Nevarez v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 27, 2025, No. D085897) 2025 WL 3002064, at *1
Summary: Nevarez drove while intoxicated and caused a collision that resulted in the death of a motorcyclist. The motorcyclist struck Nevarez’s SUV minutes after it was disabled on the freeway. Nevarez was charged with second-degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),and other crimes. Nevarez’s defense counsel filed a motion under section 995 to set aside the murder charge. Nevarez argued that under People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 545 (Chagolla), that murder could not be charged because his vehicle was inoperable at the time it was struck by the victim’s motorcycle.
The trial court denied the motion, finding Chagolla distinguishable. Nevarez filed a petition for writ of prohibition asking the court of appeal to overturn the trial court’s order. The court of appeal issued an order to show cause. The court of appeal agreed with the trial court that probable cause supports the murder charge and deny Nevarez’s petition. The court clarified its decision in Chagolla and held that liability for murder under the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279 (Watson) does not automatically end the moment an intoxicated driver ceases driving.
Factual And Procedural Background
On December 1, 2023, Nevarez was driving a Honda Pilot southbound on Interstate-15. Nevarez was in the farthest left general lane and crashed into the rear of a Honda Odyssey in front of him, causing the Odyssey to spin clockwise to the right and fly across all five general lanes of traffic. The Odyssey spun and struck a Ford box truck that was traveling in the number four lane. The impact sent the box truck and the Odyssey to the right shoulder of the freeway. After it hit the Odyssey, Nevarez’s Pilot side-swiped an Audi A7 sedan in the far left general lane. The Pilot then veered left across the two HOV lanes and came to a stop against the concrete barrier wall, blocking the number one HOV lane. The Pilot was disabled and all of its lights were off.
At the same time, a motorcyclist Sutton was traveling south in the number one HOV lane. Moments after Nevarez struck the Odyssey, as the Odyssey’s driver was on the phone with 911, Sutton struck the right rear of Nevarez’s Pilot. The force of the collision detached Sutton’s left leg from his body. First responders pronounced Sutton deceased.
Murder definition and killing a person while driving
“ ‘Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought.’ (§ 187, subd. (a).) Murder committed without premeditation and deliberation is of the second degree. Malice may be express or implied for second-degree murder. ‘Malice is implied when an unlawful killing results from a willful act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, performed with conscious disregard for that danger.’ Killing a person while driving intoxicated is second-degree murder if ‘a person, knowing that his [or her] conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard of life.’ (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 296 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279].)” (Chagolla, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 511, 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 545.)
The majority opinion in Chagolla noted that “appellate courts … upheld numerous murder convictions in cases where defendants … committed homicides while driving under the influence of alcohol.
In Chagolla, a defendant under the influence of prescription painkillers led police on a high-speed chase for 40 miles in the early morning, then crashed into a guardrail on Interstate-10, and came to rest blocking the first and second lane of the freeway. Ignoring police commands, the defendant did not exit the caruntil police shot out one of the car’s windows 45 minutes after the crash. The police shut part of the freeway, which caused rush hour traffic to stop. Thirty minutes after, and about a mile back from the crash, there was a separate multicar collision caused by the traffic and a distracted semi-truck driver that led to a fatality. The trial court found insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a murder charge and the People filed a writ of mandate seeking this court’s review of the ruling.
The court of appeal issued an order to show cause, and ultimately denied relief. The majority noted, the case before it had “one crucial, unique fact not present in Watson and its progeny”—at the time of the fatal accident, Chagolla “was not driving her vehicle and had not been driving for 30 minutes.”
The majority explained that although the defendant “created a potential deadly situation that could have supported, under Watson, probable cause of implied malice if a deadly accident occurred while [she] was driving, the environment shortly after her vehicle crashed and came to rest on the freeway was somewhat different.” The majority stated that while “the driving conditions after Chagolla crashed … present[ed] some danger, … the undisputed evidence showed that the other drivers on … I-10, at least within a half mile of Chagolla’s vehicle had safely come to a stop. The degree of danger seemed to be, at least for the time being and to some degree, abated” at the time of the fatal crash.
The majority framed the dispositive issue in determining the existence of implied malice as whether the defendant “intentionally remained in her car and knew … her action would endanger the life of others.” The majority concluded the evidence fell short of such a showing, and instead suggested the defendant had “little awareness of what she was doing.”
Nevarez drove while under the influence, with a high blood alcohol concentration level, and was speeding on a seven-lane freeway at night. Under existing law, this conduct created a high degree of probability of death under the circumstances. Nevarez caused a high-speed four-car collision, which disabled his car and led directly to Sutton’s death.
There was also direct evidence showing Nevarez knew that intoxicated driving endangers human life, but that he chose to drive drunk anyway. The evidence provides probable cause that Nevarez was aware that by drinking and driving he could kill and face a murder charge.
Nevarez’s blood alcohol level was over double the .08 percent legal limit and was still 0.155 percent nearly three and a half hours after the fatal collision. Second, the evidence supports a finding Nevarez had a pre-drinking intent to drive. Third, Nevarez had knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated. Two years before the fatal collision he was convicted of a DUI and given a Watson admonition. Finally, Nevarez engaged in highly dangerous driving, driving more than 100 miles per hour on a seven-lane freeway at night and rear-ending the Honda Odyssey to start the chain of events that led to Sutton’s death. These facts provided support for the magistrate’s finding of probable cause for Nevarez’s implied malice.
The facts here support a finding that Nevarez’s drunk driving was the proximate cause of Sutton’s death. To satisfy the actus reus element of murder, the defendant’s criminal conduct must be the proximate cause of another’s death. “[P]roximate cause consists of two components. One is cause in fact (also called actual or direct causation). ‘ “ ‘An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event’ ” ’ [citation], and it is commonly referred to as the ‘but-for’ cause of death. (See CALJIC No. 3.40; CALCRIM No. 240 [‘Causation’]; CALCRIM No. 520 [‘First or Second Degree Murder with Malice Aforethought (Pen. Code, § 187’)].) The second component ‘ “focuses on public policy considerations.
Chagolla presented a far more attenuated chain of events leading to the fatality there than the facts at issue here. The majority found that implied malice was lacking because the relevant act was not the defendant’s driving while intoxicated, but instead her act of staying in the car after it crashed in the middle of the I-10 freeway. The relevant question was whether the defendant “intentionally remained in her car and knew that her action would endanger the life of others.” The majority concluded this act did not support a finding of implied malice because “the evidence did not even suggest that Chagolla intentionally remained in her vehicle after it came to a stop or that she appreciated the danger of remaining in the vehicle.”
Here, the facts presented support a finding of probable cause both with respect to Nevarez’s mens reus, or mental state, of implied malice and his actus reus, or actions, proximately causing Sutton’s death. The magistrate properly held Nevarez to answer for the crime of second-degree murder as a result of his drunk driving. The fact that Nevarez was no longer driving at the time his car was struck by Sutton’s motorcycle did not negate the existence of implied malice.
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