People v. Wagstaff (Cal. Ct. App., June 12, 2025, No. H050597) 2025 WL 1662576, at *1
Summary: A jury found Wagstaff guilty of felony false imprisonment surrounding a domestic violence incident. He was sentenced to a term of 16 months in prison.
Wagstaff, a Black man, contends the trial court violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Racial Justice Act, or RJA) during different stages of the proceedings. Trial counsel did not object to any of these statements under the RJA, therefore Wagstaff’s claims were forfeited on appeal. Regarding a statement the trial court made at Wagstaff’s sentencing hearing, he contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object. The Court of Appeal concluded this claim had no merit because Wagstaff has not shown his trial counsel’s conduct constituted deficient performance.
Wagstaff also argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on misdemeanor false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of felony false imprisonment. This claim is without merit because substantial evidence did not support an instruction on misdemeanor false imprisonment.
The judgment was affirmed.
Claims Under the Racial Justice Act
Wagstaff contends the trial court violated the RJA during jury selection and at the sentencing hearing, rendering his conviction and sentence invalid. The Attorney General acknowledged that the trial court made a statement that violated the RJA at sentencing, such that the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing before a different judge. The Attorney General disputes all other claimed violations of the RJA and he contends Wagstaff’s conviction is valid.
Legal Principles
“The Legislature passed the RJA in 2020 with a stated aim ‘to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ The RJA prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin. [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 945-946.)
The RJA added section 745 to the Penal Code effective January 1, 2021. Section 745, subdivision (a) (section 745(a)) sets forth four categories of conduct which, if proven by a preponderance of the evidence, establish a violation. (§ 745, subds. (a)(1)-(a)(4).) A violation of subdivision (a)(1) has occurred if “[t]he judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 745, subdivision (a)(2) provides that a violation has occurred if “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the proceedings, the judge, an attorney in the case, a law enforcement officer involved in the case, an expert witness, or juror, used racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.” (§ 745, subd. (a)(2).) Subdivision (h)(4) further defines “[r]acially discriminatory language” to mean “language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)
For claims based on the trial record, a defendant may raise a claim alleging a violation of section 745(a) on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence. (§ 745, subd. (b).) If a court finds, after judgment has been entered, “that a conviction was sought or obtained in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the conviction and sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and order new proceedings consistent with subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(A).) However, “if the court finds that only the sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a), the court shall vacate the sentence, find that it is legally invalid, and impose a new sentence. On resentencing, the court shall not impose a new sentence greater than that previously imposed.” (§ 745, subd. (e)(2)(B).
The Trial Court’s Statements at the Sentencing Hearing
Wagstaff claims the trial court violated the RJA by using racially discriminatory language about his race and exhibiting bias against him in violation of section 745(a). Wagstaff cited to the trial court’s use of the phrase “strong young buck” when the court personally addressed Wagstaff about the nature of his conduct. Additionally, Wagstaff argues the court’s use of the term “boy” and admonitions to Wagstaff to “become a man” and make “manly decisions” constituted demeaning and racially discriminatory language. Wagstaff contends that if trial counsel’s failure to object constitutes forfeiture of the claim on appeal, then trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Wagstaff asserts that his conviction and sentence must be vacated because it is legally invalid, and new proceedings ordered consistent with section 745(a).
Forfeiture
The Attorney General contends Wagstaff has forfeited all other claims raised under the RJA by failing to object to them below.
The lack of any record concerning the racial implications of the language used by the trial court impairs the Court’s to evaluate the claim under the standards set forth in the RJA. Section 745(a) would require us to determine whether the court used racially discriminatory language “about the defendant’s race” or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant “because of the defendant’s race.” (See, e.g., People v. Stubblefield (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 896, 922-923. (Stubblefield) In contrast to the prosecutor’s statements in Stubblefield, the language here did not expressly reference the defendant’s race. The definition of “racially discriminatory language” includes “language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the defendant to an animal ….” But determining whether language “implicitly appeals to racial bias” and whether the speaker used the language “about the defendant’s race” may require facts about historical usages or common cultural understandings of the language. (See, e.g., People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 654.)
Had Wagstaff made a motion under section 745 in the trial court, he could have made a record on these matters under former subdivision (c): “If a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold a hearing. (1) At the hearing, evidence may be presented by either party, including, but not limited to, statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses.” Wagstaff forfeited the claim by failing to raise it in the trial court.
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