Prosecution could not proceed under  Abolished Theory of Felony Murder That Imputed Malice “Based Solely On” Miller’s “Participation In” The Kidnapping

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARMANI MILLER, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., June 27, 2025, No. A170047) 2025 WL 1779185, at *1–2

Miller appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. In August 2020, Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement, and the trial court sentenced him to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, Miller filed a petition for resentencing. Following a hearing, the court held that Miller failed to make a prima facie case that he was entitled to relief and denied the petition.

On appeal, Miller argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition because he adequately alleged that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule made effective January 1, 2019. Although Miller’s plea and conviction occurred after 2019, he contends that he is still eligible for relief based on subsequent cases that recognized youth as a factor in determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. We affirm because the charging document against Miller was filed after the felony murder rule was amended. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)

Procedural History

In January 2020, the People filed an amended felony information charging Miller and several codefendants with: (1) murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count one); (2) kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count two); and (3) second degree robbery (§ 211, count three). The amended information alleged that the charges were violent felonies within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c) and that Miller “was a major participant in the [felony kidnapping] and acted with reckless indifference to human life” within the meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(3).

Later that same month, Miller moved to admit expert testimony regarding adolescent brain development, contending that the testimony was relevant to his state of mind and whether he acted with “reckless indifference to human life.”2 The trial court ruled that Miller could only introduce this evidence if he testified at trial. A few days later, Miller pled no contest to second degree murder. Under the terms of the plea, if Miller testified truthfully at his co-defendants’ trial, he would be permitted to withdraw his plea and enter a new plea to voluntary manslaughter.

In August 2020, Miller withdrew his plea for second degree murder and pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) with a firearm use enhancement (§ 12022.5). The trial court sentenced Miller to the midterm of six years for manslaughter and 10 years for the firearm enhancement for an aggregate term of 16 years in state prison.

Miller filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 in May 2023. The trial court appointed counsel for Miller and ordered briefing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c). In its response, the prosecution argued that Miller had not made a prima facie showing for relief because he “pled guilty a year after the changes in the law were made in regards to felony murder” by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437). According to the prosecution, “[a]t the time of the plea, [it was] legally prohibited from presenting a theory of liability in which malice was imputed.”

Miller countered that “[a]t the time of his plea, it was not clear whether youth was a factor relevant to determining whether an aider and abettor was a major participant who acted with a reckless indifference to human life.” He continued that recent cases “now recognize that the defendant’s youth at the time of the offense should be a factor in determining whether that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life” and that he “was not allowed to present evidence of this ‘relevant factor.’ ”

At the hearing, defense counsel reiterated that these recent cases were relevant based on the timing of Miller’s plea, which occurred three days after the trial court ruled that he could only present evidence of adolescent brain development if he testified at trial. The court denied the petition on the ground that Miller had not met the third element for prima facie relief—that he “could not presently be convicted of murder … because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) It reasoned that there would be “no end to [Miller’s] argument” if subsequent cases were considered and that he had to show “he could not presently be convicted of murder … because of changes that occurred on [January 1, 2019], not case law that occurred several years after that.”

Prima Facie Showing

A petitioner must meet the following threshold elements at the prima facie stage: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime …. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

To meet the first requirement (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)), “the charging document filed against [a defendant] must have allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 298 (Reyes).) Here, the amended information was filed in January 2020 and alleged, as to felony murder, that Miller “was a major participant in the [felony kidnapping] and acted with reckless indifference to human life” within the meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(3). The charging document therefore did not allow the prosecution to proceed under the old invalid theory of felony murder. In Reyes, the Court of Appeal similarly held that the defendant was ineligible for relief because at the time the information was filed in 2020, “the prosecution was precluded from proving the murder charge under a theory of imputed malice.” (Reyes, at p. 298.)

In his supplemental brief, Miller contends that he qualifies for relief because he was charged with felony murder, which is all that is required under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1). We disagree, as “felony murder” under this section refers to the old and now abolished theory of felony murder. We apply two well-established canons of statutory interpretation in reaching this conclusion.

The first, “ ‘[n]oscitur a sociis (“it is known by its associates”) is the principle that “ ‘ “the meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.” ’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘a word takes meaning from the company it keeps.’ [Citation.] ‘ “In accordance with this principle of construction, a court will adopt a restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more expansive meaning would make other items in the list unnecessary or redundant, or would otherwise make the item markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.” ’ ” (Kaatz v. City of Seaside (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 13, 40 (Kaatz).)

The second, ejusdem generis, “explains that, when a particular class of things modifies general words, those general words are construed as applying only to things of the same nature or class as those enumerated.” (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 180.) And “when a statute contains a list or catalogue of items, a court should determine the meaning of each by reference to the others, giving preference to an interpretation that uniformly treats items similar in nature and scope.” (Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1011–1012 (Moore).)

Based on the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, the term “theory of felony murder” under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) must be interpreted in the context of the other listed items in that subdivision. The two other theories in the subdivision are “the natural and probable consequences doctrine” and any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Senate Bill 1437 abolished liability for murder under both those theories. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Interpreting “felony murder” to include the presently valid theory of amended felony murder renders the term ‘ “ ‘markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.’ ” ’ (Kaatz, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 40.) Confining its meaning to only the pre-Senate Bill 1437 theory of felony murder, on the other hand, results in a preferred interpretation that treats all three theories similarly—as now invalid theories of murder liability. The catchall reference at the end of section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) to any “other theory” confirms that the defendant must be charged with a “theory of felony murder” that imputes malice “to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.”

Miller is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) because the amended information was filed in January 2020 and did not allow the prosecution to proceed under the now abolished theory of felony murder that imputed malice “based solely on” Miller’s “participation in” the kidnapping.

Disposition

The order denying Miller’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

 

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