Claims under Racial Justice Act at Trial Forfeited if no Objection made

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRANDON DUANE WAGSTAFF, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., June 12, 2025, No. H050597) 2025 WL 2938987, at *1, review denied (Oct. 15, 2025)

Summary:  Wagstaff was found guilty of felony false imprisonment and related offenses arising out of a domestic violence incident. He was sentenced to16 months in prison.

Wagstaff, a Black man, contends the trial court violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act, or RJA) on multiple occasions during different stages of the proceedings. His trial counsel did not object to any of these statements under the RJA, so the Court held  that Wagstaff’s claims were forfeited on appeal. He contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to one statement the trial court made at Wagstaff’s sentencing hearing. The Court concluded this claim was without merit because Wagstaff has not shown his trial counsel’s conduct constituted deficient performance.

Wagstaff alsocontends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on misdemeanor false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of felony false imprisonment. The Court concluded this claim is without merit because substantial evidence did not support an instruction on misdemeanor false imprisonment.

The Court affirmed the judgment.

Claims Under the Racial Justice Act

Wagstaff contends the trial court violated the RJA during jury selection and at the sentencing hearing, making his conviction and sentence invalid.

Legal Principles

The Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act through the passage of Assembly Bill No. 2542.  “The Legislature passed the RJA in 2020 with the goal  ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’  The RJA prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 844, 945-946.)

The RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code effective January 1, 2021. Section 745, subdivision (a) sets forth four categories of conduct which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establish a violation. A violation of subdivision (a)(1) has occurred if “[t]he judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1).)

Section 745, subdivision (a)(2) provides that a violation has occurred if “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (h)(4) defines “[r]acially discriminatory language” to mean “language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)

For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of section 745(a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence. (§ 745, subd. (b).) If a court finds a violation of section 745(a), subdivision (e) mandates specific remedies. If a court finds, after judgment has been entered, “that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).) However, “if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(B).)

The Trial Court’s Statements at the Sentencing Hearing

Wagstaff contends the trial court violated the RJA by using racially discriminatory language about his race and exhibiting bias against him in violation of section 745(a).  Wagstaff cites the trial court’s use of the phrase “strong young buck” when the court personally addressed Wagstaff about the nature of his conduct. Additionally, Wagstaff argues the court’s use of the term “boy” and admonitions to Wagstaff to “become a man” and make “manly decisions” constituted demeaning and racially discriminatory language. Wagstaff contends that if trial counsel’s failure to object constitutes forfeiture of the claim on appeal, then trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Wagstaff argues we must vacate his conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with section 745(a). In the alternative he argued that his sentence must be vacated and remand for resentencing.

Forfeiture of claims

For claims based on the trial record, section 745, subdivision (b) allows defendants to “raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence.” But the  doctrine of forfeiture applies. “[Review] of a section 745 claim, like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in the trial court.” (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812.)

Reviewing courts may excuse a party for failing to make a timely objection at trial if the objection would have been futile. (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1328.) The record does not support Wagstaff’s characterization of the trial court’s rulings. Wagstaff cites no statements or rulings by the trial court that suggest it would not have fairly considered the merits of an objection, or that it would have punished Wagstaff more harshly had trial counsel objected. Wagstaff makes no claim the court failed to fairly consider the motion or otherwise abused its discretion. “We will not presume that sentencing courts respond to arguments and objections in an arbitrary and vindictive manner.” (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.)

Need for a timely objection

A timely objection serves to alert the court and parties to the nature of the claim and objecting counsel’s reasons for it, such that opposing counsel can address it and the trial court can make a fully informed ruling on an adequately developed record. It is particularly important that counsel object at the earliest opportunity when the issue concerns alleged bias or prejudice by the trial court.

When a claim under the RJA concerns a trial court’s conduct, requiring the claim to be raised below furthers one of the central motivations for the RJA’s enactment: “It is important to recognize the value of bringing a Racial Justice Act claim in the trial court in the first instance.” (People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 1000.) “Asking a trial court to consider whether its proposed ruling reflects the court’s own implicit biases, or could have the unintended consequence of playing to jurors’ implicit biases, serves an important purpose in raising the court’s consciousness of the biases the Racial Justice Act is intended to eliminate.”

The absence of any record concerning the racial implications of the language used by the trial court hinders the Court’s ability to evaluate the claim properly under the standards set forth in the RJA. Section 745(a) would require us to determine whether the court used racially discriminatory language “about the defendant’s race” or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant “because of the defendant’s race.”

Wagstaff has forfeited this claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Wagstaff contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in only one instance: counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s use of the phrase “strong young buck” at the sentencing hearing.Legal Principles

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show trial counsel’s performance was deficient—that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” in light of prevailing professional norms. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688.) Second, the defendant must show the asserted deficiency in counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice, defined as “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Counsel Had a Rational Tactical Reason Not to Object

There is  presumption that counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of reasonableness, and we “afford ‘great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’To justify reversal, Wagstaff must present affirmative evidence that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for not objecting.

Wagstaff does not address the possibility that his trial counsel may have had a rational tactical reason for declining to object. Here, the trial court imposed a 16-month sentence—five years shorter than the probation report’s recommended sentence of six years four months.

Application of the Racial Justice Act to the Trial Court’s Ruling on the Peremptory Challenge

Wagstaff contends the trial court violated the RJA in overruling his objection to the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to remove a Black juror. Wagstaff argues the prosecutor used racially discriminatory language when he stated, “I do not believe that just having a African-American man under the matter entitles the defendant to a jury including an African-American man.”Wagstaff asserts that, by injecting the concept of “entitlement” into the argument, the prosecutor’s statement implied that Wagstaff was “less than” and somehow had to earn the right to have a jury that includes someone of his own race. Wagstaff contends the record shows the trial court implicitly adopted the prosecutor’s biased viewpoint because the court ignored defense counsel’s arguments under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 and instead ruled solely on a perceived lack of empathy as the prosecution’s only justification for the peremptory challenge.

Wagstaff does not point to any language used by the trial court as constituting racially discriminatory language. Nothing in the record supports Wagstaff’s assertion that the trial court implicitly adopted the prosecution’s statements merely by declining to address defense counsel’s arguments under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7.  This claim is without merit.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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