THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HAYLEY MACKENZIE MURPHY, Defendant and Appellant. (Cal. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2025, No. A172224) 2025 WL 3250744, at *1–2
Summary: Murphy filed to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17.1 The trial court denied her motion. Murphy appealed and argued that the court erred by relying — despite language in section 1203.4, subdivision (c)(3)(C) (section 1203.4(c)(3)(C)) and section 17, subdivision (f) (section 17(f)) — on unpaid restitution to deny her requests. Those provisions provide that “an unfulfilled order of restitution” or “unpaid order of restitution” “shall not be grounds for denial” of such requests. Daniel argued that this language plainly prohibits courts from relying on unpaid restitution to deny requests for expungement and reduction. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed.
Facts
In January 2020, Murphy drove into a parked truck, damaging the truck and causing injuries to its driver. Field sobriety tests showed that Murphy registered a blood-alcohol concentration of .212 and .211 percent. She was charged with felony driving under the influence (DUI) causing injury with a prior conviction; DUI with a blood-alcohol content 0.08 percent or above with a prior conviction; a special allegation as to counts 1 and 2 of excess blood-alcohol content; and a misdemeanor violation of driving with a suspended or revoked license). (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subds. (a)–(b), 23560, 23578, 14601.1, subd. (a).)
In July 2021, Murphy pled no contest to a felony DUI causing injury and admitted the prior DUI conviction. Under the agreement, her felony conviction could not be reduced to a misdemeanor until the end of probation. The remaining charges were dismissed, and imposition of the sentence was suspended. The trial court also ordered her to pay $78,558.62 in restitution to the victim, plus 10 percent interest per year from the date of sentencing.
AftrrvMurphy’s three-year term of probation expired, she petitioned the trial court to expunge her conviction under section 1203.4 and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17, stating she fulfilled all the terms and conditions of probation. The People argued she only paid $3,247.28 in restitution to the victim and failed to satisfy one of the conditions of probation. Murphy explained that she lost her nursing license and employment as a result of her conviction. The expungement and reduction would enable her to regain her nursing license and pay restitution.
The trial court determined it was not in the interests of justice to grant either motion. The court stressed on the outstanding restitution balance, noting the $3,000 payment was not “significant enough and impressive enough.” The court was not satisfied with her progress in making restitution, but indicated that “[d]own the road certainly if she” makes “significant effort to take care of her restitution,” it might then grant the motion.
Analysis of statutory language of Section 1203.4
Murphy argues the trial court erred by relying on unpaid restitution in denying her requests to expunge her conviction under section 1203.4, subdivision (c), and reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17.
Section 1203.4 provides that a defendant has fulfilled conditions of probation or who has been discharged before the termination of the probation period “is entitled as a matter of right to have the plea or verdict changed to not guilty, to have the proceedings expunged from the record.” (People v. Hawley (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 247, 249–250; § 1203.4, subd. (a).) “(T)he trial court is required to grant the requested relief” and dismiss the charges. (Hawley, at p. 250, fn. omitted; § 1203.4, subd. (a).) Automatically granting expungement is prohibited if the defendant, like Murphy, has been convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 12810, e.g., a DUI or DUI causing injury. (§ 1203.4, subd. (c)(1); Veh. Code, §§ 12810, 23153.) A court may, “in its discretion and the interest of justice,” determine that such a defendant “should be granted” expungement relief. (§ 1203.4, subds. (a), (c)(2).) When exercising this discretionary authority, the Legislature has provided that “an unpaid order of restitution or restitution fine shall not be grounds for denial of the petition for relief.” (Id., subd. (c)(3)(C).)
Similarly, section 17 authorizes trial courts to reduce a wobbler offense — a crime punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor depending on the severity of the facts surrounding its commission — by declaring the crime a misdemeanor “on application of the defendant or probation officer.” (§ 17, subd. (b)(3); People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 974.) When exercising its discretion, a court may consider a range of factors, including “ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or [their] traits of character as evidenced by [their] behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ ” (Alvarez, at p. 978.) It may also consider sentencing objectives in the California Rules of Court, including “protecting society, punishing the defendant, deterring crime, encouraging the defendant to lead a law-abiding life, and preventing the defendant from committing new crimes.” (People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1027–1028.) Like section 1203.4, section 17 expressly provides that, when the court exercises its discretion, “an unfulfilled order of restitution or a restitution fine shall not be grounds for denial of a request or application for reduction.” (§ 17(f).)
The provisions of sections 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and 17(f) are clear and unambiguous. The provisions prohibit a trial court from relying on a defendant’s nonpayment of restitution or a restitution fine when denying their request for expungement or reduction. Prohibiting unpaid restitution from being “grounds for denial” means unpaid restitution cannot — in any way — be a basis for denying relief.
The Legislature also stated that “expungement should be accessible to people who have been ordered to pay direct restitution or restitution fines.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 734, § 1, subd. (o).) Senate Bill No. 1106 “would prohibit a petition for relief, whether statutorily authorized or in the court’s discretion, from being denied due to an unfulfilled order of restitution or restitution fine.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1106 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) The legislative history of sections 1203.4(c)(3)(C) and 17(f) confirms that the purpose of, and the Legislature’s goal in enacting, those provisions was to prevent trial courts from relying on unpaid restitution to deny relief.
The trial court erred by considering Murphy’s unpaid restitution in denying her relief under sections 1203.4 and 17. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156 [“abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors” or “on an incorrect legal standard”].)
The record here does not demonstrate “with unusual clarity that remand would be an idle act.” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432.) The trial court emphasized Murphy’s unpaid restitution as the primary factor for denying her relief and suggested it would reconsider its decision if she paid more restitution. It stated, “I’m not saying paying it all, that’d be nice if she could, but I think 3,000 is not sufficient, in my view, at this point in her process to grant the motion.” The court expressed its view that the paid amount was not “significant” or “impressive enough” to warrant relief. The court stated “I don’t require that someone absolutely pay off all restitution, but I wanna be impressed at their performance.” This repeated reliance on the improper factor of unpaid restitution implies that it would not have reached the same conclusion in the absence of the error. The Court reverse and remand for reconsideration. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.)
The information provided on this website does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice; instead, all information, content, and materials available on this site are for general informational purposes only. Information on this website may not constitute the most up-to-date legal or other information.