THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; HAILEY MORGAN LASHELLE, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 9, 2026, No. E086512) 2026 WL 73966, at *1–4
Summary: Lashelle (defendant) was charged by Petitioner Riverside County District Attorney’s office (the People) with misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI). (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a), (b).) Lashelle filed a motion to dismiss arguing that she was denied her right to a speedy trial under the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant contributed to any delay by failing to appear per her signed promises to appear.
Lashelle filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking review with the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court (Appellate Division). A divided panel of the Appellate Division concluded that the People’s failure to file a formal misdemeanor complaint within 25 days of defendant’s citation as specified in Penal Code section 853.6 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed and automatically relieved defendant of any obligation to appear. The Appellate Division ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order and to reconsider defendant’s motion consistent with the Appellate Division’s conclusion.
The People filed a petition to transfer the matter to this court, seeking review of the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the failure to file a formal pleading within the 25-day period specified in section 853.6 relieved defendant of any obligation to appear for any further proceedings in the trial court. People’s petition was treated as a petition for writ of mandate seeking review of the Appellate Division’s order (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.3). This Court concluded that the Appellate Division abused its discretion by applying an incorrect principle of law in reaching its decision. A peremptory writ was issued directing the Appellate Division to vacate its opinion and order and to reconsider the defendant’s writ of mandate.
Background
On March 28, 2025, defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate with the Appellate Division seeking review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss filed by defendant. Defendant made the following allegations in support of her petition to the Appellate Division:
· On November 17, 2021, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging defendant with misdemeanor DUI.
· On December 14, 2021, defendant failed to appear, and a bench warrant for her arrest was issued.
· The bench warrant was recalled after defendant was subsequently stopped by a law enforcement officer and received a new citation to appear. She again failed to appear in response to the new citation, and a new bench warrant was issued for her arrest.
· In March 2024, the bench warrant was recalled when defendant voluntarily contacted the clerk of the court and requested that her matters be added to the court calendar. She subsequently appeared and pled not guilty to the allegations of the complaint.
· On January 27, 2025, defendant filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court, arguing that she was denied a speedy trial under the 6th amendment.
· On February 25, 2025, the trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding, in part, that defendant’s two failures to appear contributed to the delay in bringing her case to trial.
On June 11, 2025, a divided panel of the Appellate Division issued an opinion concluding: (1) the failure of the district attorney to file a misdemeanor complaint within the 25 days specified in section 853.6, subdivision (a), rendered defendant “automatically freed from any restraint on her person” because “the government no longer had the right to demand her presence in court”; (2) the inability to compel defendant to appear rendered the trial court without personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (3) because the trial court lost personal jurisdiction over the defendant, “defendant cannot be faulted for failing to attend court in the absence of a valid assertion of jurisdiction over her” for purposes of conducting a speedy trial analysis under the Sixth Amendment. The Appellate Division ordered the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance directing the trial court to vacate its order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and to reconsider the motion in a manner consistent with its opinion.
On July 14, 2025, the People filed a “petition for transfer” of the matter to this court.
On October 29, 2025, we sent notice to the parties that we would construe the petition for transfer a mislabeled petition for writ of mandate seeking review of the Appellate Division’s decision, notified them that we were considering issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance, and invited the parties to notify the court of any objection.
Jurisdictional Issues
Here, the underlying procedural history is undisputed, and the parties seek resolution of a purely legal issue regarding the interpretation and application of section 853.6, subdivision (e)(3)(B). Requiring the parties to go through this process would not be in the interests of justice, as it would add significant delay to resolution of defendant’s claim regarding her Constitutional right to a speedy trial. In order to prevent any further unnecessary delay to resolution of defendant’s underlying claim, the Court of Appeal construed the People’s petition for transfer as a petition for writ of mandate seeking review of the Appellate Division’s decision.
Legal Background and Standard of Review
Generally, a criminal defendant has a right to a speedy trial under both the United States and California constitutions. (People v. Martinez (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 755, 762-763; U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 15.) The state and federal speedy trial rights differ in certain respects, as well as differ with respect to whether a felony or misdemeanor is charged. (See Martinez, at pp. 762-769.) A criminal defendant usually bears the burden of establishing actual prejudice in order to prevail on a claim that his speedy trial rights have been violated under any of the applicable standards. “(A) delay of more than one year in a misdemeanor case is presumptively prejudicial” for purposes of analyzing whether the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. (Dews v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 660, 665; Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 252-254.) A showing of actual or presumptive prejudice is a “triggering mechanism,” which then requires the court to conduct a balancing test based upon the factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 (Barker). These factors include “ ‘whether [the] delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.’ ” (Dews, at p. 665; Martinez, at p. 764.)
Generally, “[w]e review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for prejudicial delay for an abuse of discretion and defer to any underlying factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Manzo (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 538, 542.) Similarly, we review the decision of the Appellate Division to determine whether it abused its discretion or exceeded its jurisdiction. (Dews, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 664.)
The failure to file a formal charge within the 25 days specified in section 853.6, subdivision (e)(3)(B), does not deprive the government of the right to demand the cited person’s presence in court and does not render the cited individual “automatically freed from any restraint on her person.”
By statute, a person who has been released upon a written promise to appear is subject to criminal prosecution (§ 853.7), fines (§ 853.7a), and subsequent arrest for the failure to appear (§§ 853.8, 978.5, subd. (a)(4)). None of these statutorily imposed consequences are contingent upon the filing of formal charges related to defendant’s initial arrest and citation. The threat of arrest, fine, and prosecution is not contingent on the filing of formal charges in conformance with the procedures set forth in section 853.6. And the failure of the prosecutor to comply with the timeline specified in section 853.6 cannot, on its own, operate to relieve the released arrestee from the obligation to appear.
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest and continues so long as she remains either formally accused or subject to restraint as a condition of her release. So long as either of these conditions are present, defendant is not in the position of an arrestee who is free pending an ongoing investigation pursuant to a dismissal or release without charges.
Disposition
Let a writ issue directing the Appellate Division to (1) vacate its opinion and order of June 11, 2025, and (2) reconsider defendant’s petition for writ of mandate seeking review of the trial court’s order in a manner consistent with this opinion.
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