People v. Mills (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 9, 2025, No. 2D CRIM. B334998) 2025 WL 2601940, at *1–2
Summary: Mills, a convicted “three striker,” with a life sentence wanted eligibility for “elderly parole.” Elderly parole allows the Board of Parole Hearings, to review the parole suitability of any inmate who is 50 years of age or older and has served a minimum of 20 years of continuous incarceration on the inmate’s current sentence, serving either a determinate or indeterminate sentence. However, elderly parole is not available to those who sentenced pursuant to Section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, of Section 667(See Pen. Code, § 3055).
If a defendant has two or more prior serious or violent felony convictions, the term for the current felony conviction is an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 1170.12)
Here, the trial court reduced 110 years to life sentence down to 43 years to life. The trial court struck one of the two strikes. If the trial court struck this “strike” to make Mills eligible for elderly parole, it should not have done so.
Mills was 67 years old and contends that his “parole eligibility date is well after his natural life expectancy.” The trial court erroneously thought that Mills would be eligible for “elderly parole” if just one strike was stricken. Mills argues that: “Had the court known [appellant] is ineligible for elderly parole [Pen. Code § 3055 subd. (g)] it is reasonably probable it would have sentenced him differently.” Even if the prosecutor and defense counsel mistakenly believed that a “two striker” was eligible for elderly parole, that does not mean that the trial court was similarly mistaken.
Also, it is not“reasonably probable” that the court would have stricken the remaining strike. The Court of Appeal does not generally opine on the trial court’s reasoning, even if it is erroneous. It also does not reverse where a theoretical trial court remedy would be unlawful.
During a home invasion robbery, Mills attempted to kill J.A. with a firearm. He also assaulted two other people in the house with the firearm.
Letter and spirit of three strikes law does not warrant eligibility for elder parole here
Given Mill’s criminal history and the horrific nature of the instant offenses, any further attempt to lessen the sentence is illusory even if he is “elderly” and even if he could be eligible for parole consideration in the future. Mills falls within the letter and spirit of the Three Strikes Law. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429.)
A defendant has an entitlement to be sentenced by a trial court who has an “informed discretion” of the alternatives it has before making a sentence decision. (E.g., People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 773, 323 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 552 P.3d 877, citing People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 421, 324 P.3d 245.)
Dismissing a strike or two strikes so that a defendant might be eligible for “elderly parole” is not a lawful reason to remove a defendant from the letter and spirit of the Three Strikes rule or a fair application of People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628. There is no authority which allows such a striking to achieve “elderly parole.” (See In re Brown (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 969, 977, 325 Cal.Rptr.3d 304 [“elderly parole”].) “ ‘It is not our function … to add language or imply exceptions to statutes passed by the Legislature.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Atlas (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 523, 527, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 307.) Neither the trial court, nor an appellate court should attempt to make a “Three Strikes” prisoner eligible for “elderly parole.” Doing so here would be an extreme exception to the “Three Strikes rule.”
Finally, there is no need to remand for the trial court to recompute credits. The Department of Corrections presumptively correctly compute such credits. If Mills thinks the computational is erroneous, he may seek relief in the trial court. (Pen. Code § 1237.1.)
The judgment is affirmed.
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