Assembly Bill 1950’s statutory amendments retroactively bar the trial court from adjudicating a probation violation after one year

Kuhnel v. Appellate Division of Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 17, 2025, No. A163307) 2025 WL 3652126, at *1–2

Summary: Kuhnel seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to terminate her probation on the ground she is entitled to the retroactive benefit of a statutory amendment reducing the length of probationary terms. Formerly, the law generally allowed a court to place a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor on probation for up to three years. (Pen. Code, former § 1203a.) Effective January 1, 2021, this default period was reduced to one year. (Pen. Code, § 1203a.) The California Supreme Court held that because Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to cases that are not yet final, it reduces the length of probationary terms imposed before the new law went into effect and authorizes relief from the consequences of a probationer’s acts committed beyond the new maximum period. (People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199, 205, 210–211 (Faial).)

Kuhnel was originally placed on three years’ probation and allegedly violated its terms during the first year of her probation. The court responded by summarily revoking probation, but not until early in the second year. These events all occurred well before Assembly Bill 1950 was enacted or went into effect, and they were appropriate under then-governing law. (See § 1203.3, subd. (a).) The issue is whether the rule of retroactivity prevents the court from adjudicating the violation, alleged to have occurred during the period when probation was unquestionably proper, on the ground that probation was not summarily revoked until after the maximum probationary period allowed under Assembly Bill 1950.

Applying Assembly Bill 1950 retroactively in light of this new authority, the Court of Appeal concluded that Kuhnel’s probation expired by operation of law before the trial court summarily revoked it, and the court thus lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the probation violation. The Court accordingly granted Kuhnel’s petition for writ of mandate.

Factual and Procedural Background

Kuhnel was convicted of misdemeanor embezzlement and placed on probation for three years on November 17, 2016. Eleven months into her probation, in October 2017, the Orinda Police Department received a report that Kuhnel had committed new acts of fraud, and in early December 2017 the probation department submitted to the trial court a notice of the violation. Thirteen months into her probation, on December 11, 2017, the trial court summarily revoked it and set a hearing on the violation. The hearing was continued multiple times, and in the meantime, Assembly Bill 1950 was passed and came into effect, reducing the period of misdemeanor probation in most cases to one year. (§ 1203a, subd. (a).)

Without a hearing on the probation violation ever being held, Kuhnel moved on June 18, 2021, to terminate her probation, arguing that she had been on probation for more than one year and Assembly Bill 1950 applied retroactively to shorten her probationary term. The People argued that the court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate a violation that took place during the original term of probation. The trial court accepted this theory because the alleged violation occurred, at least in part, during the probationary period permitted by Assembly Bill 1950, and accordingly denied Kuhnel’s motion on July 9, 2021.

Kuhnel petitioned and the Supreme Court granted review, and on October 29, 2025 ordered Kuhnel I not citable and transferred the matterwith directions to vacate the prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of Faial.

Analysis

When Kuhnel was placed on probation, section 1203a provided that courts could suspend the imposition or execution of sentence in misdemeanor cases and “make and enforce … terms of probation for a period not to exceed three years,” or longer if the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law exceeded three years. Among the amendments made by Assembly Bill 1950, effective January 1, 2021, misdemeanor probation may now not exceed one year, unless the offense provides for a specific probation length, which Kuhnel’s crime did not. Under the new law, Kuhnel could have been ordered to serve no more than one year of probation for her offense. Assembly Bill 1950 also reduced the default maximum probationary term for felonies to two years. (§ 1203.1, subds. (a) & (m); Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.) Kuhnel contends that these amendments apply retroactively and that, as a result, her probation ended as a matter of law on November 17, 2017, and the trial court no longer has jurisdiction over her.

Retroactivity- Assembly Bill 1950’s statutory amendments acted retroactively to bar the trial court from adjudicating the alleged probation violation.

The amendments of Assembly Bill 1950 apply retroactively to the benefit of a person whose judgment is not yet final on appeal. (Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 211.)

As a general rule, only “during the term of probation” does the court have authority to revoke or modify an order placing the defendant on probation. (§ 1203.3, subd. (a); In re Bakke, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 89, 227 Cal.Rptr. 663, 720 P.2d 11.) Once probation expires, the trial court loses jurisdiction to modify its terms. The probationary period “ ‘terminates automatically on the last day,’ ” and in the absence of special circumstances such as consent to a continuance, “discharge from probation is mandatory once the probation terms expires[, and]… the court loses its ability to pronounce judgment on the defendant at this point.” (Chavez, at p. 783, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 634.)

Revocation of probation, “summary or otherwise, shall serve to toll the running of the probationary period.” (Former § 1203.2(a).) The Legislature added a tolling provision because it “was focused on preserving the jurisdiction of the trial court to hold formal probation violation hearings that met Morrissey-Vickers requirements after the period of probation had expired.”  It is well established that summary revocation of probation is appropriate and preserves a court’s jurisdiction over a probationer, “even if the evidentiary hearing, formal revocation and sentencing all occur after the period of probation would otherwise have been completed.”

Applying Assembly Bill 1950 retroactively in this case appears to give Kuhnel a “windfall.” (Faial, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 220.) We also recognize that, because the amendments had not yet been enacted at the time Kuhnel allegedly violated her probation, the prosecutor had no incentive to move swiftly to have her probation summarily revoked before the end of a one-year period. In the circumstances, applying Assembly Bill 1950 retroactively leads us to conclude that Kuhnel’s probation expired by operation of law on November 17, 2017, and the trial court accordingly lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the notice of probation violation filed in December 2017.

Disposition

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent appellate division to vacate its order denying Kuhnel’s petition for writ of mandate and to enter a new and different order granting the petition and directing the superior court to (1) vacate its order denying Kuhnel’s June 18, 2021 motion to terminate court probation and (2) enter a new and different order granting the motion and terminating probation, and make any other necessary orders consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

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