In re LATASHA RILEY on Habeas Corpus. (Cal. Ct. App., Dec. 12, 2025, No. A174426) 2025 WL 3563320
Summary: Latasha Riley was sentenced to four years of probation and a 60-day county jail term in a plea deal. She was referred to a work release program instead of serving jail time. Due to pregnancy she was unable to complete the work release program, and the trial court ordered her to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody.
Riley filed a petition for habeas corpus and the Court of Appealissued an order to show cause. Persons enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time have a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without due process. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481–482; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 458.) Here, the trial court violated Riley’s due process rights by ordering her back into custody based on a critical finding — that it was not feasible for her to participate in the program — unsupported by substantial evidence.
Background
In February 2024, Riley entered a no contest plea to two counts of willful infliction of corporal injury and one count of dissuading a witness; she also admitted causing great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a), 136.1, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (e).) She received four years of probation and a 60-day county jail term. The agreement allowed her to apply for electronic home detention in lieu of serving jail time. In March, the sheriff asked the court to refer her to its work release program instead of electronic home detention. The court did so.
In June 2024 — after having served six days in the work release program — Riley missed work because of sickness related to her pregnancy. She did not know she was pregnant when she enrolled in the program. The sheriff advised probation about Riley’s pregnancy, that she was referred back to court, and that she was advised “not to return to the worksite” because there was “no light duty available” and “to follow up with her Attorney and/or the court for the next steps.”
In September 2025, Riley voluntarily appeared in court with her eight-month-old baby. She asked the court to re-refer her to the work release program. The prosecutor instead urged that she be ordered to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody. The court found that she did not willfully violate the terms of the program, but ordered her to serve the remainder of her term in custody. It reasoned that she was sentenced to 60 days, “given the chance to do that by alternative means,” and since “[t]hose alternative means were no longer feasible … that 60-day jail sentence is going to go into effect.” It denied her request for a future surrender date so she could get her affairs in order and instead ordered her into custody immediately.
Eleven days later, Riley filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. She argued that the court abused its discretion and violated her due process rights by terminating her eligibility for the work release program despite finding that she did not willfully violate its terms and without making an adequate inquiry into whether she remained fit for it.
Statutory Framework Governing Work Release Programs
“[S]ection 4024.2 provides that the administrative official in charge of county correctional facilities may offer a voluntary work-release program in lieu of jail time.” (Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1988) 45 Cal.3d 518, 538, fn. omitted.) “Subdivision (a) of section 4024.2 states that the program may only be offered to someone already committed to the correctional facility.” (Id. at pp. 538–539.) “Moreover, subdivision (c) provides that a person is eligible for the program at the discretion of the administrative official in charge of the program, subject to the fitness of the person for the program and compliance with the rules of the program.” (Id. at p. 539.) Thus, a “judge has the power to commit a person to a correctional facility, but then the administrative official in charge of the facility has the discretionary power to offer work release if the person is deemed eligible under the rules of the program.” (Ibid.) As a condition for participating, the person “ ‘shall sign an agreement that the sheriff may immediately retake the person into custody to serve the balance of his or her sentence if the person fails to appear for the program at the time and place agreed to, does not perform the work or activity assigned, or for any other reason is no longer a fit subject for release.’ ” (In re Barber (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 368, 373, italics omitted.)
Riley argues that, once persons have been enrolled in a work release program, they have a conditional liberty interest a trial court cannot revoke without due process. (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 481–482; People v. Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 458.) The court agreed. Parolees and probationers have conditional liberty interests protected by due process, and there is no meaningful difference between them and those enrolled in work release programs. (Morrissey, at pp. 481–482; Vickers, at p. 458.) Like parolees, such persons enjoy a liberty that “includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty,” and “its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss.’ ” (Morrissey, at p. 482.) They are “free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” (Ibid.) Although they are subject to some restrictions, their “condition[s are] very different from that of confinement,” and they too rely on “an implicit promise” that their liberty “will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to” the conditions of their release. (Ibid.) Like probationers, the nature of their liberty interest is at least that of a parolee since many have “not … been an inmate of a prison or a jail.” (Vickers, at p. 458.) Notably, the prosecutor and the sheriff do not contend otherwise. (In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351 [failure to offer counter argument implicitly conceded point].)
Here, the trial court violated Riley’s due process rights by revoking her participation in the work release program. Only the sheriff had the power to terminate her participation in the program. (Ryan v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 538; In re Barber, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.) The court thus abused its discretion when revoking her liberty. (People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence”].) The court remanded her to custody after finding her participation in the program “no longer feasible.” There is no evidence supporting that finding. Even when she was pregnant, the sheriff stated the court would find “something else for [her] to do that is lighter” or might give her a “ ‘stay’ that will send [her] back to the program at a later date.” The sheriff only told her “not to return to the worksite” because there was “no light duty available” and “to follow up with her Attorney and/or the court for the next steps”; it did not terminate her from the program. None of these statements supports a finding
that she could not participate in the program as of September 2025, when she was no longer pregnant. The prosecutor and sheriff do not dispute this conclusion. (In re Ramone R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) With no evidence supporting the court’s finding, its decision to terminate Riley’s participation in the program and remand her into custody was arbitrary, irrational, and an abuse of discretion. (Cluff, at p. 998; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)g
People in Riley’s positio are entitled to more due process than she received here. (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 481–489; People v. Vickers, svuupra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 458, 460.)
Disposition
The trial court’s order is reversed, and we remand the matter. On remand, the court is instructed to re-refer her to the work release program to complete any days that she may still owe on her term.
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