THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, Respondent; EDGARDO ORTIZ GUEVARA, Real Party in Interest. (Cal., Oct. 9, 2025, No. S283305) 2025 WL 2860065, at *1–2
Summary: In 2009, Guevara was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 28 years to life following his third strike conviction, undrr the “Three Strikes” law. (See Pen. Code, former §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).) In 2012, voters enacted the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. (Prop. 36) (Reform Act or Act).) The Reform Act limited indeterminate life sentences for non-serious, nonviolent third strike offenses. Under the Reform Act, a defendant convicted of a non-serious, nonviolent third strike instead receives a sentence of double the term of the current felony. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) The Reform Act authorizes defendants “presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment” pursuant to the Three Strikes law for a third non-serious, nonviolent strike to file a petition for a recall of sentence and request resentencing per the Reform Act. The Reform Act provides that courts may deny petitions of defendants determined to pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The trial court denied Guevara’s 2013 petition for resentencing under section 1170.126 after determining that his release would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483, which retroactively invalidated certain sentencing enhancements and requires courts to recall and resentence defendants with invalid enhancements. Under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Legislature directed resentencing courts to apply “the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and … any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”
Guevara sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 due to his now-invalid prior prison term enhancements. The trial court recalled Guevara’s sentence and resentenced him on his third strike offense according to current law to a determinate term of eight years. The Santa Barbara District Attorney sought a writ of mandate and prohibition based on its view that section 1172.75 unconstitutionally amended section 1170.126 of the Reform Act. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s construction of section 1172.75 unconstitutionally amended voter-enacted section 1170.126.
The California Supreme Court granted review to consider whether Penal Code section 1172.75, by permitting recall and resentencing of indeterminate third strike sentences, amends Penal Code section 1170.126, in violation of article II, section 10 of the California Constitution. The Court held that section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override as a condition for non-serious, nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act. Section 1172.75 and section 1170.126 work harmoniously so the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act may constitutionally apply at a resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75.
Statutory Interpretation Principles.
Whether section 1172.75 unconstitutionally amends section 1170.126 is a question of statutory interpretation and is reviewed de novo. “When we interpret an initiative, we apply the same principles governing statutory construction. We first consider the initiative’s language, giving the words their ordinary meaning and construing this language in the context of the statute and initiative as a whole.” (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) “ ‘ “[T]he statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” ’ ” (People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 622.) “[O]ur ‘[t]ask is simply to interpret and apply the initiative’s language so as to effectuate the electorate’s intent.’ ” (Robert L. v. Superior Ct. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901 (Robert L.).)
Voters Did Not Intend for the Reform Act To Be the Sole Vehicle for Non-serious, Nonviolent Third Strike Defendants To Seek Recall and Resentencing
Section 1170.126, subdivision (k) establishes that alternative “rights or remedies” are consistent with the Reform Act. The subdivision establishes that “[n]othing in this section is intended to diminish or abrogate any rights or remedies otherwise available to the defendant.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (k).) Subdivision (k) guarantees that defendants for whom section 1170.126 is an available remedy are nonetheless entitled to access “rights or remedies” available through other mechanisms. The text of section 1170.126 expressly indicates the voters did not intend for the petition process to be the sole avenue for defendants sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment under the original Three Strikes law to seek resentencing relief.
Finding that the Reform Act was the exclusive means to obtain sentencing relief would require ignoring section 1170.126, subdivision (k) and finding the voters, by enacting Proposition 36, impliedly repealed the application of these statutory provisions to third strike offenders. But “all ‘ “ ‘ “presumptions are against a repeal by implication” ’ ” ’ [citation], including partial repeals that occur when one statute implicitly limits another statute’s scope of operation.” (Even Zohar Constr. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal. 4th 830, 838.) An initiative should be construed as repealing a prior statute “ ‘ “ ‘ “only when there is no rational basis for harmonizing the two potentially conflicting statutes, and the statutes are ‘irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two cannot have concurrent operation.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (State Department of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 955–956.) The Reform Act was expressly intended as an act of ameliorative legislation. (Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 658 [“There can be no doubt that the Reform Act was motivated in large measure by a determination that sentences under the prior version of the Three Strikes law were excessive”].) An assumption that an initiative intended to curb unduly harsh sentences impliedly repealed all other coexisting applications of ameliorative relief statutes merely because relief might be available to the same defendants is unreasonable.
Section 1172.75, when applied to Third Strike defendants seeking relief from their indeterminate terms under the Reform Act’s ameliorative provisions, incorporates the substantive requirements of section 1170.126.
As a Matter of Constitutional Avoidance, Section 1172.75 Incorporates Section 1170.126’s Discretionary Public Safety Determination
Consistent with its mandate to construe statutes, where reasonably possible, to eliminate constitutional doubt, the Court interpreted section 1172.75 as incorporating section 1170.126’s discretionary public safety override.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to remand the case to the superior court. If the superior court determines that resentencing Real Party in Interest pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” the court shall reimpose an indeterminate term.17 (§ 1170.126, subds. (f)–(g).) If the superior court does not determine that resentencing Real Party in Interest would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” and Real Party in Interest is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall resentence Real Party in Interest pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act
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