Imperfect self defense fails when excessive force used

People v. Temple (Cal. Ct. App., May 6, 2025, No. G062781) 2025 WL 1304577, at *1

Summary:  A jury found Temple not guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)) but guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder (§ 189, subd. (b)). The jury found to be true the allegations that Temple used a deadly and dangerous weapon—a knife—in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7).  Temple was sentenced to a prison term of 16 years to life.

On appeal, Temple argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 571 (imperfect self-defense) and CALCRIM No. 3428 (consideration of evidence of a mental disease, defect, or disorder). Temple argues those instructions did not inform the jury it could consider evidence of his mental condition in determining whether he acted in imperfect self-defense. The Court of Appeal found that the  instructional error was harmless. A claim of imperfect self-defense can be lost if the defendant used more force than was reasonably necessary to repel the attack, failed to take advantage of an opportunity to retreat, or continued using force after the perceived danger no longer existed. Here, the evidence  Temple used unreasonable force, failed to retreat, and continued using force after the danger no longer existed was so strong that it is not reasonably probable the jury would have found he acted in imperfect self-defense in absence of the claimed instructional error.

ANY ERROR IN THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE OR USE OF MENTAL STATE EVIDENCE WAS HARMLESS

At trial, Temple asserted alternate theories of self-defense and imperfect self-defense. At the request of defense counsel, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 571, on imperfect self-defense, and CALCRIM No. 3428, regarding consideration of evidence of a defendant’s mental disease, defect, or disorder. Temple argues those instructions did not expressly tell the jury it could consider his mental disorders in determining whether he acted in imperfect self-defense; and whether his mental disorders negated malice.

The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 571, on imperfect self-defense, as follows: “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect self-defense.  If you conclude the defendant acted in complete self-defense, his action was lawful and you must find him not guilty of any crime. The difference between complete self-defense and imperfect self-defense depends on whether the defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force was reasonable.  The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if:  1. The defendant actually believed that he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury; AND  2. The defendant actually believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger;  BUT  3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable. Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant.”

Although CALCRIM No. 571 does not state that imperfect self-defense negates malice, it does state that imperfect self-defense reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter.

The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3428, as follows: “You have heard evidence that the defendant may have suffered from a mental disease, defect, or disorder. You may consider this evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted with the intent or mental state required for that crime.  The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required intent or mental state, specifically: malice aforethought. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of first or second degree murder.”

Temple argues these instructions failed to convey to the jurors that they could consider the evidence of Temple’s mental disorders on the issue of imperfect self-defense or that imperfect self-defense operates to negate malice. Temple argues, “jurors who read CALCRIM No. 3428 would have no way of understanding that they could consider [Temple]’s mental disorders in assessing whether he honestly believed his life was in danger or that deadly force was necessary to defend against that danger.”

Temple failed to request modification, clarification, or amplification of those instructions and should mean he forfeited his claim of instructional error. However, an exception to the basic forfeiture rule is, “an appellate court may review any instruction, even when there was no objection or request for modification below, ‘if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 638, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 364 P.3d 359, quoting Pen. Code, § 1259.)

Harmless Error: The Standard of People v. Watson Applies

Temple’s claim of instructional error is subject to the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243 (Watson). The challenged instructions do not amount to a constitutional violation, such as misdescribing of an element of the offense, relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving an element of the crime, or completely depriving the defendant of a defense.

Under the Watson standard, an error is deemed harmless unless it is “reasonably probable” the outcome would have been different in the absence of the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243.)

A defendant who had an actual but unreasonable belief of being in imminent danger of death, but used more force than was reasonably necessary to repel the attack, or continued to use force after the danger no longer existed or was actually believed by the defendant to exist, may not invoke imperfect self-defense. Here, the  evidence shows that Templd  used excessive force.

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