Articles Posted in Uncategorized

People v. Flores (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 11, 2026, No. A171602) 2026 WL 378414, at *1

Summary: Flores pleaded no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale and was sentenced to two years of formal probation with a condition permitting warrantless searches of Flores’s electronic devices. On appeal, Flores asked the court to strike or modify the electronics search clause as unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable. Because Flores used electronic devices to coordinate the sale and to obscure his identity during negotiations, the court affirmed  the electronics search clause in its entirety.

In its presentencing report, the probation department recommended “a five-way search clause to include all electronic devices, and supply passwords upon request due to [Flores] using his cell phone to negotiate the sale of illicit controlled substances.” The report  stated that at the time of the offense, Flores had been on formal probation in Merced for possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and that Flores admitted to using fentanyl and a prior gang affiliation.

People v. Kopp (Cal., Dec. 29, 2025, No. S257844) 2025 WL 3755596, at *1–5

Summary: Co-defendant Hernandez challenged various punitive fines, along with other ancillary costs, ordered as part of a criminal sentencing. The California Supreme Court held that a challenge to the amount of a criminal fine should initially be reviewed under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions.

The imposition of ancillary payments raises separate equal protection issues. A court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). The Court urged the Legislature to revisit issues surrounding court-ordered ancillary payments in criminal cases and address them in a more comprehensive manner.

People v. Demacedo (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 12, 2025, No. A170580) 2025 WL 3169575, at *1–4

Summary: Demacedo was convicted of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)) for the death of  three victims, as well as felony violations of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivisions (a) and (b) for driving under the influence of alcohol and with an elevated blood alcohol level and causing injury to Sarah (DUI causing injury).

Demacedo argued that  the DUI causing injury counts must be dismissed as lesser included offenses of the vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated convictions. The Court of Appeal held that a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153 is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a) when the offenses involve different victims.

People v. Temple (Cal. Ct. App., May 6, 2025, No. G062781) 2025 WL 1304577, at *1

Summary:  A jury found Temple not guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)) but guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree murder (§ 189, subd. (b)). The jury found to be true the allegations that Temple used a deadly and dangerous weapon—a knife—in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (§ 12022.7).  Temple was sentenced to a prison term of 16 years to life.

On appeal, Temple argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 225 instead of CALCRIM No. 224. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 571 (imperfect self-defense) and CALCRIM No. 3428 (consideration of evidence of a mental disease, defect, or disorder). Temple argues those instructions did not inform the jury it could consider evidence of his mental condition in determining whether he acted in imperfect self-defense. The Court of Appeal found that the  instructional error was harmless. A claim of imperfect self-defense can be lost if the defendant used more force than was reasonably necessary to repel the attack, failed to take advantage of an opportunity to retreat, or continued using force after the perceived danger no longer existed. Here, the evidence  Temple used unreasonable force, failed to retreat, and continued using force after the danger no longer existed was so strong that it is not reasonably probable the jury would have found he acted in imperfect self-defense in absence of the claimed instructional error.

People v. Martinez (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 7, 2025, No. E082657) 2025 WL 429628

Summary: Martinez was charged with grand theft, acting as  contractor without a license, requiring a downpayment in excess of $1,000, and unlawfully receiving payments in excess of the work performed, filed motion to dismiss based on a violation of his rights to a speedy trial. The Superior Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. People appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeal held that:

Andrew v. White (U.S., Jan. 21, 2025, No. 23-6573) 2025 WL 247502

Summary: Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, that Due Process Clause can in certain cases protect against introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence at criminal trials, was a “holding,” for purposes of federal habeas review of state court’s adjudication of merits of prisoner’s federal claim alleging that State introduced irrelevant evidence about her sex life and her failings as mother and wife.

Facts: An Oklahoma jury convicted Brenda Andrew of murdering her husband and sentenced her to death. At trial the State introduced evidence about Andrew’s sex life and about her failings as a mother and wife, much of which it later conceded was irrelevant.  Andrew argued in a federal Habeas petition that this evidence had been so prejudicial as to violate the Due Process Clause. The Court of Appeals denied the petition because it incorrectly believed that no holding of the Supreme Court established a general rule that the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence could violate due process. However, the Supreme Court had made clear that when “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

People v. Lattin (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 18, 2024, No. D083262) 2024 WL 5153046, at *1

Summary: Lattin contends a gun must be loaded to commit assault with a firearm unless it is used as a club or bludgeon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).) He argues that the present ability element of assault cannot be satisfied with an unloaded gun if the defendant is too far from the victim to inflict injury with the firearm as a club or bludgeon. Lattin requested a pinpoint instruction that an assault with a deadly weapon is not committed by a person “pointing an unloaded gun … with no effort or threat to use it as a baton” or “pointing an unloaded gun in a threatening manner” at another person. The trial court declined to give his pinpoint instruction to the jury. Lattin claims this was prejudicial error, and the evidence was insufficient on present ability to support his conviction for assault with a firearm. The Court of Appeal rejected these claims, concluding that there is no brightline rule in California that, unless it is used as a club or bludgeon, a gun must be loaded for an assault to be committed. Proof that a firearm was unloaded can be a complete defense to charges of assault, but it is not a complete defense in all circumstances as a matter of law. If ammunition is readily available-as it was in this case—it is a question for the jury whether a defendant with an unloaded gun possesses the means to load the gun and shoot immediately, or whether he is too many steps away from inflicting injury to have the present ability to commit assault.

The Court noted its disagreement with the Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions. One of the practice notes for CALCRIM No. 875, the model instruction for assault, states a “gun must be loaded unless used as [a] club or bludgeon” in order “to have [the] present ability to inflict injury.” (Use Note to CALCRIM No. 875.)