Petition to Dismiss Parole Revocation on Due Process Grounds Must  be Considered by the Trial Court

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER SKAGGS, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 14, 2025, No. A170942) 2025 WL 2356066, at *1–2

Summary: Skaggs filed a motion to dismiss his parole revocation petition on due process grounds, which the trial court treated as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied because such a motion was procedurally improper. The court then revoked Skaggs’s parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole term to terminate upon release. On appeal, Skaggs challenges the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and subsequent parole revocation.

The appeal was dismissed as moot because the Court cannot  afford Skaggs any effective relief. The Court resolved the issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the motion to dismiss and concluded the court improperly determined it could not entertain the motion to dismiss.

Background

In 2013, Skaggs pled guilty to two felony violations of the Vehicle Code (Veh. Code, §§ 2800.3, 2800.4) in Mendocino County. In accordance with his negotiated plea, Skaggs was sentenced to nine years and eight months in prison.

In February 2019, Skaggs was released on parole. On December 15, 2020, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a petition for revocation of parole alleging Skaggs engaged in new criminal conduct, as well as a criminal complaint based on the same conduct.

Skaggs was convicted of the Lake County offenses and sentenced in May 2021 to three years and eight months in prison.

Skaggs demanded that the Mendocino County District Attorney bring him back to Mendocino County to address the parole revocation proceeding and the related criminal action. In September 2021, Skaggs moved to dismiss both the parole revocation petition and the criminal case pursuant to section 1381, which that incarcerated defendants with state charges pending against them may demand to be brought to trial on the pending charges and, if the case is not brought to trial within 90 days of giving  notice, may seek dismissal of the case.

On November 2, 2021, the trial court dismissed the Mendocino County criminal complaint pursuant to section 1381. The court declined to dismiss the parole revocation petition on the basis that section 1381 is inapplicable to such proceedings.

In August 2022, Skaggs submitted a motion to dismiss with an attached letter asking the Mendocino County Superior Court to recall the bench warrant in the parole revocation proceeding or order him brought to Mendocino County to “deal with it.” The court returned the documents to Skaggs and instructed him to review the November 2, 2021 minute order saying that  section 1381 does not apply to parole revocation proceedings.

On June 4, 2024, Skaggs filed a motion to dismiss the parole revocation petition on due process grounds. Skaggs argued his right to due process was violated by the failure to have a hearing or resolve the parole revocation matter within a reasonable time despite his repeated requests to do so. Skaggs states he was prejudiced because he could not serve his revocation sentence concurrently with his Lake County sentence and remained in custody longer than necessary or permissible.

The motion to dismiss was heard on June 14, 2024. The court likened  the motion to a section 1385 motion to dismiss and concluded it could not dismiss under that section on due process grounds. The court reasoned that “[a] parole revocation proceeding is not an action within the purview of … section 1385,” citing People v. Wiley (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1063.

Immediately after denying the motion to dismiss, the court held a contested revocation hearing and found Skaggs violated his parole conditions. The court sentenced Skaggs to 90 days in jail, with credit for time spent in custody, and ordered his parole terminated upon completion of the jail term. Skaggs appealed. The parties represent that, during the pendency of the appeal, Skaggs’s parole was terminated.

Skaggs’ Motion to dismiss was not made under 1385

The trial court erred by construing Skaggs’s motion to dismiss on constitutional due process grounds as a section 1385 motion, which in turn led the court to incorrectly conclude it lacked authority to even consider his motion.

Skaggs made clear throughout his motion that it was premised on constitutional due process grounds. The motion expressly relied on Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 (Morrissey), the seminal Supreme Court case establishing the minimum due process protections for parolees facing revocation while also clarifying that such protections are not equivalent to the “full panoply of rights due a defendant” in a criminal proceeding.  The motion also cited DeLeon, in which the California Supreme Court reaffirmed that Morrissey’s minimum due process requirements continue to apply to state parole revocation proceedings after the 2012 amendments to the parole revocation statutes. (DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 654–655.) The motion was patently based on constitutional due process grounds, not any statutory provision, and the trial court erred by construing it as a section 1385 motion to dismiss.The trial court mistakenly believed it did not have jurisdiction to entertain a nonstatutory motion to dismiss on constitutional due process grounds in the parole revocation context, that belief was misplaced. (See, e.g., People v. Ruiz (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 372, 377, 379–380 [trial court had jurisdiction to consider motion to dismiss parole revocation petition and related request to transfer supervision from parole to postrelease community supervision premised in part on constitutional due process and equal protection grounds].) The trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Skaggs’s nonstatutory motion to dismiss on constitutional due process grounds alone. (See Ruiz, at pp. 379–380.)

The trial court erred by construing Skaggs’s constitutional motion to dismiss as a section 1385 motion and denying it on that basis. Rather, the  trial court had the authority to consider the motion on the constitutional due process grounds raised therein and should have done so. Because Skaggs has completed his revocation sentence and his parole supervision has terminated during the pendency of his appeal, the Court dismissed his appeal as moot. (See DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 660.)

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