VICTOR MICHAEL ARRIAGA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Aug. 29, 2025, No. B340795) 2025 WL 2490639, at *1
Summary: Arriaga petitioned for a peremptory writ of prohibition directing the trial court to grant his motion to dismiss the information for violation of his state speedy trial right and his federal right to due process. Arriaga argued that a 16-year delay between the People’s filing of a felony complaint for wrongful diversion of construction funds in 2007, and his arraignment on the count in 2023, resulted in prejudice to him that outweighed any justification for the delay. The Court agreed and granted Arriaga’s petition.
In 2006, the Los Angeles Building and Safety Department issued a stop-work notice for lack of permits for the construction and because the work Arriaga had performed was not code compliant. An investigation discovered Arriaga was not a licensed contractor in California. The Contractors State License Board (CSLB)referred the case to the district attorney.
On February 2, 2007, the district attorney filed a felony complaint and an arrest warrant issued. There is no evidence that law enforcement ever attempted to contact Arriaga or inform him about the warrant.
In 2022, Arriaga learned about the outstanding warrant when he was arrested for a misdemeanor in Nevada. In June 2023, he returned to Los Angeles to clear the warrant and appeared in the Los Angeles Superior Court, where he was arraigned. The People then filed an information alleging one felony count of wrongful diversion of construction funds (Pen. Code, § 484b; count 1).
In March 2024, Arriaga moved to dismiss the information on the ground that the People’s delay in prosecuting him after the filing of the felony complaint violated his state and federal rights to a speedy trial. Arriaga argued that the delay caused him to suffer actual prejudice because evidence key to his defense was no longer available and other witness memories had faded. Arriaga contended that his bank records were purged, preventing him from showing that he lawfully used the funds paid him for the construction project.
Arriaga also claimed that his father’s death in 2011 meant his father could not testify to the cost of the repairs or to Arriaga’s lawful use of the funds to pay wages for his labor on the project.
The trial court court found Arriaga failed to demonstrate actual prejudice because the lost evidence could not “plausibly exculpate” Arriaga from liability under section 484b since it was undisputed that he failed to complete the work at Torres’s house. The court also concluded the People proffered a legitimate justification for the delay in that Arriaga ignored state licensing requirements, did not respond to the CSLB’s communications, and left California during the delay period.
Arriaga filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the court of Appeal.
Delay in prosecuting the felony charge and right to a speedy trial
The California Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1.) “Under the state Constitution, the filing of a felony complaint is sufficient to trigger the protection of the speedy trial right.” (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 754.) In California, only a delay occurring “after the complaint is filed and before arrest” (the post-complaint delay) implicates a defendant’s speedy trial right. (People v. Hayton (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 413, 418 (Hayton); Scherling v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493, 504 (Scherling).)
Courts balance the prejudice to a defendant resulting from the delay against the prosecution’s justification for the delay. (Scherling, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 505.) “[T]he defendant has the initial burden of showing some prejudice before the prosecution is required to offer any reason for the delay.” (Garcia v. Superior Court (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 148, 151 (Garcia).) If the defendant makes the necessary prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifts to the prosecution to explain the delay. (Ibid.) The court then balances the showing of prejudice against any asserted justification for the delay to determine if the delay violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. (Id. at pp. 151–152.)
“Whether a delay is prejudicial is a factual question that we review for substantial evidence.” (People v. Manzo (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 538, 542 (Manzo).)
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Denying Arriaga’s Motion To Dismiss Based on His State Speedy Trial Right
Substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that Arriaga failed to make a prima facie showing of prejudice
A defendant has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that a delay in prosecution caused actual prejudice. (Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1540.) A defendant may meet this burden by demonstrating “that the loss of such evidence … makes it difficult or impossible for the defendant to prepare a defense ….” (People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1328 (Mirenda).)
Here, Arriaga contends that the prosecution’s post-complaint delay prejudiced him because his bank purged his account records from 2006, and his father died in 2011causing him to lose evidence would have created reasonable doubt about whether he received all funds from Torres necessary to complete the repairs and renovations.
Section 484b
“The purpose[ ] of section 484b is to punish fraudulent conversion. But so long as construction funds are used on bona fide costs of the project for which they are received there is no conversion. The interest section 484b seeks to protect is the economic security provided by a direct transmutation of construction funds into project assets. Where a progress payment is applied to bona fide project costs the owner and lender receive a value in project assets presumably of equivalent value to the construction funds that have been so used.” (People v. Butcher (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 929, 938 (Butcher).)
Arriaga only needed to make “ ‘ “a minimal showing” ’ ” of actual prejudice to overcome an insubstantial justification for delay. (Mirenda, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332.) He did not have to demonstrate that the lost evidence would have provided a complete defense to meet his burden.
There was no substantial evidence to support a finding that there was a legitimate justification for the People’s post-complaint delay
Arriaga made a prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden shifted to the People to offer a legitimate reason for the delay.
The Court concluded substantial evidence does not support the finding that the People established a reasonable justification for the 16-year delay between the filing of the felony complaint and Arriaga’s arraignment.
It was an abuse of discretion to conclude the justification for the delay outweighed the prejudice to Arriaga
Courts balance the defendant’s showing of prejudice against the People’s explanation for delay.
Here, substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that Arriaga failed to make a prima facie showing that the 16-year delay in this case prejudiced his defense. There was no evidence to support a conclusion that the People’s delay was reasonable, or that Arriaga waived his speedy trial right. The trial court abused its discretion by concluding the People’s justification for the delay outweighed the prejudice to Arriaga.
Disposition
The petition for writ of prohibition was granted. Respondent Los Angeles Superior Court was to vacate its order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and to enter a new order granting the motion with respect to count 1 of the amended information charging Arriaga with a violation of section 484b.
The information provided on this website does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice; instead, all information, content, and materials available on this site are for general informational purposes only. Information on this website may not constitute the most up-to-date legal or other information.