Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

Boitez v. Superior Court of Yolo County (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 7, 2023, No. C098102) 2023 WL 7313899, at *1

Summary: Boitez filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a search of his mother’s car. After the trial court denied his motion, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition.

The issue is whether defendant gave voluntary consent for the police to search his mother’s car after he was pulled over for a traffic violation. Here, the police officer falsely, but apparently with subjective belief that it was true, stated that he had the authority to tow defendant’s mother’s car, but would not do so if defendant consented to the search. Did  the police officer’s false promise of leniency as to the towing of defendant’s mother’s car, the prosecution met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant’s consent was uncoerced? (Vazquez, supra, 724 F.3d at p. 18.)

People v. Molina (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2023, No. G061280) 2023 WL 6834852

 Summary: Molina appealed after conviction of sexual penetration with a child 10 years or younger and lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under 14 years, after a trial in which safety protocols related to the COVID-19 pandemic were implemented.

The Court of Appeal held that: defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated by use of face masks during trial; defendant’s right to a fair trial was not violated by jurors’ social distancing during trial; and defense counsel’s tactical decision to inform prospective jurors that defendant was in custody did not constitute ineffective assistance.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VERNON LEE HAMPTON, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 25, 2023, No. A165957) 2023 WL 7009789, at *1

Summary: Before closing arguments, which took place in January 2022, the trial judge dismissed two jurors for reasons related to COVID-19 and seated the two remaining alternate jurors. After the jury began deliberating, the judge had a personal emergency, and another judge took her place. Then, one of the remaining jurors tested positive for COVID, and Hampton moved for a mistrial, contending that the original judge had made an off-the-record ruling prohibiting any remote deliberations. After consulting with the original judge, the substitute judge denied a mistrial. The substitute judge then permitted the juror who had COVID to deliberate remotely for one day, at the end of which the jury returned its verdicts. The foreperson stated that the jury reached agreement on the verdicts while all the jurors were present in person, and that during the remote deliberations the jury discussed only the lesser weapon enhancements on which it hung.

On appeal, Hampton contends that (1) the substitute judge improperly relied on ex parte communications with the original judge in denying a mistrial and (2) the jury deliberations in which one juror participated remotely were unauthorized and unconstitutional. He contends that these errors are structural, meaning they are reversible without a showing of prejudice. The Court of Appeal concluded that the judges’ communications were ethical and did not deny Hampton a fair trial. Any error in permitting the jury to deliberate remotely for one day was harmless because, as the record establishes, that day of deliberation did not result in a finding of guilt. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.

People v. Manzo (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 17, 2023, No. E079991) 2023 WL 6826849, at *1

 Summary:The Riverside County District Attorney appealed the trial court’s dismissal of three felony charges against Manzo due to evidence lost during the prosecution’s five-year delay in prosecuting the case after filing charges against defendant. Because there is no evidence that the loss of evidence prejudiced defendant, the Court of Appeal the order dismissing the complaint.

Facts: After Manzo completed a five year prison sentence in a San Bernardino robbery case, he was arrested and arraigned on outstanding charges in Riverside County in April 2022. Manzo moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the delay in prosecuting him violated his due process rights under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. Manzo claimed that the delay between the filing of charges against him and his arraignment prejudiced him for several reasons, including loss of the video footage of his arrest from the officer’s dashcam. The District Attorney’s argued that Manzo  suffered no actual prejudice from the delay.

People v. Simmons (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 12, 2023, No. 2D CRIM. B309921) 2023 WL 6631578, at *1

Summary: The Racial Justice Act (RJA) aims to eliminate racism from criminal trials in California. The Court of Appeal held that  the RJA does not violate article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. The dissent argued  that the RJA violates article VI because section 13 states that it is the province of the court to decide whether an error results in a miscarriage of justice.

Simmons appealed his conviction, by jury, of the attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder of Danny Graves (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664)1 and fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2.) The jury further found he personally used a handgun in committing the attempted murder. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c).) The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison plus a 20-year enhancement term for the firearm use and a concurrent term of 27 months on the evading conviction.

Parris J. v. Christopher U. (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 4, 2023, No.

B313470) 2023 WL 6458520, at *1Summary: Christopher U. appeals from the five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against him at the request of his former spouse, Parris J. Christopher contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting Parris’s request for a DVRO because the record does not demonstrate he engaged in conduct rising to the level of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Family Code section 6200 et seq. He appealed the order of the trial court to change the beneficiary of the $4 million insurance policy he owns on Parris’s life from himself to a charity of her choice. He also appealed the denial of  his requests for a statement of decision. Christopher claimed  that because the DVRO must be reversed, the trial court’s order awarding $200,000 in attorneys’ fees to Parris as the prevailing party under section 6344 must also be reversed.

The Court of Appeals concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Parris’s request for a DVRO. The Court rejected Christopher’s contentions regarding the life insurance policy. There was no reason to reverse the order awarding attorneys’ fees to Parris. It concluded that reversal is not required based on the denial of Christopher’s requests for a statement of decision.

People v. Suazo (Cal. Ct. Appl., Sept. 19, 2023, No. F082140) 2023 WL 6118736, at *1

Summary: Suazo while having an elevated blood-alcohol level, drove his 2008 Ford Focus at a high rate of speed off the highway, through a fence, and into agricultural equipment parked in an adjacent yard. His passenger was ejected from the vehicle and killed. Suazo was convicted of second degree murder; gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated; driving under the influence and causing bodily injury; driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more and causing bodily injury; leaving the scene of an accident; and driving on a suspended license.  The jury found defendant fled the scene of the crime. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)).

On appeal, Suazo contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder in light of his testimony that he drank alcohol without intending to drive afterward, then drove while unconscious. He also contends the trial court erred in failing to give, or his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request, instructions on unconsciousness and voluntary intoxication with regard to count and the fleeing-the-scene allegation.

People v. Pomar (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 13, 2023, No. A167241) 2023 WL 5947909, at *1

Summary: Brooke Jenkins, an assistant district attorney (ADA), left the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office (Office) to join the campaign to recall Chesa Boudin, the then San Francisco District Attorney (District Attorney). After leaving the Office, Jenkins spoke to a reporter about a homicide case being prosecuted by the Office in which the victim was her husband’s cousin. Jenkins criticized the Office for its approach toward prosecuting the two alleged killers of her husband’s cousin, defendants and respondents Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins faulted the Office for dropping felony gang charges against Mitchell and Pomar and for failing to detain Pomar for the murder of her husband’s cousin. After Boudin was recalled, Jenkins became the District Attorney. The Office installed an “ethical wall” to prevent Jenkins from influencing its prosecution of Mitchell and Pomar for the murder of her husband’s cousin. Mitchell and Pomar moved to disqualify the entire Office from that case pursuant to Penal Code section 1424. Pomar also moved to disqualify the entire Office from his separate prosecution for the additional crimes mentioned by Jenkins in the newspaper article. The trial courts in both cases granted the recusal motions and disqualified the entire Office from prosecuting the cases. Plaintiff and appellant the People of the State of California (People) appeal from the recusal orders, contending both courts abused their discretion. Court of Appeal affirmed.

Facts: On June 30, 2021, the Office filed an amended felony complaint dismissing the felony gang count against Mitchell and Pomar. Jenkins resigned from the Office on October 15, 2021, and joined the recall campaign against Boudin. Jenkins spoke with a reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle. The published article discussed Jenkins’s reasons for leaving the Office and joining the recall campaign. The article observed that “this is personal for Jenkins” because her husband’s family had been “devastated” by the death of Mallory.  The article reported that Mallory, “[a]ccording to Jenkins,” “was an innocent bystander in a gang dispute.” Jenkins then criticized the Office for refusing to file “felony charges of gang conspiracy” against Mitchell and Pomar in the Mallory case. As the article explained, Jenkins “wanted those charges filed against [Mitchell and Pomar], seeing them as the only way for prosecutors to make a case.” Because the Office declined to pursue those gang charges due to Boudin’s resistance, “Jenkins said she doubt[ed] the case w[ould] hold up in court.”

DEMOND FINLEY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 30, 2023, No. A167311) 2023 WL 5620093, at *1

Summary: The San Francisco Superior Court erred in finding that Finley failed to make a prima case of an RJA violation, where the police officer stopped and searched his car for being parked in a “high crime area.” An expert testified that “high crime area” was routinely used by police to conduct pretext stops of Black people for minor offenses to search for contraband, and SFPD’s own stats showing Black people were stopped and searched at a higher rate than whites.

The Court of Appeal set a low prima facie bar in RJA cases and held that the trial court must accept the defenses proffered factual allegations and supporting evidence as true and could not consider the DA’s race-neutral counter evidence at the prima facie stage. The court remanded for a rehearing applying the proper prima facie standard.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent; ROBERT L. ESCOBEDO, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 25, 2023, No. A166559) 2023 WL 5498785

Summary: Escobedo was placed on felony probation pursuant to a plea bargain. The  superior court permitted the People to withdraw a pending petition for revocation of parole that CDCR filed against Escobedo, who was on lifetime parole when he committed his offense. (Pen. Code, § 3000.1, subd. (a)(1).) The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sought review by extraordinary writ challenging  the authority of the superior court to release Escobedo on probation, instead of adjudicating CDCR’s parole revocation petition and returning him to prison if the court finds that he has committed a new offense. (See § 3000.08, subd. (h) (section 3000.08(h)).)

Because Escobedo was on lifetime parole, the superior court lacked authority to release him on probation after finding that he committed a new criminal offense. Once the court found Escobedo had committed another crime, it was required to remand him to the custody of CDCR. (§ 3000.08(h).) The Court of Appeal granted  CDCR’s mandate petition.

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