Low Threshold to Meet the Plausible Justification Standard Under RJA Discovery

McDaniel v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (Cal. Ct. App., May 19, 2025, No. A171858) 2025 WL 1428762

Summary: McDaniel, a Black individual, alleges he was disparately charged with gang enhancements due to his race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. McDaniel challenged the trial court’s order holding that he failed to demonstrate “good cause” to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to a potential violation of the Act. (Pen. Code,1 § 745, subd. (d).) The Court of Appeal held that:

1 defendant presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate good cause to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to his RJA claim, and

2 remand of defendant’s claim was warranted for discretionary weighing of the factors for deciding appropriate scope of discovery of material requested to support his RJA claim.

Petition granted.

Background

The San Mateo County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging five defendants, including McDaniel, with attempted first degree murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2), assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 3 & 4), carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle by an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1); count 5), unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 6), active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 7), conspiracy to commit a felony by active street gang participants (§ 182.5; count 8), and conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 9). The information further alleged personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) as to counts 1 through 4, infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to counts 1 and 3, and commission of the offenses for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) as to counts 1 through 4.

Motion for data under RJA

McDaniel filed a motion under the RJA for  information regarding: (1) cases in which a violation of sections 664/187, 245, 245.2, 245.3, 245.5, 12022, 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.53, 12022.55, 12022.7, 12022.75, 12022.8, 12022.9, 12022.95, 182, 182.5, and/or 186.22 were charged or alleged; (2) for each case, the date of offense, case number, date of filing, name of the defendant, date of birth of the defendant, race and ethnicity of the defendant, address of the defendant, and list of all charges, enhancements, prior conviction allegations, and any other allegations filed; (3) policies concerning the charging of gang enhancements pursuant to section 186.22 et seq.; and (4) records showing any statistical analysis by the District Attorney concerning the racial demographics of those who are charged with gang enhancements pursuant to section 186.22 et seq.2

McDaniel argued the requested records were relevant to prove  that the District Attorney’s office more frequently charged gang enhancements against Black defendants as compared to defendants of other races who committed similar offenses and were similarly situated. McDaniel further argued the request easily satisfied the low good cause standard for discovery under the RJA.

McDaniel’s contends the trial court erred in concluding his discovery motion failed to demonstrate good cause under the RJA. McDaniel asserts a “plausible factual foundation” for showing good cause does not require evidence of case-specific facts, but instead may rely solely on statistical evidence indicating disparate charging based on the race of the defendant.

The RJA, effective January 1, 2021, added section 745 to the Penal Code. The Legislature enacted the RJA in response to then-prevailing law, stating “ ‘[c]urrent law, as interpreted by the courts, stands in sharp contrast’ to the Legislature’s strong commitment to root out discrimination in the criminal justice system and runs contrary to the Legislature’s declared acknowledgement that ‘all persons possess implicit biases …, that these biases impact the criminal justice system …, and that negative implicit biases tend to disfavor people of color.’ ” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 149–150, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513.) The express intent of the RJA was to “eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system” and “ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.”

In applying this interpretation of good cause to the RJA, the Young court concluded that “in order to establish good cause for discovery under the [RJA], a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the [RJA] ‘could or might have occurred’ in his case.” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 159.) The court emphasized good cause under the RJA is a “minimal standard” that is “in some respects even more relaxed than the ‘relatively relaxed standard[ ]’ ” for Pitchess motions. (Young, at p. 159, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513.) The threshold showing for good cause must be commensurately broad and flexible.” (Id. at p. 160.) In addition, a low threshold for entitlement to discovery is in accord with the RJA and its escalating burdens of proof. (Young, at p. 160,.)

Whether the RJA Requires Case-specific Facts

Here, the primary question is whether the prosecutor’s decision to charge McDaniel with a gang enhancement was the result of racial bias. Would Black defendants be more likely to be charged with gang enhancements than White defendants under similar circumstances? In such a scenario, case-specific facts—apart from a defendant’s race and the charges against him—may not be persuasive evidence of potential racial bias. Instead, county-level data reflecting a racial disparity in charging or convictions may provide a plausible basis for asserting that an RJA violation “could or might have” occurred. (See Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159, 161, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 [“the plausible justification standard [under the RJA discovery provision] … should not be difficult to meet”]; id. at pp. 168–169, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 [“Where the defendant makes a showing of plausible justification that there was or could have been a violation of the Racial Justice Act, thus triggering access to ‘all relevant evidence’ [citation] concerning a potential violation …, it will likely be an abuse of discretion to ‘totally foreclose[ ]’ discovery.”].)

Here, McDaniel provided county-specific data suggestive of a disparity between the racial composition of San Mateo County and the racial composition of those charged with gang or gang enhancement charges. He also provided an expert declaration evaluating charging and incarceration rates and concluding that available data indicates “some actual disparity.” While in no way definitive, this evidence presents specific facts of actual racial disparities in gang and gang enhancement charges brought by prosecutors in San Mateo County. And those disparities are sufficient to support a plausible claim that gang charges could or might be impacted by racial bias. As noted by Young, “the plausible justification standard [under the RJA discovery provision] … should not be difficult to meet.” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 161, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513.)

Here, McDaniel has provided county-specific data that presented a “plausible” showing of a racial disparity, supported by an expert declaration supporting the possibility of an actual racial disparity. While McDaniel will need to meet a higher burden to demonstrate a prima facie case under the RJA, the discovery he requests—e.g., lists of cases involving the same or similar charges, race and ethnicity of defendants in those cases, enhancements and prior conviction allegations regarding those charges and defendants—is reasonably calculated to disclose evidence that illuminates whether a charging disparity exists between defendants “who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(3).) At the discovery stage, requiring defendants to resolve all statistical flaws or provide analysis from a larger data pool, when such data has not yet been provided by the district attorney’s office, would not be consistent with the legislative intent behind the Act. (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 162, 294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513; Gonzales, supra, 108, 329 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 Cal.App.5th at p. Supp. 65.)

Remand Is Appropriate for the Trial Court to Consider the Appropriate Scope of Discovery in the First Instance

McDaniel has offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate a plausible factual foundation for discovery under the RJA, but a question remains regarding the appropriate scope of his request. As explained in Young, “ ‘[t]he trial court, in deciding whether the defendant shall be permitted to obtain discovery of the requested material, must consider and balance a number of [other] factors’ [citation], ‘[s]pecifically … (1) whether the material requested is adequately described, (2) whether the requested material is reasonably available to the governmental entity from which it is sought (and not readily available to the defendant from other sources), (3) whether production of the records containing the requested information would violate (i) third party confidentiality or privacy rights or (ii) any protected governmental interest, (4) whether the defendant has acted in a timely manner, (5) whether the time required to produce the requested information will necessitate an unreasonable delay of defendant’s trial, [and] (6) whether the production of the records containing the requested information would place an unreasonable burden on the governmental entity involved.’ ” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 144–145,

The Court remanded to the trial court to engage in a discretionary weighing of the Alhambra factors, including the potential probative value of the information he seeks, and the burdens of gathering the requested “records or information” for disclosure.

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