was involved in law enforcement and had significant interactions with domestic violence victims, and he was combative during voir dire. The People responded beliefs and opinions about police officers are presumptively invalid reasons for a peremptory challenge and there was no record of Juror 122’s attitude towards defense counsel. The People also pointed out the juror would be the second white male defense counsel sought to remove. Defense counsel argued general attitudes, as opposed to distrust or negative experiences, toward law enforcement, was not a presumptively invalid reason.

The trial court sustained the People’s objection, clarifying Juror 122 indicated several times he could be fair and impartial. Juror 122 remained on the jury.

On September 22, 2022, the jury found defendant guilty on Count 1, guilty on the lesser included charge for Count 2 (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)), and not guilty on Count 3. On September 26, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years of informal probation.

The Appellate Division reversed the judgment on count 1 but in all other respects affirmed. The Appellate Division concluded the “deemed prejudicial” standard of section 231.7(j) does not apply to the erroneous grant of an objection to a peremptory challenge. Although the People had conceded the trial court had erred by granting the objection to the peremptory challenge, the Appellate Division concluded Guzman had not demonstrated prejudice from including Juror No. 122 on the jury.

Peremptory Challenges and Section 231.7

Both the California Constitution and the United States Constitution prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors based on race and other protected characteristics.

Batson and Wheeler created a three-step process which trial courts had traditionally used to evaluate a party’s constitutional objection to an opposing party’s peremptory challenge on the ground it was based on race.  “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case ‘by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.’  Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide … whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.’ “ (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168. (Johnson).)

Section 231.7, subdivision (a) states: “A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.” To enforce that prohibition, section 231.7 sets forth a new procedure to replace the Batson/Wheeler one. Under this new procedure, “[a] party … may object to the improper use of a peremptory challenge” based on a “prospective juror’s race” or “perceived” race. (§ 231.7, subds. (a) & (b).) “[U]pon objection …, the party exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.” (Id., subd. (c).) The trial court must “evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances” identified in a nonexhaustive list. (Id., subd. (d)(1), (3).) In evaluating the reasons, the court “shall consider only the reasons actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge.”2 (Id., subd. (d)(1).)

Under the Batson/Wheeler test, the ultimate question for the trial court in ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge is whether the party exercising the objection engaged in “purposeful discrimination.” Under section 231.7, in contrast, the trial court must sustain the objection to the peremptory challenge “[i]f the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race … as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1)) An “objectively reasonable person” is defined as one who is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California.” (Id., subd. (d)(2)(A).)

If the trial court grants an objection to a peremptory challenge, the court must take one or more of the corrective actions identified in section 231.7, subdivision (h), which include “[s]eat the challenged juror.” (Id., subd. (h)(3).)

Section 231.7(j) sets forth the applicable standard of review: “[T]he denial of an objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence.” Second, section 231.7(j) bars the reviewing court from imputing any findings to the trial court, limits appellate review to the reasons actually given for the peremptory challenge, and directs the reviewing court not to speculate to or consider other reasons that were not given.

The last sentence of section 231.7(j), which is the subject of this appeal, states: “Should the appellate court determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.”

The Deemed Prejudicial Standard of Section 231.7 Applies Only to Denials of Objections to Peremptory Challenges

Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation

General standards of appellate review apply to appeals transferred from the superior court appellate division for decision in the Court of Appeal.

Plain Language

Section 231.7(j) states, “the denial of an objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de novo,” and “should the appellate court determine the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.” (Ibid.) The plain and express language in section 231.7(j) makes the “deemed prejudicial” standard applicable only to objections that were erroneously denied. The phrases “denial of an objection” and “the objection was erroneously denied” cannot reasonably be interpreted also to mean “granting an objection” and “the objection was erroneously granted.”

The statutory scheme of section 231.7 reflects a concern for the improper removal of jurors. Section 231.7  limits the use of peremptory challenges and make removal of jurors for discriminatory purposes more difficult. Subdivision (c) requires the party exercising the peremptory challenge, upon objection, to state the reasons for the challenge. Subdivision (d)(1) requires the trial court to evaluate the reasons given considering “the totality of the circumstances” to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would view an impermissible ground as a factor in the use of the challenge.

Section 231.7 replaced the Batson/Wheeler “purposeful discrimination” standard with a narrower, objective standard. Section 231.7 permits a trial court to grant an objection to a peremptory challenge only “[i]f the court determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race … as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) Section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) states “[t]he court need not find purposeful discrimination to sustain the objection.”

Guzman Has Not Demonstrated Prejudicial Error

The Appellate Division noted “[t]he People concede error” in granting the objection to Guzman’s peremptory challenge to Juror No. 122 “because law enforcement is not a cognizable class under section 231.7 and there is no language in the statute concerning a prospective juror’s friendliness toward law enforcement.” (People v. Guzman, supra, 30-2022-01290936 at p. 6.) Guzman has failed to demonstrate, however, that he suffered prejudice from the error.

The jury verdict  shows Guzman suffered no prejudice from the seating of Juror No. 122. According to the Appellate Division, Guzman’s reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 122 were that he had had a traumatic childhood involving domestic violence, had been involved in law enforcement, and had had significant interactions with domestic violence victims. But the jury, with Juror No. 122 participating, acquitted Guzman of domestic battery with corporal injury (the greater charge on count 2) and of assault on a peace officer (count 3).

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.

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