Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

People v. Duenas (Cal. Ct. App., May 27, 2025, No. B335274) 2025 WL 1502018, at *1

Summary: In 2011, a jury convicted Robert Duenas of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and it found true gang, firearm, and great bodily injury enhancements. The trial court sentenced Duenas to 23 years in prison, including four years for the firearm enhancement and three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.

In June 2022, Duenas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his sentence. In August 2022, an order to show cause was issued to consider why Duenas was “not entitled to have the Penal Code section 12022.7 great bodily injury enhancement and the 12022.5 firearm enhancement stayed or have his unauthorized sentence otherwise remedied.” The trial court imposed and stayed the three-year great bodily injury enhancement, declined to stay or strike the firearm and gang enhancements, and left the six-year midterm on the substantive offense unchanged, reducing Duenas’s sentence from 23 years to 20 years.

McDaniel v. Superior Court of San Mateo County (Cal. Ct. App., May 19, 2025, No. A171858) 2025 WL 1428762

Summary: McDaniel, a Black individual, alleges he was disparately charged with gang enhancements due to his race, ethnicity, or national origin in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. McDaniel challenged the trial court’s order holding that he failed to demonstrate “good cause” to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to a potential violation of the Act. (Pen. Code,1 § 745, subd. (d).) The Court of Appeal held that:

1 defendant presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate good cause to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to his RJA claim, and

People v. Horton (Cal. Ct. App., May 13, 2025, No. B337373) 2025 WL 1378482, at *1

Summary : Horton was convicted of stalking and making criminal threats against Seiko H. He was acquitted of making criminal threats against Seiko’s father, John H. At sentencing, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (k), prohibiting Horton from having any contact with both Seiko and John, and an order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly or dangerous weapons. On appeal, Horton challenges the portion of the protective order naming John as a protected person, and the order directing Horton not to possess any deadly or dangerous weapons. The trial court did not err in including John as a protected person in the protective order, because there was sufficient evidence that Horton committed or attempted to commit some harm against John. The court mistakenly extended the weapons prohibition beyond firearms to any deadly or dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to strike the order prohibiting Horton from possessing any deadly and dangerous weapons, and affirmed the judgment as modified.

Jury verdict and sentencing

People v. Antonelli (Cal., Apr. 24, 2025, No. S281599) 2025 WL 1249609, at *1

Summary: In 1991, a jury convicted Antonelli of first degree murder under the provocative act doctrine based on his role in a home invasion robbery during which one of his accomplices was killed by a victim. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 which, as amended in 2021 by Senate Bill No. 775, makes eligible for resentencing persons convicted of murder pursuant to a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Pen. Code, § 1172.6, subd. (a)).Antonelli argued that that he was convicted of murder under “ ‘a provocative act theory whereby malice was imputed to [him] based on his participation in the robbery.’ ” The trial court denied the petition. Antonelli appealed and the Court of Appeal below affirmed, holding that he was categorically ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law because the provocative act murder doctrine “requires that the defendant personally harbor malice” (Antonelli, at p. 721, 311 Cal.Rptr.3d 265), i.e., he was not convicted under a theory by which malice could be imputed to him. The Court of Appeal found the jury instructions given at defendant’s trial to be irrelevant.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 314 Cal.Rptr.3d 146 (Lee) “disagree[d] with Antonelli that provocative act murder has always had a personal malice requirement.” (Id. at p. 1186, fn. 9, 314 Cal.Rptr.3d 146.) Lee held that it was not until 2009 that our decision in People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 141, 218 P.3d 660 (Concha) clearly articulated that a defendant had to personally harbor malice to be convicted of provocative act murder. According to Lee, individuals with pre-Concha provocative act murder convictions, like Antonelli  and the Lee defendant, are therefore not categorically barred from seeking relief under section 1172.6. The Lee court determined the defendant made a prima facie case for relief from his murder conviction and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

People v. Luu (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 24, 2025, No. G063066) 2025 WL 1189508, at *1–2

Summary:

In 2001, Phuoc Thien Luu was 17 years old when he participated in an attempted home invasion robbery with three other men. One of the men shot the homeowner who survived Police later killed the shooter when they tried to arrest him.

People v. Virgen (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 7, 2025, No. B333314) 2025 WL 1032450

Summary: Virgen was convicted of second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The Court of Appeal held that:

Thr trial court committed instructional error when it used two pattern jury instructions that, when read together, could have allowed jury to find defendant guilty of second-degree murder under uncharged-conspiracy theory, without finding that he acted with malice aforethought, and the error was not harmless.

People v. Gomez (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 7, 2025, No. H051210) 2025 WL 1024681, at *1

Summary: Police found a flare gun in Gomez’s possession. Based on an officer’s testimony describing the flare gun, the trial court found Gomez guilty of possessing a firearm as a felon under Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). The Court of Appeal held the prosecution must prove the flare gun was designed to be used as a weapon. Here, the record contained insufficient evidence to support such a finding. The court vacated the conviction on that count.

The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, and remanded the matter for resentencing.