Articles Posted in Prison Law

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER SKAGGS, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 14, 2025, No. A170942) 2025 WL 2356066, at *1–2

Summary: Skaggs filed a motion to dismiss his parole revocation petition on due process grounds, which the trial court treated as a Penal Code section 1385 motion and denied because such a motion was procedurally improper. The court then revoked Skaggs’s parole, sentenced him to 90 days in jail, and ordered his parole term to terminate upon release. On appeal, Skaggs challenges the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and subsequent parole revocation.

The appeal was dismissed as moot because the Court cannot  afford Skaggs any effective relief. The Court resolved the issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to consider the motion to dismiss and concluded the court improperly determined it could not entertain the motion to dismiss.

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Cal. Ct. App., July 28, 2025, No. C100274) 2025 WL 2104730, at *1–2

Summary: In 2016,  Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Cal. Const., art. I § 32) amended the California Constitution to give the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) the authority, “notwithstanding … any other provision of law,” to award credits for good behavior and for approved rehabilitative or educational achievements. It directed the CDCR to adopt regulations in furtherance of such authority.

The CDCR adopted regulations that: (1) award credits beyond statutory limits and (2) use credits to advance all indeterminately-sentenced inmates’ minimum eligible parole dates (the regulations). The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and several family members of crime victims (collectively, petitioners) challenged the validity of these regulations through a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court denied the writ in part and granted it in part, invalidating the department’s regulations to the extent they allow the use of credits to advance an indeterminately-sentenced inmate’s minimum eligible parole date. Both the department and petitioners appealed.

In re Rogowski (Cal. Ct. App., May 22, 2025, No. D084748) 2025 WL 1691929, at *1–2

Summary: In 2022, after he had served 31 years in prison, the Board granted Rogowski parole a second time. The Governor found Rogowski still posed an unreasonable danger to society if released from prison and, again, reversed the Board’s decision to grant parole. Rogowski filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal which issued an order to show cause. The Court upheld the Governor’s decision and denied Rogowski’s petition.

Judicial Review of Parole Decisions

People v. Grajeda (Cal. Ct. App., June 3, 2025, No. B337664) 2025 WL 1564615, at *1

Summary: In 2012 a jury found Grajeda guilty of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true gang and firearm allegations. The trial court found true allegations Grajeda had served four prior prison terms. The trial court sentenced Grajeda to a prison term of 59 years to life.

In 2024 the superior court held a resentencing hearing under Penal Code, section 1172.75, at which Grajeda appeared remotely. The court denied Grajeda’s request to postpone the hearing to allow him to speak with his attorney. The court resentenced Grajeda to a prison term of 50 years to life.

People v. Rodriguez (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 7, 2025, No. B332704) 2025 WL 1023731, at *1

Summary: Rodriguez appealed from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, contending that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made in a letter to the Board of Parole Hearings in 2011, and statements he made to a Forensic Psychologist in a 2016 Comprehensive Risk Assessment evaluating his suitability for parole. We find no error and affirm.

Im 1984, Rodriguez pled guilty to second degree murder. The prosecutor explained that the plea agreement was appropriate because no witnesses were available to  identify Rodriguez as the shooter. The prosecutor also noted that evidence revealed Rodriguez was under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP) at the time of the crime, which  may have entitled him to a voluntary intoxication defense.Rodriguez pled guilty and was sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder.

In re Nguyen (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 27, 2024, No. B329158) 2024 WL 4901809, at *1

Summary: Nguyen was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with the possibility of parole. Penal Code section 3046 establishes a minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) for when that hearing will occur. Additionally, because Nguyen was under 26 years of age when he committed his crimes, Nguyen is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, and Penal Code section 3051 establishes a youth parole eligible date (YPED) for when that hearing will occur. Nguyen thus has two parole hearing dates, one set by the MEPD and the other by the YPED. Per California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the department) regulations, Nguyen can earn good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, educational merit credit, and extraordinary conduct credit to bring forward his MEPD. However, those same regulations provide that only educational merit credit can bring forward his YPED; good conduct credit, milestone completion credit, rehabilitative achievement credit, and extraordinary conduct credit do not impact a youth inmate’s YPED.

Nguyen petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, it granted review, and the court ordered the Court of Appeal to issue an order to show cause.

In re JOSE OLIVERAS on Habeas Corpus (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 2, 2024, No. A168677) 2024 WL 3633748

Summary:Oliveras challenged a disciplinary report revoking his computer access and making him ineligible for computer-access-required work assignments or programming because of being found with contraband pornographic images on a tablet device.

The Court issued an order to show cause to the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Secretary), requesting they address whether Oliveras’s conduct violated Penal Code section 502.2 In response, the Secretary asserts the petition is moot because Oliveras’s computer clearance was reauthorized.  The Court disagreed and order the Secretary to vacate any reference to a section 502 and/or “computer fraud and abuse” violation from Oliveras’s record.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ROBERT L. ESCOBEDO, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 25, 2023, No. A166559) 2023 WL 5498785

Summary: Escobedo was placed on felony probation pursuant to a plea bargain. The  superior court permitted the People to withdraw a pending petition for revocation of parole that CDCR filed against Escobedo, who was on lifetime parole when he committed his offense. (Pen. Code, § 3000.1, subd. (a)(1).) The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sought review by extraordinary writ challenging  the authority of the superior court to release Escobedo on probation, instead of adjudicating CDCR’s parole revocation petition and returning him to prison if the court finds that he has committed a new offense. (See § 3000.08, subd. (h) (section 3000.08(h)).)

Because Escobedo was on lifetime parole, the superior court lacked authority to release him on probation after finding that he committed a new criminal offense. Once the court found Escobedo had committed another crime, it was required to remand him to the custody of CDCR. (§ 3000.08(h).) The Court of Appeal granted  CDCR’s mandate petition.

The PEOPLE, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.BOARD OF PAROLE HEARINGS, Defendant and Appellant; Nathan Joshua Ramazzini, Real Party in Interest and Appellant. C093941,Filed September 15, 2022

2022 WL 4244262 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.)

Summary: in 1997, Ramazzini was convicted of a first degree murder with a special circumstance he committed when he was was 16 years old. Ramazzini was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP).At the time Ramazzini was sentenced, courts interpreted section 190.5, subdivision (b) as establishing a presumption in favor of LWOP. (People v. Guinn (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1130, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 791, disapproved by People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245 (Gutierrez).)

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