San Francisco Criminal Lawyer BlogJuvenile’s 44 year to life sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP under section 1170(d)(1)(A).
People v. Baldwin (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 27, 2025, No. F088265) 2025 WL 2462748, at *1–2
Summary: Baldwin was sentenced to 44 years to life. In 2024, he petitioned for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (section 1170(d))1 and pursuant to People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, (Heard). Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides for recall and resentencing only to those juveniles who were sentenced to an explicit term of life without parole (LWOP). Heard held that section 1170(d) violates equal protection principles to the extent it excludes from relief those juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP. The trial court concluded appellant’s sentence was not the functional equivalent of LWOP, and denied relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A).
On appeal, Baldwin argues the functional equivalence of LWOP should be determined under the formulation of functional equivalency articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, (Contreras) in the context of the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. Contreras analyzed whether sentences of 50 and 58 years to life imposed on juveniles for nonhomicide crimes were functionally equivalent to juvenile LWOP sentences the United States Supreme Court had categorically prohibited in Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, (Graham) and were, therefore, unlawful under the Eighth Amendment. Contreras evaluated whether the juvenile sentences at issue provided the type of “ ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” that Graham requires, and ultimately found the sentences unlawful under the Eighth Amendment.
The Courts of Appeal are presently split on whether Contreras’s Eighth Amendment formulation of functional equivalency applies to equal protection challenges to section 1170(d) based on Heard, and whether a sentence of 50 years to life for homicide crimes constitutes the functional equivalent of LWOP in that context. The California Supreme Court has granted review to address whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1) on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP.
This Court accepts that an equal protection analysis to section 1170(d) requires “an equal protection specific” analysis that is not centered on Eighth Amendment concerns (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1073) and affirmed the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition. Baldwin failed to meet his burde that section 1170(d)’s limitation on eligibility to those sentenced to LWOP has no rational basis, and is therefore unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to 44 years to life.
Functional Equivalence of LWOP in the Eighth Amendment Context
In Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568, the United States Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits sentencing juvenile offenders to death. In 2010, the Supreme Court expanded Roper and held the Eighth Amendment also prohibits sentencing nonhomicide juvenile offenders to LWOP; only by giving such offenders “some realistic opportunity to obtain release” would punishment provided by the states comport with the Eighth Amendment. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 82.) The United States Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that makes LWOP a mandatory sentence for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide. (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 489, (Miller).) Miller outlined mitigating factors relating to youth that must be considered by the sentencing court before committing a juvenile homicide offender to prison for LWOP, and explained the “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”
The California Supreme Court extended Graham, holding the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing nonhomicide juvenile offenders to a “term-of-years sentence that amounts to the functional equivalent of a [LWOP] sentence ….” (People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268, (Caballero).)
Contreras held a sentence of 50 years to life is functionally equivalent to LWOP for a juvenile nonhomicide offender because it does not provide the opportunities Graham requires.
Eighth Amendment Arguments in the Equal Protection Context
In Hardin, the California Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that a young adult offender sentenced to a lengthy term-of-years sentence that is functionally equivalent to LWOP would be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, while a young adult offender serving an explicit sentence of LWOP would not. (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 863.)
Equal Protection Challenges to Section 1170(d)(1)(A) and Sentences Functionally Equivalent to LWOP
The Second District Court of Appeal, Division Three, agreed with the majority in Munoz that section 1170(d)’s exclusion of a juvenile sentenced to 50 years to life for a homicide offense did not violate equal protection principles. (Thompson, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072.) Thompson explained that Contreras had limited the question before it regarding functional equivalence “ ‘to the Eighth Amendment concerns that constrain lawful punishment for juvenile nonhomicide offenders ….’ ”
Thompson explained, rather than “asking whether a 50-year-to-life term functions like [LWOP] with respect to Eighth Amendment concerns that constrain lawful punishment for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, we must ask whether ‘ “a statutory distinction [between [LWOP] and a 50-year-to-life term] is so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection.” ’ ”
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee is meant to “ ‘ensure[ ] that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some justification’ ”; it “ ‘confers no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties’ ”; its function “ ‘is simply to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws.’ ” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 122.)
Determining what term-of-years sentence will result in the juvenile’s certain death in prison and, thus, becomes rationally indistinguishable from a term of LWOP in light of the Legislature’s purposes in enacting section 1170(d), becomes even more difficult where a sentence extends beyond 50 years Those questions are not presented here, however, and we do not reach them.
Here, as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to 44 years to life, appellant fails to demonstrate section 1170(d)’s eligibility limitation has no rational basis and is therefore unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Disposition
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
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