Articles Posted in New Criminal Case Law

People v. Cofer (Cal., June 25, 2026, No. S286297) 2026 WL 1830928, at *1

Summary: After a plea agreement, Cofer was sentenced at a single hearing on five separate pending criminal cases. Cofer had been in presentence custody for extended periods in some of these cases and for shorter periods in others. The trial court awarded Coffey custody credits in each case that reflected the time he spent in custody in that specific case. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that under Penal Code section 2900.5, he should receive presentence custody credits in each of his five cases for all the time he served in custody on any of these cases, except for custody time that preceded his arrest in a particular case. (People v. Cofer (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 333, 341–342, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891 (Cofer).) The Court of Appeal held that the resolution of these cases through a single sentencing hearing meant that they all involved the same “proceedings” for purposes of section 2900.5, subdivision (b), under which “the custody to be credited” against a sentence must be “attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted.” (See Cofer, at p. 341, 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.) This interpretation of the statute would result in Cofer receiving more than 300 additional days of custody credit on his six-year term, compared to credits awarded by the trial court.

The California Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 2900.5 and concluded that “proceedings,” as used in section 2900.5, subdivision (b), is properly understood as referring to an individual criminal case. Therefore, custody credit is not automatically applied across multiple, distinct prosecutions merely because those cases are resolved and sentenced at a single hearing. Here, the trial court correctly interpreted the statute in awarding credits in each case for the time defendant spent in custody in that matter, rather than awarding him credit in each case for time served in other cases. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

People v. Brim (Cal. Ct. App., June 17, 2026, No. A170747) 2026 WL 1746369, at *1

Summary: Brim boarded a BART train and got into fight with another passenger, Williams, during it Williams drew a knife and attempted to stab Brim. Brim gained control of the knife, fatally stabbed Williams in the head and neck, and ran from the train. The fight was captured on two BART surveillance cameras.

Brim was charged with murder and tried by jury, where he testified that he had acted in self-defense. The jury found him guilty of second degree murder and he was later sentenced to 16 years to life in prison. Brim asserted that the trial court erred in: instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3474 regarding the right to self-defense, and in responding to the jury’s question about that instruction during its deliberations. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially erred in responding to the jury’s question regarding CALCRIM No. 3474, and reversed Brim’s murder conviction. The Court also concluded that there was substantial evidence to support that conviction, so People may retry Brim for murder. If they elect not to do so, the Court directed that the judgment be modified to reflect a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH CHARLES RUSSO, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., May 22, 2026, No. C103388) 2026 WL 1459441, at *1

Summary: Russo appealed the trial court’s denial of his request for mental health diversion. (See Pen. Code,2 § 1001.36.) The Court of Appeal affirmed in a published decision.

Russo was charged with dissuading a witness by force or threat, cruelty to an animal, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He had a prior strike for first degree burglary in 2013.

People v. Bankston (Cal., June 1, 2026, No. S044739) 2026 WL 1530539, at *1

Summary: This appeal is automatic from a death sentence.

The California Supreme Court finds that the penalty phase in this case violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a), and requires reversal of the judgment of death.

People v. Santa Clara County Superior Court (Cal. Ct. App., May 14, 2026, No. H053051) 2026 WL 1347413, at *1

Summary: Does an officer’s failure in a search warrant application to inform the magistrate of the defendant’s request for a breath test invalidate the warrant authorizing seizure of a blood sample to test the defendant’s blood alcohol level. The Court concluded it does not.

Feghhi was arrested after his vehicle, speeding at 130 miles per hour on Highway 101 in Gilroy, rear-ended a vehicle driven by Vanessa Arellano, killing her. Officers obtained a warrant to draw a blood sample from Feghhi after he initially refused—though later consented—to submit to a chemical test. The blood sample, taken more than three hours after the accident, revealed a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.14 percent.

In re GERALD JOHN KOWALCZYK on Habeas Corpus. (Cal., Apr. 30, 2026, No. S277910) 2026 WL 1175320, at *1–2

Summary: California’s state and federal laws presume that a person charged with a crime will not be detained prior to trial. The California Constitution has recognized a right to release on bail since 1849. (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 7.)  California’s  Constitution continues to guarantee such a right, providing that a defendant “shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties,” subject to specifically delineated exceptions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12 (section 12).) For noncapital offenses, these exceptions are set forth in subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12, which limit the right to release on bail in certain felony cases involving violence, sexual assault, or threats of great bodily harm where a court makes required findings by “clear and convincing evidence” of a “substantial likelihood” of specified harms if the defendant is released. (§ 12, subds. (b), (c).)  Section 12 also prohibits the requiring of excessive bail.

In In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135 (Humphrey), the California Supreme Court recognized that many criminal defendants who might otherwise be entitled to pretrial release were being detained “ ‘solely because’ the arrestee ‘lacked the resources’ to post bail.” (Id. at p. 143.) In Humphrey, we held that the common practice of detaining criminal defendants based solely on their financial condition violated state and federal equal protection and due process principles. The Court held that courts may not condition release on posting bail unless they “consider an arrestee’s ability to pay alongside the efficacy of less restrictive alternatives” to money bail. (Id. at p. 152.) We also held that while constitutional principles did not “categorically prohibit the government from ordering pretrial detention, … ‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.’ ” (Id. at p. 155.)

Bobo v. Appellate Division of Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 22, 2026, No. D087393) 2026 WL 1102519, at *1

Summary: Bobo was charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2)) after running a red light, colliding with another vehicle, and killing the other driver. She requested misdemeanor diversion before trial under section 1001.95. The trial court found Bobo eligible for misdemeanor diversion but not suitable on the ground that her negligent conduct caused the death of another person. Bobo filed a petition for writ of mandate in the appellate division of superior court. The appellate division  denied the petition. She then filed another petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal challenging the appellate division’s ruling. The Court issued an order to show cause and concluded Bobo was entitled to relief. A defendant charged with misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter is eligible for misdemeanor diversion because it is not one of the excluded offenses specifically listed in the statute. (§ 1001.95, subd. (e).)

By relying solely on facts inherent in the qualifying offense and failing to connect them to the underlying purposes of the misdemeanor diversion statute, the trial court abused its discretion in deciding Bobo was not suitable for diversion.  Bobo  also demonstrated the absence of an adequate legal remedy and irreparable harm if relief were denied. The Court  issued a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order summarily denying Bobo’s petition for writ of mandate and issue a new order (1) issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, and (2) directing the superior court to vacate its order denying misdemeanor diversion and reconsider Bobo’s suitability in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.

People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 16, 2026, No. E086779) 2026 WL 1029464, at *1

Summary: Petitioner, the People of the State of California, filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to vacate the order issued on August 12, 2025, denying their request to disqualify the Honorable Samah Shouka from further action in the case of real party in interest Russell Austin. Austin was charged in 2018 with first degree murder and the People sought the death penalty. Austin filed a claim under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA), a prima facie case had been found and RJA discovery was ordered. Judge Shouka was assigned to Austin’s case to conduct the evidentiary hearing. Judge Shouka was a former deputy district attorney employed by the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office (DAO) in the homicide unit. The People sought to disqualify Judge Shouka from presiding over Austin’s case based on provisions in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. The People claimed that that Judge Shouka had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts; she served as a lawyer for a party in a proceeding that involved the same issues as in the present proceeding; and facts and circumstances exist that would lead a person to reasonably doubt that Judge Shouka would be impartial in these proceedings. The Honorable Jeffrey B. Jones was assigned to decide the request for disqualification and entered an order on August 12, 2025, denying the request.

The People filed a petition for writ of mandate (Petition) asking the appellate court to reverse the order denying the request to disqualify Judge Shouka and issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its August 12, 2025, order. The People requested a stay of the proceedings until the issue has been resolved by this court. The Court of Appeal granted the requested stay and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. The Court of Appeal granted the Petition finding that Judge Shouka’s previous employment with the DAO might cause a person to reasonably entertain a doubt that she would be able to be impartial at the RJA evidentiary hearing within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii).