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People v. Campbell (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 3, 2026, No. B334456) 2026 WL 2577310

Summary: In People v. Campbell, the California Court of Appeal reconsidered whether Sidney Campbell was entitled to resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 following significant developments in California law governing murder liability and resentencing petitions. The case arose after the California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of People v. Lopez (2025) 19 Cal.5th 639. Although Lopez expanded the circumstances under which petitioners may seek relief, the Court of Appeal ultimately concluded that Campbell remained ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the jury instructions in his case required a finding that he personally acted with malice.

The Crime and Conviction

People v. Esquivias (Cal., Aug. 17, 2026, No. S286371) 2026 WL 2386584, at *1–10

Summary: A habeas corpus court has broad equitable authority to craft relief “as the justice of the case may require.” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 976; Pen. Code, § 1484.) Petitioner Miguel Alberto Esquivias sought habeas relief based solely on Senate Bill No. 620, which gave trial courts discretion to strike previously mandatory firearm enhancements. The superior court granted that targeted relief by striking those enhancements, but declined to reopen the entire sentence. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that habeas relief is not an “all-or-nothing” remedy. The California Supreme Court agreed thatbecause Esquivias’s original sentence was valid and neither the Constitution nor any statute required full resentencing, the habeas court could limit relief to the firearm enhancements.

Factual and Procedural History

People v. Newt (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 30, 2026, No. A169899) 2026 WL 861690, at *1–6

Summary : Newt appealed his felony conviction of receiving a large-capacity magazine (Pen. Code, § 32310, subd. (a)). He claimed that no substantial evidence supports the conviction; the jury was erroneously instructed on the crime; and the statute is unconstitutional.

The statute’s use of the terms “receives” and “possesses” are at issue here.  Subdivision (a) of section 32310 provides that any person who “receives” a large-capacity magazine commits a crime punishable as a felony or misdemeanor. Subdivision (c) provides that any person who “possesses” a large-capacity magazine also commits a crime, but that crime is punishable only as a misdemeanor or infraction. (§ 32310, subd. (c).) Newt acknowledges the prosecution presented evidence that he “possessed” a large-capacity magazine—that an assault rifle with a large-capacity magazine was found on the front seat of the car he was driving while he attempted to avoid a traffic stop and from which he subsequently fled. But he asserts the prosecution presented no evidence beyond mere “possession” and therefore his conviction for felony “receiving” the large-capacity magazine cannot stand. He argues the jury was not properly instructed on the distinction between “receiving” and “possessing” such a magazine.

People v. Valencia (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 10, 2026, No. B338672) 2026 WL 672932, at *1

Summary: Valencia, under the influence of methamphetamine and cocaine, drove his pickup truck and would not comply with police orders to pull over. Police chased Valencia until he crashed into a parked car. Valencia jumped out, ran to his nearby apartment, and barricaded himself in his bedroom. During an overnight standoff, Valencia shot one officer to death and seriously wound another. A SWAT team eventually blew through his bedroom wall and blasted down his bedroom door. The jury convicted Valencia of murder and other felonies.

Valencia appealed challenging the warrantless entry of police into his apartment. The Court of Appeal held that jurors could find exigent circumstances justified the initial warrantless entry and that police did not need to seek a warrant once they were in the apartment.

People v. Flores (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 11, 2026, No. A171602) 2026 WL 378414, at *1

Summary: Flores pleaded no contest to felony possession of fentanyl for sale and was sentenced to two years of formal probation with a condition permitting warrantless searches of Flores’s electronic devices. On appeal, Flores asked the court to strike or modify the electronics search clause as unconstitutionally overbroad and unreasonable. Because Flores used electronic devices to coordinate the sale and to obscure his identity during negotiations, the court affirmed  the electronics search clause in its entirety.

In its presentencing report, the probation department recommended “a five-way search clause to include all electronic devices, and supply passwords upon request due to [Flores] using his cell phone to negotiate the sale of illicit controlled substances.” The report  stated that at the time of the offense, Flores had been on formal probation in Merced for possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and that Flores admitted to using fentanyl and a prior gang affiliation.

LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants. (Cal., Jan. 21, 2026, No. S275272) 2026 WL 171531, at *1–4

 Summary: California requires law enforcement agencies to investigate complaints against peace officers. (See Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (a)(1).) Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a) (section 148.6(a))  makes it a crime to file a knowingly false allegation of misconduct against a peace officer. (See § 148.6, subd. (a)(1) [section 148.6(a)(1) or subdivision (a)(1)].) Law enforcement agencies must require the complainant to read and sign an advisory informing the complainant that filing a knowingly false complaint of police misconduct is a crime. (§ 148.6, subd. (a)(2) [section 148.6(a)(2) or subdivision (a)(2)].)  The Court held that Section 148.6(a)’s provisions violate constitutional free speech rights.

Background: The City of Los Angeles (the City) entered into a consent decree barring it from requiring complainants to sign the advisory in section 148.6(a)(2). Although the consent decree expired in 2013, but the City still does not require a signed advisory from complainants.

People v. Kopp (Cal., Dec. 29, 2025, No. S257844) 2025 WL 3755596, at *1–5

Summary: Co-defendant Hernandez challenged various punitive fines, along with other ancillary costs, ordered as part of a criminal sentencing. The California Supreme Court held that a challenge to the amount of a criminal fine should initially be reviewed under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions.

The imposition of ancillary payments raises separate equal protection issues. A court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). The Court urged the Legislature to revisit issues surrounding court-ordered ancillary payments in criminal cases and address them in a more comprehensive manner.

People v. Demacedo (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 12, 2025, No. A170580) 2025 WL 3169575, at *1–4

Summary: Demacedo was convicted of three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a)) for the death of  three victims, as well as felony violations of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivisions (a) and (b) for driving under the influence of alcohol and with an elevated blood alcohol level and causing injury to Sarah (DUI causing injury).

Demacedo argued that  the DUI causing injury counts must be dismissed as lesser included offenses of the vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated convictions. The Court of Appeal held that a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153 is not a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a) when the offenses involve different victims.

People v. Mills (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 9, 2025, No. 2D CRIM. B334998) 2025 WL 2601940, at *1–2

Summary: Mills, a convicted “three striker,” with a life sentence wanted eligibility for “elderly parole.” Elderly parole allows the Board of Parole Hearings, to review the parole suitability of any inmate who is 50 years of age or older and has served a minimum of 20 years of continuous incarceration on the inmate’s current sentence, serving either a determinate or indeterminate sentence. However, elderly parole is not available to those who sentenced pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667(See Pen. Code, § 3055).

If a defendant has two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, the term for the current felony conviction is an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12)

People v. Grajeda (Cal. Ct. App., June 3, 2025, No. B337664) 2025 WL 1564615, at *1

Summary: In 2012 a jury found Grajeda guilty of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true gang and firearm allegations. The trial court found true allegations Grajeda had served four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced Grajeda to a prison term of 59 years to life.

In 2024 the superior court held a resentencing hearing under Penal Code, section 1172.75, at which Grajeda appeared remotely. The court denied Grajeda’s request to postpone the hearing to allow him to speak with his attorney. The court resentenced Grajeda to a prison term of 50 years to life.

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