Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

People v. Tirado (Cal., Jan. 20, 2022, No. S257658) 2022 WL 176141, at *1

 Summary: Penal Code section 12022.53 authorizes enhancements for certain felonies involving firearms.Section 12022.53, subdivision (h) (section 12022.53(h)) authorizes courts to strike certain enhancements in the interests of justice under the authority of section 1385.

Issue: when the prosecution has alleged, and the jury has found true, the facts supporting an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) (section 12022.53(d)). what may the court  do if it decides to strike that enhancement. May the court impose a lesser uncharged enhancement under either section 12022.53, subdivision (b) (section 12022.53(b)) or section 12022.53, subdivision (c) (section 12022.53(c))? Or is the court limited to imposing the section 12022.53(d) enhancement or striking it? The California Supreme Court held that a court may strike the section 12022.53(d) enhancement found true by the jury and impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement.

People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563

Summary: Strother was convicted of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)1 and theft of access card information (§ 484e, subd. (d)). Under the Three Strikes law, he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison. In 2013, Strother filed a petition to recall his entire sentence pursuant to Proposition 36 (§ 1170.126), and in 2014 he filed a petition to recall his sentence for theft of access card information pursuant to Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18). The trial court issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted for both petitions and in found Strother eligible for relief under both propositions. Following a July 2020 hearing on both petitions, the trial court found appellant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and was not suitable for resentencing. The trial court denied both petitions.

Strother appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in finding he posed an unreasonable risk of committing one of the “super strikes” identified in Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18) because the trial court 1) failed to consider that his two prior convictions involving violence and firearm use occurred almost 30 years ago with no evidence he was the shooter; 2) failed to consider his prison fighting from 2016 through 2019 was the result of his gang renunciation in 2016; and 3) erroneously found that his conflict resolution and anger management programming and parole plans were inadequate. He makes similar claims about the trial court’s denial of his Proposition 36 petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed  the trial court’s order.

Grassi v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 28, 2021, No. G060362) 2021 WL 6124764, at *1

Summary: Grassi filed a petition for writ of mandate after the trial court concluded that she was statutorily ineligible for misdemeanor diversion. Grassi claims that Penal Code section 1001.95’s plain language and legislative history makes diversion available to misdemeanor driving under the influence defendants despite Vehicle Code section 23640’s prohibition on granting diversion to driving under the influence defendants.

The Court of Appeal, in this case of first impression, we conclude the two statutes can be harmonized  to provide diversion to misdemeanor defendants, except for those defendants excluded in Penal Code section 1001.95, subdivision (e), and misdemeanor driving under the influence defendants pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23640. The court denied the petition.

People v. Nault (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 20, 2021, No. B306460) 2021 WL 5997961, at *1–3

Summary: Nault, driving whiledrunk after four previous DUI convictions tried to pass an 18-wheeler on a narrow road. Nault’s pickup hit an oncoming car and killed its driver. While Nault was unconscious from the crash, police took a warrantless sample of his blood. Nault argues this violated the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeal affirmed but direct the trial court to stay a second sentence under Penal Code section 654.

Prior DUI Convictions: At his 2020 trial, Nault stipulated to four DUI convictions between 2000 and 2009. On August 11, 2017, a park ranger found Nault digging his pickup out of beach sand. Nault was stumbling about and he sounded and smelled drunk. He refused field sobriety tests and a blood test. He told the ranger to arrest  him and said his blood alcohol content was over 0.08 percent because he drank a Four Loko. The ranger arrested Nault and impounded his truck.  Nault’s license was suspended.

People v. Benzler (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 14, 2021, No. C092779) 2021 WL 5902741, at *1

 Summary: Benzler, sentenced in 2014 for offenses he committed when he was 18 years old, appealed the summary denial of his motion for a Franklin hearing1 under Penal Code section 1203.01.2.  Benzler contends he satisfied the eligibility criteria for such a hearing laid out in In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 669, 441 P.3d 912 (Cook) and did not previously have an opportunity to present evidence related to his status as a juvenile offender. He argued for remand  so he may make a record of this evidence to use in future parole hearings. The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

 Facts and background

In re L.J. (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 30, 2021, No. A161118) 2021 WL 5578276

Summary: Juvenile defendant came within Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction for reckless evasion of a peace officer, assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The juvenile was committed to county institution until earliest of age of 21 or maximum custody time of six years and eight months and ordered to participate in treatment program, and Juvenile defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal  agreed  that the punishment on the reckless evasion of police count must be stayed under section 654 because it is based on the same indivisible course of conduct with the same intent and objective as the assault counts. But the statute concerning offenses punishable in different ways by different provisions of law did not prohibit juvenile defendant from being punished for both assault convictions.

Valderas v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 30, 2021, No. D078735) 2021 WL 5575569, at *1

Summary: Valderas, facing several felony charges, did not appear at a status conference/trial call on October 20, 2020. It was the second consecutive court appearance that Valderas missed. The trial court issued a bench warrant for Valderas but ordered the warrant to be held until December 8, 2020, the date on which the court had set a readiness conference. The court sent notice to Valderas by mail to his last known address. When Valderas did not appear at the December 8 hearing, the court lifted its hold on the bench warrant.

Valderas seeks a writ of mandamus to recall the December 8 bench warrant. The court denied Valderas’s  relief.

People v. Williams (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 23, 2021, No. A159914) 2021 WL 5460724, at *1–2

Summary: Williams,  was convicted of murder in 1995 and sentenced to 30 years to life in prison and was released on lifetime parole in 2018. In 2019, he was charged with two misdemeanors, and the district attorney filed a petition to revoke his parole. The  trial court determined that Williams had committed one of the charged offenses and remanded him to prison, the required sanction whenever a court finds that a lifetime parolee has violated parole. (Pen. Code, § 3000.08, subd. (h) (section 3000.08(h).)

Williams appealed claiming that the trial court erred by refusing to refer the matter to the parole agency for a written report before ruling on the petition. Under the plain terms of section 1203.2, subdivision (b)(1) (section 1203.2(b)(1)), a court is required to receive a parole agency’s written report before ruling on a parole revocation petition initiated by a district attorney. There is no implied exception to this requirement when such a petition is filed against a lifetime parolee such as Williams, because the report is not pointless even though a court has no discretion to impose intermediate sanctions.

People v. Schuller (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 10, 2021, No. C087191) 2021 WL 5228434, at *1

Summary: Schuller, shot his long-time friend, W.T., nine times in the head and set the body on fire.  Schuller testified, claiming self-defense, but his trial testimony about suggested he was delusional and hallucinating. Following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a jury found Schuller guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase. He was found legally sane and sentenced to a term of 50 years to life.

On appeal, Schuller contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He argues that evidence demonstrates he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self-defense that was not entirely delusional. The Courtnof appeal agreed but find the error harmless.

People v. Davenport (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 10, 2021, No. A161954) 2021 WL 5230876, at *1–3

Summary: In 2007, Davenport pled no contest to second degree murder with a firearm enhancement and was sentenced to  18 years to life. Davenport appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Davenport contends that the   trial court erroneously concluded he failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief by  relying on facts stated in the preliminary hearing transcript in the absence of any stipulation from him that the facts supplied a basis for his plea. The Court of Appeal agreed  and reversed the order summarily denying His  petition and remanded this case for further proceedings.

Facts: Davenport was charged by information with murder (§ 187), alleging he committed the murder “unlawfully and with malice aforethought.” The information included an enhancement for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury and death as well as personal and intentional discharge and personal use of a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d).)

Contact Information