Requiring an advisory that it is a crime of file a false allegation of police misconduct violates free speech

LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants. (Cal., Jan. 21, 2026, No. S275272) 2026 WL 171531, at *1–4

 Summary: California requires law enforcement agencies to investigate complaints against peace officers. (See Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (a)(1).) Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a) (section 148.6(a))  makes it a crime to file a knowingly false allegation of misconduct against a peace officer. (See § 148.6, subd. (a)(1) [section 148.6(a)(1) or subdivision (a)(1)].) Law enforcement agencies must require the complainant to read and sign an advisory informing the complainant that filing a knowingly false complaint of police misconduct is a crime. (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(2) [section 148.6(a)(2) or subdivision (a)(2)].)  The Court held that Section 148.6(a)’s provisions violate constitutional free speech rights.

Background: The City of Los Angeles (the City) entered into a consent decree barring it from requiring complainants to sign the advisory in section 148.6(a)(2). Although the consent decree expired in 2013, but the City still does not require a signed advisory from complainants.

In 2017, the Los Angeles Police Protective League (LAPPL) sought an injunction that would require the City to comply with section 148.6(a)(2)’s advisory requirement. The City argued that section 148.6(a) was an unconstitutional regulation of speech. The trial court concluded it was bound by Stanistreet and enjoined the City from accepting any complaint alleging misconduct by a peace officer unless the complainant had signed the advisory required by section 148.6(a)(2). The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding (as the trial court had) that it was bound by Stanistreet. (See Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1088.) The City was ordered to advise complainants that it was a crime to file a knowingly false claim of misconduct against a peace officer despite the fact that multiple federal decisions had found that criminal provision to be unconstitutional. The City petitioned for review, and the Court granted review.

Since Stanistreet was decided, the United States Supreme Court has issued additional guidance on First Amendment issues that relate both to R. A. V. and, more generally, prohibitions on knowing falsehoods. In United States. v. Alvarez (2012) 567 U.S. 709 (Alvarez), the court announced for the first time that even well-intentioned prohibitions on knowing falsehoods can trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny if they go too far in chilling protected speech. In Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton (2025) 606 U.S. 461 (Free Speech Coalition), the court held that content-based restrictions that regulate unprotected speech are subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny if they have an “incidental burden” on protected speech. (Id. at p. 495; see id. at pp. 482–483.

Courts should ask whether the content-based regulation of proscribable speech is structured in such a manner that it either disfavors certain subjects or viewpoints (as in R. A. V.) The Court concluded that section 148.6(a)’s criminal provision (§ 148.6(a)(1)) and its required admonition (§ 148.6(a)(2)) exhibit numerous characteristics that, considered together, sufficiently burden a protected form of speech — namely, truthful (or at least well-intentioned) complaints of police misconduct — so as to warrant heightened constitutional scrutiny. Those features include: (1) singling out for criminal treatment knowingly false allegations of misconduct that are filed against a category of government official whose job duties are of particular concern to the public; (2) asymmetrically criminalizing knowingly false allegations that are filed against law enforcement, while leaving unregulated false statements that witnesses might make in support of law enforcement during the course of the ensuing investigation that is required under section 832.5; (3) barring law enforcement from accepting a formal complaint of police misconduct unless complainants agree to read and sign an admonition warning that they can be criminally prosecuted if their claims are disbelieved; (4) providing complainants ill-defined and inconsistent descriptions of what specific types of false statements might trigger criminal liability; and (5) failing to require that the statements actually be material to an actionable type of misconduct or that they cause any harm to the falsely accused. The Court expressed no view whether any of these elements might unduly burden speech when considered in isolation, but considered together, they “threaten censorship of ideas” (R. A. V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 393) by deterring citizens from filing truthful (or at least not knowingly false) complaints of police misconduct.

The Court concluded that section 148.6(a) cannot survive even the less exacting standard of intermediate scrutiny, which requires that “a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’ ” (Packingham v. North Carolina (2017) 582 U.S. 98, 105–106 (Packingham).)

The Legislature is authorized to take steps to protect the integrity of the peace officer complaint process (see Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 510), but section 148.6(a) “ ‘burdens substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’ ” (Packingham, supra, 582 U.S. at p. 105 [describing intermediate scrutiny standard].)

 

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