San Francisco Criminal Lawyer BlogCDCR cannot award credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Cal. Ct. App., July 28, 2025, No. C100274) 2025 WL 2104730, at *1–2
Summary: In 2016, Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Cal. Const., art. I § 32) amended the California Constitution to give the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) the authority, “notwithstanding … any other provision of law,” to award credits for good behavior and for approved rehabilitative or educational achievements. It directed the CDCR to adopt regulations in furtherance of such authority.
The CDCR adopted regulations that: (1) award credits beyond statutory limits and (2) use credits to advance all indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates (the regulations). The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims (collectively, petitioners) challenged the validity of these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allow the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and petitioners appealed.
CDCR contends the regulations advancing indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible paroles dates with credits are consistent with the plain language of Proposition 57 and reasonably necessary to effectuate Proposition 57’s purpose. CDCR asserts that Proposition 57 authorizes the department to adopt regulations “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Petitioners contend that Proposition 57 does not authorize the department to adopt regulations that award credits beyond statutory limits and concluding otherwise is an impermissible delegation of legislative power, resulting in a constitutional revision that cannot be done by initiative process.
The Court of Appeal held that (1) Proposition 57 properly removed statutory restraints on the department’s authority to award credits, allowing the regulations to supersede contrary statutes; and (2) the department may use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates only if permitted by existing law because both the plain language and ballot materials of Proposition 57 are silent on this issue. The Court remanded and directed the trial court to modify the writ of mandate and enter a modified judgment.
Proposition 57
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a federal district court order directing California to reduce its prison population after concluding that severe overcrowding was the primary cause of the state’s unlawful treatment of prisoners. (Brown v. Plata (2011) 563 U.S. 493, 502.) The district court later refused to vacate the prison population reduction order because, among other things, the state had not achieved a “ ‘durable remedy’ ” to the overcrowding problem. (Coleman v. Brown (E.D.Cal. 2013) 922 F.Supp.2d 1004.)
The voters passed Proposition 57 to “enable[ ] inmates to be released earlier on parole by … giving the [d]epartment authority to award credits to inmates for good behavior.”
Proposition 57 added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution (section 32). It provides
: “(a) The following provisions are hereby enacted to enhance public safety, improve rehabilitation, and avoid the release of prisoners by federal court order, notwithstanding … any other provision of law: (2) Credit Earning: [The department] shall have authority to award credits earned for good behavior and approved rehabilitative or educational achievements. (b) [department] shall adopt regulations in furtherance of these provisions.”
Pursuant to section 32, the department promulgated the regulations to (1) award good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, and educational merit credit to most inmates, as well as credits to inmates housed in minimum security facilities (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3043.2, subds. (a), (b)(5), 3043.3, 3043.4, 3043.5); and (2) permit the use of credit to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3043, subd. (a), 3043.2, subd. (b), 3043.3, subd. (c), 3043.4, subd. (b), 3043.5, subd. (b).)
On December 13, 2023, the trial court issued a ruling finding that Proposition 57 did not give the department the authority to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date with credit. The trial court denied the petition in all other respects.
Minimum Eligible Parole Dates
Although the department has broad authority to award credits, its power to apply those credits is a different issue. Petitioners contend section 32 does not authorize the department to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates in conflict with existing law. The Court agreed.
Credits awarded by the department affect determinately-sentenced and indeterminately-sentenced inmates differently. Determinately-sentenced inmates’ prison terms are reduced by credits. (Pen. Code, § 2933, subd. (a).) Credits received by indeterminately-sentenced inmates “go towards advancing only their minimum eligible [parole] date[s], not their actual release from prison.” (In re Jenkins (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1167, 1179.) These inmates cannot be paroled until they have served the greater of: “(1) A term of at least seven calendar years. (2) A term as established pursuant to any other law that establishes a minimum term or minimum period of confinement under a life sentence before eligibility for parole.” (Pen. Code, § 3046, subd. (a).) Among such “other law[s]” are Penal Code section 190, subdivision (e) that “bars a murderer from earning any postsentence conduct credit to reduce” his or her minimum eligible parole date (In re Maes (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1094.), as well as other Penal Code sections that “specially allow credits to apply in some indeterminate life terms with parole minimums … effectively allows an earlier [minimum eligible parole date].” (People v. Stofle (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 417, 421, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 829; see, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 191.5, subd. (d), 217.1, subd. (b), 667.7, subd. (a)(1), 667.75.) Existing law permits the department to use credits to advance some indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. But the regulations allow the department to do so for all inmates. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 3043, subd. (a), 3043.2, subd. (b), 3043.3, subd. (c), 3043.4, subd. (b), 3043.5, subd. (b), 3043.6, subd. (b).)
Did CDCR overstep its authority under section 32 to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates?
The ballot materials did not mention the department’s ability to use credits to advance minimum eligible parole dates.
When Proposition 57 says nothing about whether the department may use credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date, “it does not replace the existing law on these issues.” (Koenig, at p. 566, 315 Cal.Rptr.3d 592.)
Therefore, the regulations are void to the extent they conflict with existing law, such as Penal Code section 190, to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date with credits. (Terhune v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 873 [administrative action is void if it is not authorized by or is inconsistent with acts of the Legislature].) But the regulations do not flatly conflict with Penal Code section 3046, as petitioners suggest, because section 3046 looks to “other law” in deciding the minimum term and some of them allow the use of credits to advance the minimum eligible parole date. Indeed, petitioners concede “if the statute setting the minimum allows the minimum to be reduced by credits, then it can be.”
The Court rejected the department’s claim that the “notwithstanding” language in section 32, subdivision (a) allows it to use credits to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates. The language gives the department broad power to award credits. But awarding credits and applying the credits awarded are two different things, and section 32 is silent on the latter.
The matter is remanded to the trial court. On remand, the trial court is directed to (1) modify the writ of mandate invalidating the regulations to the extent they allow the department to advance indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates with credits in conflict with other statutes; and (2) enter a modified judgment. Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
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