Electronic search clause is reasonable when devices were used for drug sales

People v. Flores (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 11, 2026, No. A171602) 2026 WL 378414, at *1

Summary: Flores pleaded no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale and was sentenced to two years of formal probation with a condition permitting warrantless searches of Flores’s electronic devices. On appeal, Flores asked the court to strike or modify the electronics search clause as unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable. Because Flores used electronic devices to coordinate the sale and to obscure his identity during negotiations, the court affirmed  the electronics search clause in its entirety.

In its presentencing report, the probation department recommended “a five-way search clause to include all electronic devices, and supply passwords upon request due to [Flores] using his cell phone to negotiate the sale of illicit controlled substances.” The report  stated that at the time of the offense, Flores had been on formal probation in Merced for possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and that Flores admitted to using fentanyl and a prior gang affiliation.

At the September 11, 2024 hearing, the sentencing court adopted the terms of the plea agreement, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Flores on felony probation for two years with six months of electronic monitoring, as negotiated. The court imposed a five-way search condition, adding the electronics search clause “in consideration of the facts of this particular case” because Flores was “on probation in Merced for possession for sale of narcotics” and “used electronics here to facilitate [the] drug sales.”

The sentencing court advised Flores of the search condition: “during the term of your probation here, any law enforcement or probation officer may search you, any of your belongings, any vehicle you’re in control of, your residence or any electronic devi[c]e under your control at any time day or night, with or without probable [cause]. As to electronic devices or computers, you must supply any password upon request.”

The sentencing court explained the search condition  “was based upon [Flores’s] actual use of the cell phone Voice Over Internet (VOIP) to facilitate his drug sales.” The court distinguished the “generalization that people often use cell phones to do things” from the instant offense that involved the “actual use” of a cell phone “to facilitate [the] crime,” as well as a VOIP to obscure Flores’s identity. Therefore, the court concluded the electronics search clause was “directly related to [Flores’s] criminal activity and future criminal activity.”

Modification of probation conditions “In an appropriate case,” courts may modify probation conditions (In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901.)  but only to the extent “necessary to render the condition constitutional.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 892.) Given the integral role electronic devices and the internet played in the commission of the underlying offense, the court concluded that the electronics search condition ordered by the sentencing court is both constitutional and reasonable.

Constitutionality of the Search Clause

A trial court has discretion to impose the conditions of probation it deems appropriate for a particular defendant, considering “ ‘the nature of the offense; the interests of justice, including punishment, reintegration of the offender into the community, and enforcement of conditions of probation; the loss to the victim; and the needs of the defendant.’ ” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120, quoting Pen. Code, § 1202.7.) A trial court must also consider the recommendations of the probation department. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234, [“the court must take the probation officer’s report and recommendation into consideration” and although “not bound to accept recommendations in the probation report,” courts “commonly do”].)

“Probation conditions restricting a probationer’s exercise of his constitutional rights are upheld only if narrowly drawn to serve the important interests of public safety and rehabilitation, and if they are ‘specifically tailored to the individual probationer.’ ” (People v. Smith, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.)

Here, Flores’s use of electronic devices and platforms extended beyond the simple use of a cell phone to contact an accomplice, and he admitted the cell phone used to communicate with the undercover officer belonged to him. Flores seeks modification of the search clause to protect the constitutional rights of third parties but he “lacks standing.” (In re Q.R., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 702–703.)

The electronics search clause is narrowly tailored to Flores’s circumstances. The electronics search clause imposed by the sentencing court is not unconstitutionally overbroad.

Reasonableness of the Search Clause

A probation condition will not be invalidated under Lent unless three factors are satisfied: (1) the condition bears no relationship to the underlying crime, (2) it relates to conduct that is not in itself criminal, and (3) it requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1118,

.On appeal, we review the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation for abuse of discretion. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.)

Permitting searches of Flores’s electronic devices bears a reasonable relationship to the underlying offense and precludes Flores from satisfying the first Lent factor.

Flores’s challenge also fails for the additional and independent reason that the ordered search clause is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

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