People v. Luu (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 24, 2025, No. G063066) 2025 WL 1189508, at *1–2
Summary:
In 2001, Phuoc Thien Luu was 17 years old when he participated in an attempted home invasion robbery with three other men. One of the men shot the homeowner who survived Police later killed the shooter when they tried to arrest him.
Luu and another accomplice, Dung Van Nguyen, were charged with attempted murder (under the now invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine), related crimes, and enhancements. The remaining accomplice pleaded guilty to attempted murder with a reduced sentence and testified for the People.
A jury found Nguyen guilty of attempted murder, the related crimes, and enhancements. The trial court sentenced Nguyen to 102 years to life, plus 10 years. A separate jury found Luu not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, as well as the related crimes and enhancements. The court sentenced Luu to 25 years to life, plus a year and six months.
In 2022, Nguyen and Luu each filed Penal Code section 1172.6 petitions (formerly 1170.95).1 “Section 1172.6 offers resentencing for petitioners who have not been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have the degree of culpability now required for a murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 720.)
The People conceded Nguyen was entitled to relief, and he was released from prison. The People conceded that they likely could not prove Luu guilty under current laws; however, because the crime of attempted manslaughter is not specifically mentioned in section 1172.6, the People argued Luu was statutorily ineligible for relief.
The trial court initially issued an order to show cause (OSC), but later held that Luu was statutorily ineligible for relief.
Had the victim died, Luu would be eligible for relief under section 1172.6. Had the jury found Luu guilty of attempted murder (rather than the lesser included crime of attempted manslaughter), Luu would also be statutorily eligible for relief under the statute. The Court found this result to be unintended, unjust, and absurd. Courts generally follow the plain language of a statute unless that interpretation would be inconsistent with legislative intent or “ ‘would lead to absurd results.’ ” (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 472, 513 [“ ‘we may reject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results’ ”].)
The Court held that a petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 when that person was charged with attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter.
*A contrary rule would frustrate the intent of the Legislature, and—as demonstrated by the facts in this case—would manifestly lead to unjust and “ ‘absurd results.’
The Court reversed the order of the trial court, which denied Luu’s section 1772.6 petition. On remand, the court was directed to reissue an OSC, and set an evidentiary hearing. If the People cannot prove that Luu is guilty of attempted manslaughter under current laws, then the court shall resentence Luu with credit for time served (about 24 years).
Luu trial and jury instructions
The court instructed the jury that attempted voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The court further instructed the jury that to find Luu guilty of either attempted murder or attempted voluntary manslaughter, the jury must find that the crime “was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crimes of attempted robbery in concert or the lesser included offense of attempted robbery or burglary or … attempted burglary.”
The jury found Luu not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. The jury found Luu guilty of the remaining counts and found true the sentencing enhancements. The trial court sentenced Luu to a term of 25 years to life, plus one year and six months.
In April 2022, Luu filed a section 1172.6 petition seeking to vacate his attempted manslaughter conviction and to be resentenced. The People filed a response arguing the trial court should “deny petition because the petitioner’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter is not enumerated in Section [1172.6].”
August 2023, the trial court ruled: “The Court is aware that by denying the petition, Mr. Luu’s sentence is disproportionate to sentences imposed on his codefendants, and is, therefore, inconsistent with the Court’s understanding of the legislative intent of the statute. However, the plain wording of Penal Code 1172.6 is clear. The Court presumes that the Legislature’s omission of attempted manslaughter was deliberate, and despite the apparent inequities of this outcome, the Court finds that Mr. Luu is not eligible for relief, and his petition is denied.”
Statutory construction
Luu claims the Legislature intended that defendants convicted of attempted manslaughter under the natural and probable consequences doctrine are eligible for relief under section 1172.6, and a contrary interpretation has led to an unjust and absurd result.
Issues of statutory interpretation are pure questions of law that we review de novo. (People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023.)
The fundamental goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.
“The rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes does not apply in California.” (People v. Squier (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 235, 241)
Had Luu been convicted of a completed manslaughter (or a completed murder) under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the court would have found him eligible for relief. Luu is statutorily eligible for relief. Although the crime of attempted manslaughter is not explicitly stated in the statute, the completed crime of manslaughter is explicitly stated in the statute. e apparent intent of the Legislature was to offer relief for those convicted of certain designated crimes under now obsolete theories of liability—be they completed crimes or attempted crimes—and the trial court’s ruling has manifestly led “ ‘to absurd results.’ ” (See People v. McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 45.)
The Legislature’s explicit purpose in enacting section 1172.6 was “to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (b).) Consistent with the reasoning of other courts in similar circumstances, we find: “There is no apparent reason consistent with this purpose to treat persons who attempted [an eligible] offense differently from those who completed it.” (Barrajas, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 930, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 123.)
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