THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; JOB URIAH TAYLOR, Real Party in Interest. (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 5, 2026, No. B346062) 2026 WL 622265
Summary: Penal Code section 1001.36 authorizes a court to grant pretrial diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder who agrees to comply with mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)) and will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Taylor with several counts of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon, alleging Taylor viciously attacked four individuals with a metal pipe. The defense moved for mental health diversion to a community facility, supported by a psychological evaluation that Taylor suffered a treatable schizoaffective disorder but would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment.”
The trial court granted diversion.
The People petition for a writ vacating the court’s order on the ground that no evidence suggested, and the court did not find, that Taylor would comply with a treatment regimen in a community facility, and no evidence supported the court’s finding that he would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion. The Court of Appeal agreed and granted the petition.
Motion for Diversion
In June 2024, Taylor filed a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. The motion described Taylor’s abusive and troubling family history and his struggle with mental health issues beginning at the age of 12.
Taylor offered a psychological evaluation prepared by Robin Rhodes Campbell, PhD., who evaluated him in April 2024 in response to a referral from the alternate public defender’s office. The referral asked Dr. Campbell’s opinion on three questions: (1) “Does the defendant suffer from a mental health condition other than antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, or pedophilia”; (2) “Would the defendant’s condition respond to mental health treatment”; and (3) “Would the defendant pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community?”
Dr. Campbell stated that Taylor suffered from a qualifying, treatable mental health condition which played a significant role in the commission of the offenses.
Campbell stated: “In my opinion, the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment. Given that his untreated psychiatric disorder was a significant and proximal cause of his behavior at the time of the alleged offense, if his symptoms are under good control with medication and psychosocial support, he would not present an unreasonable risk. If the defendant abstains from substance use, his risk would be further reduced. The defendant would not be at risk of committing any [offenses specified in section 1001.36] if treated in the community and would not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
The People opposed Taylor’s motion for diversion.
The court granted Taylor’s motion for diversion. The court ordered residential, medically assisted treatment, ordered Taylor to comply with the program’s rules, set monthly appearances for progress reports. The court ordered Taylor not to forgo his medication or leave the program without permission and admonished him that any violation of requirements would result in notification to the court. The court made no express finding regarding any of the section 1001.36 criteria for diversion.
Petition of mandate
The district attorney argued that no evidence supports the trial court’s implicit finding that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, and the grant of diversion constituted an abuse of discretion.
Mental Health Diversion
The district attorney contends no evidence supported the court’s implicit finding that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion, and that the grant of diversion constituted an abuse of discretion.
Mental Health Diversion Statutes
Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder. The statute defines “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as “the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).)
The stated purpose of the statute “is to promote all of the following: (a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings. (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)–(c).)
A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if (1) the defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder and (2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) A defendant charged with certain crimes, such as murder and rape, is ineligible for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (d).)
If a defendant satisfies these eligibility requirements, the court may deem him or her suitable for pretrial diversion if the following criteria are met: (1) The defendant’s symptoms will respond to mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1); (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her right to a speedy trial (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)); (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)); and (4) The defendant “will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
In deciding whether a defendant meets the criteria for diversion, “the ‘strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community’ should inform a trial court’s discretion.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 138.)
The maximum period of diversion is two years. (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(C)(i).) “If the defendant is subsequently charged with an additional crime, or otherwise performs unsatisfactorily in the assigned program, then the court may reinstate criminal proceedings.” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627; see also § 1101.36, subd. (g).)
Standard of Review
A ruling on a motion for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the factual underpinnings of that decision are reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147(Whitmill).)
Here, there is no evidence of prior compliance with treatment, and on the contrary a history of noncompliance, the trial court must take the possibility of future noncompliance into account.
The court made no express finding on this issue, but its grant of diversion necessarily included an implicit finding that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk if granted diversion. Here, no expert nor any other evidence suggested that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion.
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted.
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